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Prologue 
 
 
 
I started my PhD from a very simple viewpoint: There is this incredible idea of 
microfinance, seen to be the tool to combat poverty, and I wanted to know what it 
actually does to the living conditions of the poor. No more, no less. 
Now, three years later, I have put this dissertation together and it has ended up to be 
quite different from what I expected it to be (as much as one can have expectations 
about a PhD when starting) – and maybe surprising to myself, I am rather more happy 
than disappointed about this.  
The main reason for this is that my PhD gave me the opportunity to learn a lot about 
an issue that I had basically only read about. Reading books and articles and reports 
and studies about microfinance, things became extremely clear and I had the feeling to 
have a very good idea what microfinance is all about.  
And then I went to the field and realized that I actually know basically nothing.  
I want to start with a little story, which I wrote during my second longer-term field 
visit in India. I hope this story gives an idea about why I am not disappointed about my 
dissertation not being the way I anticipated it to be. Because in the end, it is stories like 
these that shaped my research, which I, today, find at least as important as the 
“rigorous academic research”. 
Microfinance can be broadly defined as the provision of loans to the poor for the 
purpose of supporting an income generating activity. In most cases, it can be seen that 
loans are not actually used for the purpose they were initially (or officially) intended 
for. Case studies show that about 60% of loans are used for domestic purposes, such as 
payment of wedding expenses, religious festivals, consumption, or even the repayment 
of other debts. Quite logically (and especially the latter issue will be taken up in one of 
the chapters), this is seen as a big problem, since it usually entails a deterioration 
rather than improvement of the poor clients’ living conditions. During one of my last 
field visits, I saw something similar – while one of the clients used the loan for its 
intended purpose, the reason behind it cannot really be related to the general idea of 
microfinance. Nevertheless, this story shows that in some cases, it might be more 
important to satisfy a higher goal than to stick too close to the established rules.  
Let me tell you the story: The client I am talking about is a farmer in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh in the South East of India. This client took a “housing loan” – a loan 
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that is, as the name suggests, provided to improve the condition of the home or 
business. His intention was to build a toilet. Since he did not plan to rent it out, this is 
obviously not a loan in the traditional sense of microfinance – an ‘income-generating’ 
one, but given all the positive results that come from proper hygiene and sanitation and, 
considering that an incredible amount of households in India do not have one, one can 
easily argue that this is a perfectly viable reason for taking a loan.  
So, why am I telling this story? Things became puzzling when observing that the client 
in fact already had a toilet. Looking at his living situation more closely, the roof could 
actually use some repairing and the new toilet was built about 3 meters closer but was 
in a perfectly usable condition nonetheless. So, why then did this man decided to get 
into debt – for something he didn’t really need - while being poor? The answer is 
simple: building a new toilet would resolve all the problems which he had with the 
neighbours and the fights within the family that were going on over the last decade - 
both of which, to be mentioned, did not evolve around the toilet. Still unclear? The 
secret is the principle of 'Vashtu Shastra' which is comparable to the Chinese idea of 
'Feng Shui' – an ancient philosophy of how the design of one's environment, let's say a 
house, can influence the flow of energies, i.e., luck. About ten years ago, an expert in 
Vashtu had already told the farmer that the water tank of the toilet was built in the 
wrong corner of the garden. Being “young and stubborn” at that point in time, the 
farmer did not listen and did nothing to change the position of the water tank. The 
result was that over the years, more and more difficulties began to arise. Ten years 
later and much wiser, the farmer finally decided to do something about it and build a 
new toilet. And, surprise, surprise, for this he needed a loan. At the time of my field 
visit, the old toilet was still in use and the problems were not solved yet. Whether they 
will be solved in the future needs to be seen. But then – who are we to judge? Maybe, 
one should not always look for rational explanations – ‘rational’ as defined in the west 
that is. It is important for this man and his family, for them it is a legitimate reason; he 
is paying back his debt, building his toilet and feeling happier. And, is feeling happier 
and hence having improved living conditions not the ultimate goal? 
Definitely, the ultimate goal of a field visit is the realization that we need to overcome 
our preset ‘western assumptions’ in order to understand and study other cultures. The 
story might put a smile on your face – it did for me. 
 
 1
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
Its stupendous population consists of farm labourers. India is one vast farm – one 
almost interminable stretch of fields with mud and fences between. Think of the above 
facts: and consider what an incredible aggregate of poverty they place before you. 
Mark Twain, Following the Equator, 1897. 
 
This was India more than 100 years ago. Since then, a high rate of economic growth 
has contributed to a steady reduction in poverty.  In the 1980s, more than 40 per cent 
of Indians lived below the official poverty line, a number that fell to 36 per cent in 
1993/94 and further to 27.5 per cent in 2004/051. But even thought this is a great 
decrease, this percentage translates into an enormous amount of people: of India’s 
population of nearly one billion almost 300 million are primarily worried about how to 
afford their next meal, while their children die from easily preventable diseases. 
Seventy-five per cent of these people live in rural areas. Mark Twain’s observation 
from 1897 still holds true today in large parts of the country.  
 
To the poor, the state is both an enemy and a friend. It tantalises 
them with a ladder that promises to lift them out of poverty, but it 
habitually kicks them in the teeth when they turn to it for help. It 
inspires both fear and promise. To India’s poor the state is like an 
abusive father whom you can never abandon. It is through you that 
his sins are likely to live on. 
Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods, 2006. 
One means embraced by the Indian government to reduce poverty is microfinance. 
Microfinance started to develop about forty years ago, in the 1970s when experimental 
programmes in Bangladesh, India, Brazil, and several other countries extended tiny 
                                                 
1 The all-India poverty index is provided by the Indian government. It is a weighted average of the state-wise 
poverty indexes. These are based on state-wise poverty lines, calculated using data from the Consumer Price 
Index of Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) for rural poverty lines and Consumer Price Index for Industrial 
Workers (CPIIW) for urban poverty lines. For details see Planning Commission, Government of India 
(2007). 
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loans to the poor to invest in micro-businesses.2 The best known of these programmes 
is undoubtedly the Grameen (Village) Bank in Bangladesh, initiated by Professor 
Muhammed Yunus, who in 2006 received the Nobel Peace Price for their work. 
Yunus’ initiative is often credited for being one of the first microfinance operations, 
making small loans to poor local villagers who lacked access to traditional formal 
financial institutions. Since then, microfinance has come a long way. While initially 
concentrating purely on the provision of formal credit, the term nowadays 
encompasses a broad range of financial services such as savings, insurance and money 
transfers. The providers follow the social mission of poverty alleviation and a broader 
impact on livelihood opportunities to the poor through capital creation and hence risk 
mitigation and consumption smoothing. 
The concept proved to have enormous implications: Microfinance generated vast 
enthusiasm among aid donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s), practitioners, 
politicians and academics alike. It was, and continues to be seen, as an instrument for 
reducing poverty, even as an instrument believed to have the potential to realize the 
Millennium Development Goal of cutting absolute poverty in half by 2015. 
The reality though is not as bright as is often portrayed. To its clients, microfinance 
has turned out to be both “an enemy and a friend”. While it is certainly not an ‘enemy’ 
in the traditional sense, and most would agree that its legitimacy is beyond doubt, it 
does display certain adverse traits. These traits are not clearly apparent to many people. 
Others prefer to ignore or dismiss them. But there remain those that are left to deal 
with the antagonistic flaws. And without doubt, they would be better off if helped in 
doing so. 
 
This dissertation has two objectives: 
The first objective is to draw attention to those aspects of microfinance that under 
certain circumstances can be characterized as the lesser evil rather than the greater 
good. The second is to get a deeper understanding of a special intervention designed to 
bring out the greater good in microfinance. 
 
Specifically, the first part of the dissertation consists of two chapters.  
The first chapter analyses the spread of microfinance in India and its determinants. 
Despite the explosive growth of the sector, this is one of the first studies addressing 
this issue. Among others, the results of this study indicate that microfinance serves as a 
                                                 
2 When talking about “the poor” this dissertation follows the conventional approach and adopts the absolute 
poverty line set by the World Bank in their World Development Report from 1990.  According to this 
document, the poor in developing countries are those that live on US$ 1 (or to be precise “$1.08 purchasing 
power parity for the USA in 1993”) a day or less. 
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replacement for other social programmes. This is a greater evil in the sense that 
microfinance “is nowhere close to being as important as primary health care, primary 
education, decent nutrition and a decent infrastructure, decent government and 
security.” (Harper, 2007) 
The second chapter explains how Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) experience a 
mission drift away from social goals towards business values. It is argued that this drift 
results in microfinance institutions neglecting their social objectives, which translates 
into unethical practices that are detrimental to the clients. The chapter further points to 
the role that donor agencies play in this process. 
The second part of this dissertation consists of three chapters. It focuses on one 
specific microfinance programme that helps the rural poor to diversify their income 
sources by engaging in milk-production as an extra income generating activity. This 
type of intervention is strongly promoted by the Indian government in an effort to 
increase the livelihood of the deprived rural population. In view of this, the fourth 
chapter examines whether this overall strategy does indeed improve welfare and 
whether households really derive economic benefits from selling dairy products – as 
perceived by an outsider as well as by the beneficiaries themselves. 
The last two chapters analyse an intervention by an Indian microfinance institution 
within this dairy sub-sector. The providing organization, BASIX India, sees itself not 
as a microfinance institution but a livelihood promotion institution, offering services 
that go beyond financial support. The institution is one of the drivers of the integrated 
sector approach to microfinance in India. It is seen as one of the most innovative 
institutions – almost an experimental microfinance laboratory, following their strategy 
of the livelihood triad as explained in chapter five. 
Two types of evaluations of institutional intervention in the dairy sub-sector are being 
conducted in this dissertation. One uses readily available data from the Management 
Information System (MIS) of the organization, while the other applies household 
survey data. Comparing results of these two approaches gives new insight into the 
usefulness of administrative microfinance data (data that was not designed for 
evaluation purposes) to estimate the impact of components of the programme. 
These studies are among the first that evaluate not only the credit-impact of 
microfinance but also the impact of additional financial and non-financial services on 
several outcome indicators. A positive (and for certain indicators significant) overall 
programme effect is found, but interestingly, customers with additional non-financial 
services do not seem to benefit to a greater extent. This latter conclusion is drawn 
irrespective of which data set is used in the analysis but relates only to economic 
indicators. On the other hand, additional services do seem to reduce uncertainty in 
income streams. This latter observation is possible despite the fact that only cross-
sectional data is available for analysis - data on subjective expectations of the 
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customers allows distinguishing between heterogeneity and uncertainty. Work with 
this type of data is a relatively new but growing field. This dissertation adds to the 
literature by collecting new data in a developing country on a population that faces 
above average uncertainty as well as by eliciting expectations not only on income but 
also on investment-specific returns.  
I independently designed and conducted a household survey of just over 1,000 
households. The survey was a thorough process, starting with deciding on the precise 
purpose of the survey, designing the questionnaire, hiring and training interviewers, 
managing their work, supervising the data entry and finally cleaning and analysing the 
data. This allowed me to design the survey and overcome constraints that were 
experienced when evaluating the programme with data available through the MIS of 
the MFI. The non-availability of proper control groups as well as a very constrained 
set of outcome indicators were among these constraints. 
As mentioned above, the survey includes a unique set of information that allows 
working with the subjective expectations of clients. On average a third (~25 minutes) 
of each interview was used to elicit probabilities on the beliefs of the respondents – 
beliefs about their future household income as well as two outcome variables directly 
related to the intervention under consideration – income from the dairy activity as well 
as expected health expenditures and foregone earnings in the case of the animals 
falling ill. 
These subjective expectations data are used in the overall analysis of the extra-income 
generating activity and its contribution to the improvement of social welfare as well as 
in the evaluation studies. The use of this data in the evaluation study serves to estimate 
the subjectively expected return to investment, an estimation of the impacts that 
customers themselves expect in the future. This type of analysis is new in microfinance 
literature and for that matter, in evaluation literature as a whole. Work with subjective 
expectations was pioneered by Charles F. Manski a few decades ago. Nevertheless, 
given considerable initial scepticism as well as criticism of this approach validation of 
answers by respondents to expectation questions was and still remains the initial focus 
of research. This holds true especially for this type of data collected in developing 
countries, of which very limited numbers of surveys exist up to date. In this 
dissertation I go one step further, using the data in the analyses. 
First though, I will give an overview of the Indian microfinance sector and an insight 
into the field of operations provided. 
 5
 
PART I 
 
Greater Good or Lesser Evil? 
 
 
 
This first of two parts of the dissertation serves to provide a macro as well as a micro 
perspective of the microfinance sector in India. 
The macro perspective refers to an overview of where microfinance is operational in 
India and what factors contribute to the observed geographical spread. The micro 
perspective is an analysis of observations from several months of field work in India – 
including my experience made by working at and with a microfinance institution, 
numerous discussions with practitioners, academics and of course clients. 
The main lessons that are being highlighted in this first part are negative ones, pointing 
to the fact that microfinance is not always as satisfactory as it is often portrayed to be. 
Many problems exist that need to be addressed in order for microfinance to develop its 
full potential – that being the greater good rather than the greater (or even lesser) evil. 
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2. Why There? The Reach of Microfinance in India 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction3 
According to Ghate (2007a), India is home to the worldwide largest microfinance 
sector having grown rapidly in recent years both in terms of size and institutional 
diversity. Two delivery models dominate the sector: The Microfinance Institution 
(MFI) model and the Self-Help Group (SHG) Bank Linkage Programme (SBLP). Both 
these models have contributed to the observed growth of the sector, but the SBLP is 
the more dominant model by far , in terms of the number of borrowers and loans 
outstanding. 
While the second part of this dissertation turns to a microfinance intervention that falls 
under the MFI model, this chapter is concerned with analysing the enormous growth of 
this SBLP.  
The SBLP was a proposed solution by the National Bank of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (NABARD) for the failed attempts of the Indian government to reach 
financial deepening. Their suggestion made in the early 1990s was to link informal 
credit groups – the SHGs – to formal banks.4 A SHG is a homogeneous group of on 
average fifteen poor people that voluntarily form to save small amounts. These pooled 
resources are forwarded to members for meeting their credit needs in the form of loans, 
either for consumption or income generating activities. Once the groups show mature 
financial behaviour, banks become encouraged to provide loans to the SHGs. Typical 
for microfinance loans, these bank loans are given without any collateral and at 
interest rates not higher than market interest rates And peer pressures ensure timely 
repayments (Seibel and Dave 2002).  
This was the basic idea behind the Self-Help Group Linkage Programme, which turned 
out to be the main policy instrument of the Indian government to tackle the inefficacy 
of existing rural credit institutions, especially the “twin problems of non-viability and 
poor recovery performance” (Rangarajan 1996).  
                                                 
3 This chapter is based on work with Cyril Fouillet, University Lumière Lyon 2, France. 
4 The idea had actually been initiated in the late 1980s by the NGO MYRADA operating in Southern India 
(Karnataka). NABARD picked up the idea in 1991 and it was approved by the Reserve bank of India (RBI) 
in 1992. 
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The Indian SHG Bank Linkage Programme developed into one of the most important 
microfinance programmes across the world with 964,611 linked SHGs during financial 
year 2005-20065 alone. In the period from March 1993 to March 2006 the programme 
managed to incorporate more than fourteen million households into the financial sector, 
experiencing an average annual growth rate of 82 per cent, at the same time credit 
amounts grew at a rate of 110 per cent. 
Nevertheless, territorial inequalities are an ongoing reality in this process of 
microfinanciarization6. The dissemination of banking services is limited, with strong 
inequalities in the distribution of branches between urban areas and the rest of the 
country (Ramnachandran and Swaminathan 2005). In the words of Y.S.P. Thorat, 
Managing Director for the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD): “The uneven spread of the SHG-Bank Linkage Programme has been a 
matter for concern”. Understanding the spatial dynamics at work in India is a crucial 
component in the future development of SHGs. This especially holds in view of the 
fact that the SBLP seems to do slightly better than the MFI model when targeting 
those living below the poverty line (Ghate, 2007a). 
Very little information exists that gives insight into the patterns and determinants of 
spatial distribution and evolution of this economic phenomenon across India. There is 
hence a clear need for a greater understanding of questions such as: where does the 
SBLP primarily operate and where does it not? How can one explain the spatial 
variations of the process, if there are any? What are the factors that influence the 
geographical spread?  
This chapter analyses the above mentioned questions by briefly discussing the 
development in India as a whole before focusing on Tamil Nadu.7 This latter analysis 
is based on a panel data set covering all districts8 in Tamil Nadu over the period 
1999/2000-2005/2006.  
Results show that the spread of SHGs did not evolve evenly over time within the state 
of Tamil Nadu. A natural question to arise is therefore what the influencing factors of 
the distributional variations are? To answer this question, an econometric analysis of 
                                                 
5 This number includes the number of new SHGs provided with bank loan during the financial year 2005-06 
(620,109) plus the number of existing SHGs provided with repeat bank loan during the financial year 
(344,502).  Also, important to note is that NABARD data is not always specific as to whether a loan 
distributed to a group is indeed its first loan or actually its second, third…Reported numbers are therefore 
likely to overstate the numbers of SHGs. 
6 In the broadest sense, microfinanciarization is the process of structural change that involves financial 
inclusion, bancarization, or regulations of the informal financial practices, and utilization of voluntary sector 
and third sector capabilities in financial service provision to the people who do not have access to financial 
and banking institutions – i.e. 60 to 90% of the whole population. It is one of the most fascinating features of 
today’s financial economics. 
7 A map indicating the names of all Indian States is given in Appendix 2.A, Figure 2.A1. 
8 India is divided into sub-national administrative units. Districts form the second form of such subdivision 
below states.(versteh ich nicht...below??) 
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the determinants of this evolution is conducted. Three issues that are of great 
importance and debate when it comes to the spatial dimension of the microfinance 
sector are addressed: whether microfinance operates in areas that are less developed 
than others or not; whether there is an existing trade-off for governments between the 
support of creation of SHGs and other social protection programmes; and whether 
SHG programmes really go where people have no access to formal financial services. 
The analysis takes into account the potential impact of SHGs in one area considering 
the likelihood of SHGs in a nearby or far away location, i.e. itconsiders the question of 
whether the spatial patterning of SHGs is consistent with some kind of diffusion 
process. 
The chapter is structured as follows: The next section gives an overview of the Self-
Help Group Bank Linkage Programme and its spatial distribution and variation in 
India as a whole, followed by a detailed discussion of the state of Tamil Nadu. The 
second part of the chapter looks at the determinants behind the observed distribution 
by doing an econometric analysis. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
2.2. Spatial Distribution & Variation of Microfinance Development 
2.2.1. The Self-Help Groups Bank Linkage Programme in India 
India is experiencing a huge expansion in the number of households linked to 
microfinance, and more specifically to SHGs. According to Sa-Dhan, an association 
lobbying for the microfinance sector, this approach accounts for two thirds of the total 
number of microfinance clients.9 While it is banks, microfinance organisations and 
cooperatives that are involved, the most important driver of the program’s 
development is indisputably NABARD with the SHG Bank Linkage Program.10 
The growth of the program according to the cumulative data of NABARD (various 
years) is displayed in Figure 2.1. Reddy (2005) divides the development into three 
phases: “The evolution of the SHG Bank-Linkage Programme could be viewed in 
terms of three distinct phases, viz., (i) pilot testing during 1992 to 1995, (ii) 
mainstreaming during 1996 to 1998 and (iii) expansion from 1998 onwards.”  
The first peak in Figure 2.1 marks the end of the piloting phase: NABARD initiated 
the SBLP process by forming 225 SHGs in 1992 and between March 1994 and March 
1995 the real start up of the pilot phase took place during which the cumulative 
number of SHG passed from 620 to 2,122. In the two years thereafter “mainstreaming” 
took place, including among other several projects initiated by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in collaboration with several Non-Government 
                                                 
9 Note that the growth of MFI clients is increasing which implies a relatively rapid change in this percentage. 
10 It is worth pointing out though that while NABARD initiates, trains and subsidises (and sometimes 
refinances) SHG loans, it is the banks, microfinance institutions and cooperatives that take all the risk.   
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Organizations (NGOs) in India (like Myrada  in Tamil Nadu). The third phase started 
in March 1998 and implied a drastic change of scale. NABARD launched a major 
initiative for accelerating credit linkage to SHGs during that year. Various national 
schemes11 supported the formation and strengthening of SHGs across the country and 
within two years, more than one hundred thousand SHGs were linked.  
Figure 2.1 SHG – Bank Linkage 1992 - 2006 
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While numbers for India as a whole tell a continuously promising story, great regional 
variations are to be found within this, as will be exemplified in what follows by 
looking at the proportion of households engaged in a SHG as well as the 
corresponding standard deviation within Indian states. Following common practice 
(NABARD various years, Daley-Harris 2005) the number of households linked to one 
SHG is assumed to be fifteen.12 This average group-size is multiplied with the total 
number of SHGs linked by formal agencies (commercial banks, Regional Rural Banks 
and cooperatives) during each financial year. This number is divided by the number of 
households, whereas the corresponding standard deviation is used to compare the 
evolution within the Indian states across time. 
The importance of not looking at absolute numbers to detect patterns of microfinance 
coverage is exemplified by the state of Uttar Pradesh in the North of India, bordering 
                                                 
11 These include Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (RMK, an autonomous organisation promoted by Department of 
Women and Child Development (DWCD), Swarnjayanti Gram Swa-rozgar Yojana (SGSY) and Watershed 
Development Projects of Ministry of Rural Development, etc. 
12 Note that observations from the field show that this assumption is not adequate for all areas in India. As 
Malcolm Harper pointed out in a personal conversation, in West Bengal, for instance, SHG are often made 
up of less than ten members. The reason for this lies in cooperative banks in this area being strongly 
influenced by the Grameen Bank from across the border. Since we were not able to collect such information 
on all areas, we decided to stick to the commonly made assumption of SHGs sizes of on average fifteen 
members. We believe though that the variation in our case study, Tamil Nadu, is less than in India as a 
whole. 
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with Nepal. In terms of absolute numbers of SHGs, this Indian state is ranked fifth 
among all of twenty-eight states in March 2001 13 . Nevertheless, taking its big 
population base into account leaves the State to be one of the weakest ones in India 
with respect to its relative strength in SHGs. 
In 2000, it was the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP) in the South that at nine per cent had 
the highest percentage of households participating in SHGs. This needs to be 
compared to Northern states such as Sikkim, Assam and Punjab, where not even every 
ten thousandth household was home to a member of a SHG. This spatial pattern is 
mapped in Figure 2.2, where the states are grouped using the standard deviation of the 
relative share of SHGs. The dark spot on the map is for example Andhra Pradesh, the 
state with the highest number of SHGs per households; more than three standard 
deviations above the mean14.  
Figure 2.2 State variations in relative share of SHGs (measured by standard deviation) 
 
 
During that same year, it was mainly southern states (except for Kerala in the south-
west) as well as Himachal Pradesh in the north that formed the second leading group 
after Andhra Pradesh. The states had approximately 15 out of 1,000 households 
participating in SHGs, which translates into one standard deviation above the mean. 
The weakest states – those with below average percentage of households linked to the 
formal financial sector through SHGs - were all to be found in the North of India.  
                                                 
13 District wise date on the SHG-bank linkage programme is only available after 2000-2001. Unfortunately, 
this data are not available at the district level before this date.  
14 As pointed out by Harper and Nath (no year), the contrast becomes even starker when looking at the 
number of households below the poverty line linked to SHGs. 
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While these disparities continued to exist in the years thereafter, one observes a slight 
convergence in the relative strength of the SHGs among states, as evidenced in the 
decline of the average coefficient of variation from 1.99 in 2001 to 1.15 in 2006.15 
Five years later, in March 2006 (Fig. 2.2b) a “catching-up” can be observed.  
Andhra Pradesh had further consolidated its role as the leading state in the SHG 
movement, with now about 28 per cent of households participating in SHGs. Also 
other states had increased their rate of linking households. Only the northern states 
could not keep up with the trend: In Uttaranchal and Jharkhand there were less than 
thirty-two households participating in SHGs for every 1,000. In Jammu and Kashmir, 
Haryana, Punjab and Arunachal Pradesh there were less than ten households 
participating in SHGs for every 1,000 of the total households.  
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with getting a better understanding of 
dynamics that are at work behind this uneven spread of the SHG movement. To do so, 
the analysis will concentrate on one Indian state. The rationale of this decision for one 
lies in data limitations regarding comparable statistics on a national level. The decision 
is mainly supported by the fact that the SBLP is developed and managed by District 
Rural Development Agencies and hence within states and not on a national level. 
In fact, on a national level/nationwide, most of this unequal spatial pattern can be 
readily explained. The SHG Bank Linkage Programme has, since its beginning, been 
predominant in certain states, showing spatial preferences especially in the south - 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Karnataka but also for the northern State of 
Himachal Pradesh. These preferences are predominantly driven by engaged 
individuals such as Chandrababu Naidu, at the time the Chief Minister of Andhra 
Pradesh, pushed mightily for the extension of the SHG-Bank Linkage Program in his 
State. Also, the presence of Vijay Mahajan, founder of BASIX India, one of the most-
known microfinance institutions in India as well as SHARE showed great support for 
the initiative. This again attracted donors into these regions.16 From these states, a spill 
over to many states in the eastern region of India, especially along the coast of the Bay 
of Bengal, was observed and made these states part of the leading provinces with high 
ratios of microfinance. It was most states in the north, in the centre and in the eastern 
region (except for West Bengal and Assam) that exhibited less support and hence a 
much less developed microfinance sector.  
The analysis to follow concentrates on the south-eastern state of Tamil Nadu. Tamil 
Nadu was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, together with Andhra Pradesh, it was one 
                                                 
15 The coefficient of variation is a measure of dispersion of a probability distribution. It is defined as the 
ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
16 In Andhra Pradesh, for example, the government initiated a microfinance programme called ‘Velugu’ with 
the assistance of the World Bank and made up by two projects: the District Poverty Initiatives Project and 
the Rural Poverty Reduction Program. Another society called Society for the Elimination of Rural Poverty 
channel funds and provides effective implementation.  
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of the first states to experiment with the idea of SHG’s and thus has one of the longest 
histories and best developed microfinance sectors. It also has extensive field 
experience on which to draw and enjoys a strong political role in the development of 
the movement. Tamil Nadu is thus both an interesting case study and one with many 
years of data to base the analysis on. Most other states only recently started to become 
engaged with the linkage of Self-Help Groups. Furthermore, personal knowledge 
gained through extensive field-work in this state facilitated the gathering of 
information and data, as well as the interpretation of results.  
 
2.2.2. The case of Tamil Nadu 
In Tamil Nadu, the SHG-bank linkage programme emerged from the Tamil Nadu 
Women’s Development Programme (TNWDP) (called also Mahalir Thittam ‘women 
scheme’). TNWDP was an initiative of the International Fund for Agriculture and 
Development (IFAD) together with the government of Tamil Nadu and several NGOs. 
The initiative was taken to compensate for the disappointing effect of the Integrated 
Rural Development Programme (IRDP) resulting from mistargeting, as well as low 
repayment rates (on average 24 to 40 per cent)17. The main innovation in the TNWDP 
as compared to previous programmes was the use of women’s groups to channel 
individual and group loans and to offer trainings within different fields, including 
economics, social studies and marketing. (Holvoet, 2005; Tesorio, 2005) 
Overall, the SHG-bank linkage programme in Tamil Nadu, represented by the 
Mahillar Programme (Seibel, various years), is experiencing an expansion comparable 
in its size to the national level. An average annual growth rate of linked SHGs of 174.5 
per cent was observed for the State of Tamil Nadu in the period from March 1999 to 
March 2006, with a 210.7 per cent growth rate in terms of disbursed bank loans. At the 
national level, the corresponding figures are 175.2 per cent and 279.6 per cent 
respectively. Figure 2.3 displays the number of SHGs linked in TN for the period 1998 
to 2006. 
 
                                                 
17 IRDP is a major self employment programme for poverty alleviation. Its objective was to provide suitable 
income generating assets through a mix of subsidy and credit to below poverty line families with the 
objective of bringing them above the poverty line (Gaiha et al., 2001; Ghosh, 1998; IFAD, 1989; Mahajan 
and Ramola, 1996; World Bank, 1991). Nevertheless, recognizing the effectiveness of microfinance through 
group lending methodology, the government of India has given up on IRDP along with several other 
programmes (such as JRY, Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP), National Rural 
Employment Programme (NREP), Drought Prone Areas Programme (DPAP), Training of Rural Youth for 
Self-employment (TRYSEM) that had all been implanted in the 1980’s.  
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Figure 2.3 Evolution of the SHG bank linkage system in the State of Tamil Nadu 
according to the number of SHG (1999-2006) 
 
Sources: NABARD (various years) 
It is interesting to note that even if Tamil Nadu’s contribution to the development of 
the all-India Indian microfinance sector is relatively stable at about 14 per cent during 
the period, the average loan size given to a SHG for Tamil Nadu was 30,662 rupees 
during the financial year 1998-99 and increased to 78,661 in 2005-06, which is to be 
compared to the national average of almost half that size with 17,883 and 46,641 
rupees respectively.18 The evolution amount of Rupees disbursed can be seen in Figure 
2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4 Evolution of the SHG bank linkage system in the State of Tamil Nadu 
according to the amount of disbursed Rupees (1999-2006) 
 
Sources: NABARD (various years) 
The rapidly expanding development of the SHG model reflects the major role the 
microfinance sector plays in the life of Tamil Nadu’s population. After a first cycle of 
                                                 
18 The exchange rate Euro to Rupees in the financial year 2006/06 was approximately 1:55. 
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growth, during which the number of clients went from a few thousand to several 
million, microfinance is now at the core of many agendas -  irrespective of being 
public or private. 
Indian microfinance, both in terms of the number of clients and the volume of 
disbursed credit, is no longer anecdotal. Because of the socio-economic, political, even 
cultural questions it raises, microfinance has become a challenge for society.  
This makes it important to judge the growth of the sector not only in terms of 
generating income and employment for the poor19 but to also pay attention to its 
regional distribution. 
Appendix 2.B gives details on the absolute as well as the relative strength of the SHGs 
in the state’s districts and the district variation over several years, repeating the 
analysis that was previously presented on an all-India level. Results show that while 
Tamil Nadu is ranked among those states with a high level of microfinance 
development, the intra-state analysis shows significant district inequalities. These 
intra-state inequalities are very significant and partially call into question the successes 
that seem so apparent when considering the numbers for the state as a whole.  
Given this uneven spread it is of interest to understand the factors, which influence the 
distributional variations. These will be analysed in the next section by empirically 
testing several variables that are theorized to influence the spatial distribution. 
 
2.3. Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of the Evolution 
In the analysis of the spread of the SBLP the cumulative number of linked SHGs per 
household contributes the dependent variable. ‘Linked’ means that a group received at 
least one loan from a formal bank. An alternative would have been to look at the 
number of groups formed – which implies the inclusion of groups that might never 
have been linked to a bank. These groups would probably have started to save and 
maybe also to forward these savings as loans, but due to targets in terms of promoting 
a certain number of SHGs, group formation unfortunately does not always receive the 
needed attention. This implies that the focus is not always on the formation of 
functioning groups and that the subsequent nurturing and development is neglected 
(Pramod, 2006). Especially in view of the long-term benefits of the SHG programme 
this is a matter of concern. A study supported by NABARD showed that 70-80% of 
poor households use up the first two credits for consumption purposes, but that an 
increasing proportion of them use further credit for non-conventional micro-
enterprises within two years. The need to take a long-term perspective becomes 
                                                 
19 For a comprehensive review see for example Ghate (2007). 
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apparent and it is important to understand where successful groups (in terms of having 
been linked to formal financial services) are in operation20. 
One way of getting an insight into which factors influence the spread of the number of 
linked SHGs per households is to apply simple ordinary least square (OLS) regressions, 
maybe including area dummies to capture spatial influences. Nevertheless, since 
dealing with a geographical component, problems are likely to arise with this 
conventional econometric technique. The matter of concern is that spatial dependence 
is expected to exist between regions. Put differently, it is likely that the increase in the 
number of SHGs in one district is not independent of what is happening in a 
neighbouring district. If this is the case, OLS results are no longer valid and inference 
on t-statistics misleading. Techniques that account for the fact that geographic context 
might condition or moderate the effect of certain explanatory variables on the number 
of SHGs in a certain location are called for.  
Therefore, before going into the analysis of structural determinants, the potential 
impact of SHGs in one district on the likelihood of SHGs in a nearby or far away 
location is addressed, i.e., is the spatial patterning of SHGs consistent with some kind 
of diffusion process? This latter issue is one of the main distinguishing methodological 
features of spatial data analysis.  
2.3.1. Methodology  
Spatial data analysis takes into account the spatial arrangement of the observational 
units, which are typically called locations (Anselin, 1992a) - corresponding to the 
state’s districts in this analysis. This spatial arrangement is represented by a spatial 
weights matrix W whose elements wij express the presence/absence (binary weight 
matrix) or the degree (non-binary weight matrix) of potential spatial interaction 
between each possible pair of locations.  
This interaction is consistent with spatial dependence, also referred to as spatial 
autocorrelation, and can be defined as the phenomenon that occurs when the spatial 
distribution of the variable of interest – in this case the number of SHGs per household 
- exhibits a systematic pattern (Cliff and Ord 1981). 
Three different weight matrices are used in this analysis to test, and if necessary 
account, for spatial dependence in the data: The simplest one (and also the one most-
often used in studies) is the binary neighbour matrix, indicating border sharing 
between districts (this is henceforth referred to as ‘neighbour matrix’). The second 
matrix is a slight refinement on the first, indicating the length of common border as a 
                                                 
20 NABARD started to report also the number of SHGs that opened a savings account with a bank. As will 
be discussed in the subsequent chapter, the microfinance sector has the tendency to promote indebtedness. In 
the SHG model, this shows by some groups being put under pressure to borrow, rather than merely to save – 
in most cases in order to meet targets. This can be pernicious and needs to be kept in mind when defining 
‘linked groups’ as more successful than ‘formed groups’. 
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ratio to total border of both districts together (‘border matrix’). Finally, the third 
matrix uses the driving distance (in km) between capitals of the districts, implying that 
the matrix has only zeros on the diagonal (‘distance matrix’)21. 
Three measures of global spatial autocorrelation are looked at and presented in Table 
2.2: Moran’s I (Moran 1948), Geary’s c (Geary 1954), and Getis and Ord’s G (Getis 
and Ord, 1992) to test for dependences in the spread of the SHG Bank Linkage 
Programme in Tamil Nadu.  
 
Table 2.2. Diagnostic Test for spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable 
Moran's I I E(I) sd(I) z-stat p 
(1) neighbour matrix 0.160 -0.037 0.115 1.723 0.042 
(2) border matrix 0.257 -0.037 0.138 2.128 0.017 
(3) distance matrix -0.083 -0.037 0.020 -2.322 0.010 
Geary's c c E(c) sd(c) z p 
(1) neighbour matrix 0.735 1.000 0.167 -1.589 0.056 
Getis & Ord's G G E(G) sd(G) z p 
(1) neighbour matrix 0.169 0.156 0.017 0.736 0.231 
Please note that Geary’s c, and Getis and Ord’s G can only be calculated when 
the weight matrix is binary. Therefore, these statistics are only provided for the 
first of our three matrices. 
 
The statistics strongly confirm suspicion that the distribution of the number of SHGs 
in the State of Tamil Nadu is not totally random. Except for Getis & Ord's G, all 
statistics indicate significant global spatial autocorrelation in the variable of interest on 
a six per cent significance level. Furthermore, all statistics agree that this spatial 
autocorrelation is a positive one. In other words, the value taken on by Y (number of 
SHGs per households) at each location (district) i tends to be similar to the values 
taken on by Y at spatially contiguous locations. Note that for the distance matrix 
numbers show negative autocorrelation (I is smaller than its expected value), which is 
due to the fact that a bigger number in the matrix stands for districts being further 
away from each other while a bigger number in the other two matrices implies the 
opposite. Therefore, the change in sign - the interpretation remains the same.  
The analysis continues using the distance matrix as the weight matrix.22 This choice is 
founded on statistical results (Table 2.2 shows that results suggest strongest global 
autocorrelation when using this matrix) but also on theoretical considerations: the 
SHG Bank Linkage programme is developed and managed by District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA) of which the offices are located in the respective 
                                                 
21 These driving distances are calculated using the interactive mapping portal www.mapmyindia.com. 
22 Where appropriate and interesting, results obtained when using one of the other matrices is pointed out. 
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district capitals. Significant influences between neighbouring districts can be related 
back to DRDA’s collaboration. To understand this, one should keep in mind that social 
relationships and personal exchange still play a crucial role in day-to-day as well as 
business life in India (as elsewhere) that cannot be fully replaced by the internet or 
other media.  
The measures of spatial autocorrelation as discussed above are global measures 
meaning they offer an “average” picture of the spatial distribution of the variable of 
interest. It is possible to test whether clustering is especially present in certain districts 
and less in others. These measures of local spatial autocorrelation reveal areas 
exhibiting significant deviation from spatial randomness and help to identify those 
locations that contribute most to the overall pattern of spatial clustering (Sokal et al. 
1998). 
Figure 2.5: Local autocorrelation within districts of Tamil Nadu 
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When employing so called ‘local statistics’ to detect significant spatial clustering 
around individual locations six ‘hotspots’ are identified. These districts are the ones 
shaded darker in Figure 2.5 and correspond to Tirunelveli, Ramananthapuram, 
Sivagangai, Thoothukudi, Tiruvallur, and Dharmapuri.23 From the previous section it 
is known that these are districts that were either continuously strong in terms of 
microfinanciarization over the years or showed a fast growth in the number of 
households linked to banks (see discussion of Figure 2.6). It is worth pointing out that 
only two out of these seven districts are among those where the programme was 
initially started. 
                                                 
23 A map indicating the names of all districts is given in Appendix 2.A Figure 2.A2. 
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The above analysis gives strong indication of a significant pattern of spatial clustering. 
The spatial autocorrelation statistics show that the values taken on by the variable of 
interest at the different locations are more spatially clustered than they would be under 
a random assignment. This is the first step in the analysis of spatial data. The second 
step is to find out why such clustering occurs (Anselin 1992) so that the appropriate 
econometric model can be applied in the analysis.  
In the literature, typically two types of spatial dependences are considered: The first 
one takes the form of a spatial autoregressive process in the error term and is referred 
to as the spatial error model. The second takes the form of a mixed regressive spatial 
autoregressive process, called the spatial lag model. 
Spatial error model: εβ += XY  where .µελε += W Where Y is the number of 
linked SHGs per households in a certain district, X are covariates, ε is an error 
term, λ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, W the weight matrix and µ  
denotes a vector of homoskedastic and uncorrelated errors (Anselin and Hudak 
1992). 
Spatial lag model: µβρ ++= XWYY , where ρ denotes the spatial autoregressive 
parameter, WY denotes the spatially lagged dependent variable, and all the other 
terms are defined as above (Anselin and Hudak 1992).24 
Statistical tests for both kinds of spatial dependence are performed. To do so, a simple 
OLS model will be estimated first. The Moran's I statistic can then be used to gauge 
the level of spatial dependence in the residuals of this OLS regression and thus provide 
some additional justification for using more rigorous spatial econometric methods (see, 
e.g. Tiefelsdorf 2000 for details). The Lagrange Multiplier tests can then be used to 
test which spatial error model is most appropriate25. 
Results of this testing procedure (Tables are provided in Appendix 2.E) lead to the 
decision of estimating a spatial lag model. In addition to the estimated test statistics, 
the motivation for a spatial lag model is supported by formal theoretical concerns since 
this model is generally seen to be appropriate when the focus of interest is the 
assessment of the existence and strength of spatial interactions. 
A spatial lag model is hence used to analyse determining factors of the observed 
spread, using a distance matrix as weight matrix.  
 
                                                 
24 In this model the covariates in the other countries only indirectly impact the current yi, through their 
impact on the yj for other countries, which then in turn impacts the current yi. It is also possible to allow the 
covariates in other countries to directly impact the current yi, by adding a wix term to the model, where x 
refers to the values of the covariates for all countries. This is easy to do using standard methods, and causes 
no econometric problems. See Pace and Barry (1998) to obtain more details of this type of model. 
25 Details of these tests can be found in Anselin and Hudak (1992) and Anselin et al. (1996). 
 19
2.3.2. Explanatory Variables 
In determining the explanatory variables of the analysed microfinance spread, three 
areas that are of great importance and debate when it comes to the spatial dimension of 
the microfinance sector are used as a theoretical guideline. A short outline of these 
issues is given below. More details on specific variables and how estimated 
coefficients have to be interpreted will be given when discussing the results of the 
analysis. 
Level of Development  
The first concern is the relationship between microfinance and the level of 
development in the different regions of Tamil Nadu. Since microfinance, here 
represented by SHGs, is a tool to eradicate poverty one would hope that it interacts in 
areas where it is most needed, hence where dimensions such as income or human 
development are lowest. Initially, the implementation of the programme followed a 
spatial approach. Selected indicators of women’s status (including educational 
attainment, literacy, maternal mortality, dependency upon agriculture for employment, 
percentage of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe 26  in female population) were 
analysed and taken as a basis by IFAD in consultation with the Tamil Nadu 
government and civil society to decide on where to implement the pilot phases. 
Decision was taken to operate in those districts of Tamil Nadu with the lowest scores, 
i.e. the districts of Dharmapuri and South Arcot (now divided into Cuddalore and 
Villupuram) (Holvoet, 2005). It is of interest whether the priority towards these lesser 
developed districts prevailed in the years after the set-up of the programme or whether 
primacies shifted.  
Level of Banking  
Microfinance is targeted at that part of the population that does not have access to 
formal financial services. This aim of financial inclusion is given major importance. 
Clear signals that stress the priority of microfinance as a tool to eradicate poverty were 
given by the international community over recent years: The G8 meeting in 2004, the 
declaration of the year 2005 as the year of microfinance by the United Nations, the 
accolade of Mohammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank with the Nobel Peace Price in 
2006, to name but a few. Besides poverty reduction, these meetings set the additional 
target of focusing on financial inclusion – coinciding with one of the main objectives 
of the SHG model (Parekh, 2006). Attention is therefore paid in our analysis to 
whether or not the SHG movement operates predominantly in areas where such formal 
financial services are available or not. 
                                                 
26 Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are Indian communities that are granted special status by the 
constitution of India in order to extend positive discrimination against these groups. There is no unified 
theory on how the caste system developed in India but it is generally associated with Hinduism. 
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Level of Social Protection 
The third issue is whether districts that are more actively involved in the provision of 
social protection than others also foster more than average the development of SHGs. 
Social protection consists of policies and programmes designed to reduce poverty and 
vulnerability. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) identifies five areas of social 
protection. The data available allows testing variables on four of these areas. The 
dependent variable of the analysis falls into the fifth and final of this classification. 
The areas and available variables are displayed in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Areas of Social Protection and corresponding variables 
SOCIAL PROTECTION AREA VARIABLE USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
1. Labour market: 
Policies and programmes designed to 
promote employment, the efficient 
operation of labour markets and the 
protection of workers  
Prime Minister Rozgar Yojana's programme aiming to 
provide self-Employment to Educated Unemployed Youth 
was announced by the Prime Minister on 15th August, 
1993.  The goal was to provide self-employed opportunities 
to one million educated unemployed youth in the country. 
The Scheme was formally launched on 2nd October, 1993. 
The amount of Rupees disbursed per household is used as 
an indicating variable. 
2. Social insurance: 
Programmes to cushion the risks 
associated with unemployment, ill 
health, disability, work-related injury 
and old age  
The number of elderly benefiting from old-age benefit 
scheme as a percentage to total population is used as the 
indicating variable (please note that no information was 
available on the size of the elderly population itself 
3. Social assistance: 
Social assistance and welfare service 
programmes for the most vulnerable 
groups with no other means of adequate 
support, including single mothers, the 
homeless, or physically or mentally 
challenged people. 
The emphasis in the successive Five Year Plans developed 
by the Planning Commission of India has been to bring 
about economic and social development of disadvantaged 
groups in the society, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes 
receiving special attention. Effort has been made to 
increase equality through socio-economic development 
schemes. The number of free housed distributed to 
members of the scheduled castes is one example that 
reflects such a social scheme. 
4. Child protection: 
to ensure the healthy and productive 
development of children. 
With the aim to reduce the economic cost of sending a child 
to school and by this increase enrolment, the State 
Government of Tamil Nadu has introduced various 
schemes, including the Noon Meal Scheme as well as the 
provision of free textbooks and uniforms. Data on the latter 
two were available on a district level. Such textbooks and 
uniforms are provided to all children studying up to Class 
VIII in the government and government-aided schools 
(uniforms cover even all kids up to class X). 
Furthermore, information provided by family welfare 
centres in rural as well as urban areas is used. 
5. Micro-and area-based schemes: 
to address vulnerability at the 
community level, including 
microinsurance, social funds and 
programmes to manage natural disasters. 
 This is the area to be tested. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative number of SHGs per number of households in a 
district (to be elaborated on below). 
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2.3.3. Results and their Interpretation 
The final model includes variables that can be placed under one or more of these 
described areas of debate. Table 2.4 presents the final results.27 
 
Table 2.4. Estimation Results of the Final Model Specification 
  Coeff. Std. Err. z-stat P>|z| 
Income index -9.827 3.593 -2.73 0.006 
Literacy -0.072 0.032 -2.23 0.026 
Human Development Index 21.001 8.363 2.51 0.012 
No of rural bank branches (per hh) 9.732 2.321 4.19 0.000 
% of amount disbursed to agricultural sector -1.677 1.474 -1.14 0.255 
% of amount borrowed to other small industries -7.541 2.626 -2.87 0.004 
Youth Unemployment programme (per hh) -6.459 1.918 -3.37 0.001 
Area 0.0002 0.00003 5.74 0.000 
Constant 1.927 3.772 0.51 0.609 
rho -2.672 0.357 -7.49 0.000 
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 56.124 (0.000) 
Likelihood test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 14.598 (0.000) 
Lagrange multiplier test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 6.033 (0.014) 
Variance Ratio =  0.666    
Squared Corr. =  0.800    
Sigma =  0.49       
Notes: Spatial lag model where the weight matrix reflects the distances between district 
capitals. 
 
Given the nature of the programme under consideration, most estimated coefficients 
are best discussed in the context of Sharma and Zeller (1999). The authors propose a 
placement rule for a Bangladeshi NGO, incorporating the fact that profit is not the 
principal aim of this institution. The four proposed areas that are considered in the 
placement decision are: (1) targeting poverty, (2) expected demand for services, (3) 
cost of supplying services, and (4) perceived riskiness in operation. A more detailed 
discussion of each of these is provided in Box 2.1. In brief, when deciding where to 
supply services, microfinance organisations face the problem that most determining 
factors contributing to the social mission of microfinance work contrary to the 
objective of minimizing costs and risk. 
This discrepancy is reflected in the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The 
example below clarifies how one variable can influence several of the four areas in a 
way that makes the prediction of the expected sign ambiguous. 
                                                 
27 Please note that the model only includes a limited number of variables. The choice to go for such a 
parsimonious model was made given the limited degrees of freedom with just 28 observations (districts in 
the state of Tamil Nadu). 
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For example the availability of banking services (represented by the variable ‘no of 
rural bank branches per 1,000 households) influences the ‘cost of supply’ and 
‘perceived riskiness’ positively in the sense that the availability of banking services in 
an area is hypothesised to induce an institution to operate within the same area. This is 
due to microfinance providers (and especially the SHG Bank Linkage Program) 
typically depending on these formal financial institutions to make cash disbursement 
and deposits. Furthermore, it is likely that banks themselves are found in areas with 
favourable supply conditions such as good infrastructure – which again reduces costs 
in operation. 
Box 2.1: Sharma and Zeller’s (1999) Placement Rule 
Microfinance is praised today as the tool to eradicate poverty and most institutions and 
organisations specifically mention poverty-targeting in their mission statement. Their 
principal aim is the social mission; to “reduce poverty” (Vital Finance, Benin), to 
“promote a large number of sustainable livelihoods” (BASIX India), to “give people the 
tools to work their way out of poverty” (ACCION International), “to promote the 
economic development of Dominican women and integrate them and their families into 
the formal economic system” (ADOPEM, Dominican Republic) to name just a few. One 
would therefore assume that delivering institutions, including the government, operate in 
areas where it is most needed, hence where poverty indicators are highest. 
Nevertheless the cost of supply has – not surprisingly - been shown to be especially high 
when serving the neediest. There is a great debate in the microfinance sector as to how 
these costs should be covered. The debate evolves about the sustainability of 
microfinance and the depth of its outreach (Robinson, 2001; Cull and all, 2007). It 
emerged from the demonstration that due to innovations in the microfinance sector, a 
substantial portion of this new market could in fact be lent to profitability. This 
realization has then drawn profit-motivated lending institutions into these markets and 
donors have and are questioning the need for continued subsidies, resulting in the recent 
focus on ”institutional sustainability” in the MFI sector (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005). 
Microfinance became business. Critics of this development fear that MFIs tend to be so 
much preoccupied by their own financial sustainability that they move away from the 
poor as their preferred clientele and tend to start providing bigger loans closer to ”low 
income section” of the population instead of deepening their outreach to include the most 
needy. 
Of further importance to be able to cover costs – but also to have greatest impact, is a 
certain mass of customers. Where demand is highest, the marginal impact on 
participating households is also likely to be the highest, while at the same time reducing 
the marginal cost of supplying services. This explains the weight of expected demand in 
the placement decision. 
Finally, institutions place considerable weight on perceived riskiness of operations when 
deciding where to operate. It is of course important for an organization to keep high 
repayment rates to cover costs and to keep access to mainstream on a continuous basis, 
which is best achieved when risk is minimized. 
 
Nevertheless, microfinance is seen as a tool to “bank the unbanked” – people that have 
no access (including physical access) to formal financial services. Therefore, in view 
of the social mission of an MFI (and hence of ‘poverty targeting’), one would hope 
that MFIs operate predominantly in areas where formal financial services are not as 
readily available, where the human development indicators are low, etc. Therefore, in 
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terms of ‘cost of supply’, the estimated coefficient of availability of banking services 
is theorized to be positive, and negative when considering the goal of targeting 
excluded groups such as the ‘unbanked’28.  
As in this example, also in the remaining cases this ambiguity turns out to be 
favourable when deriving conclusions with respect to the three issues of concern 
previously discussed. This will become clear in the following discussion of estimated 
coefficients of the model. 
Income Index & Literacy: 
Fewer SHGs per household are found in areas that are more developed, as defined by 
the indicators on income and literacy.  
There are more SHGs in areas where income is lower: The estimated coefficient of the 
‘Income Index’29 is significantly negative, meaning that the higher the income in the 
region, the less number of SHGs per households were linked, and, respectively, the 
higher the literacy rate in a region, the fewer number of SHGs were provided with a 
formal bank loan. 
These findings can be related to the overall mission of the programme to serve the 
poor but can additionally be attributed to the fact that during the pilot phase, the 
targeting concentrated on the poorest women in rural areas. Geographically, the 
project was implemented initially in four contiguous districts (Dharmapuri, Salem, 
Cuddalore and Villupuram) and extended to two other districts during implementation 
(Madurai and Ramanathapuram). According to a report of IFAD:  
“The project focused on districts that were backward in terms of human 
development, such as Dharmapuri and Ramanathapuram, and other areas with 
high levels of female infanticide such as Madurai and Salem.” (IFAD, 1998) 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed next, this focus does not seem to have taken place as 
significantly as one would have hoped for. 
 
 
                                                 
28 This is not to say that a positive coefficient implies that no poverty targeting takes place. Many poor might 
live within a reasonable distance from a bank branch but are excluded from accessing their services due to a 
number of other possible reasons; such as being too poor to afford needed official papers or not even being 
allowed to enter a branch. 
29 “Values of per capita GDP (PPP$) for women and men are calculated from the female share (sf) and male 
share (sm) of earned income. These shares, in turn, are estimated from the ratio of the female wage (w f) to 
the male wage (wm) and the percentage shares of women (ea f) and men (ea m) in the economically active 
population. When the data on the wage ratio are not available, a value of 75 per cent is used.” (Tamil Nadu 
Human Development Report (2003), p.4) 
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Human Development Index: 
The model includes the Human Development Index, which was calculated by The 
Government of Tamil Nadu in 2003. It is a composite index, covering the following 
three dimensions of living standards: 
 
The model results suggest that a higher level of human development is associated with 
more linked SHGs. Specifically, the positive sign of the HDI seems to be driven by 
attainments in longevity, the enrolment ratio, or both. This is because variables falling 
under the remaining two dimensions of the HDI (literacy rate and the income index) 
are estimated to have a negative coefficient.  
“Longevity as an indicator of human development captures several aspects of welfare, 
because of its close correlation with nutrition, health and other biological and social 
achievements.” (Tamil Nadu Human Development Report (2003), p.4). 
Given these results, it seems that Thorat (2003) was right in his observation that “[…] 
in states which have a larger share of the poor, the coverage is comparatively low.” 
Also Vijay Mahajan, founder of BASIX, an influential livelihood promotion institution 
in India highlights the problem: “there is a real risk that in celebrating the SHG Bank 
linkage microcredit programme, attention is diverted from the larger problem of 
financial exclusion of the poor and banks are let off the hook from their real job.” 
Mahajan (2005) 
The next discussion underlines this latter statement. 
Number of rural bank branches per 1000 households, Amount disbursed for 
agricultural credit (as percentage to total amount disbursed) & Amount borrowed to 
‘other small industry’ sector30 
As laid out in the example above, the sign of the coefficient of number of bank 
branches is influenced by several considerations – some favouring the operation where 
                                                 
30 Small Enterprises is defined by the RBI as small (manufacturing) enterprises engaged in manufacture/ 
production, processing or preservation of goods, and small (service) enterprises engaged in providing or 
rendering of services, and whose investment in plant and machinery and equipment (original cost excluding 
land and building and such items as mentioned therein) does not exceed a certain amount. It furthermore 
includes any person providing inputs to or marketing the output of artisans, village and cottage industries, 
handlooms and to cooperatives of producers in this sector.  
Other Small Business / Service Enterprises then include small business, retail trade, professional & self-
employed persons, small road & water transport operators and all other service enterprises. 
Dimension Dimensions Variables 
1. Attainment in longevity Life expectancy at birth 
2. Educational attainment a) Adult literacy rate 
b) Combined enrolment ratio (primary, secondary and tertiary) 
3. Command over resources Real per capita income 
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a banking network is in place (cost and risk considerations), others factors supporting 
rather the decision to locate in areas less served by financial institutions (social 
mission). 
The model as presented in Table 2.4 estimates a positive coefficient in the number of 
rural bank branches per households, which supports a statement made by the chairman 
of NABARD: 
“Banks through their rural branches have played and continue to play an important 
role in providing financial services to the poor on a standalone basis.” (Thorat, 2006) 
The bank branches playing a strong role at the same time though imply that the SHG 
movement does not go into areas where formal financial institutions are not available. 
On the contrary, the SHG movement makes use of and reinforces the old rural bank 
network, which was established in the phase of ‘social banking’ in India. Indeed, 
linking SHGs with banks was made a national priority from 1999 onwards by the 
government of India through its periodic policy and Budget announcements. 
NABARD takes over the role of nurturing the expansion of the outreach of the 
programme by providing umbrella support to the stakeholders. It might then be 
claimed that, while the objective of NABARD with the SHG movement is the right 
one, the general goal of microfinance is not met in areas where people lack access to 
formal financial services. 
One explanation for this particular spread, which is so strongly linked to the rural 
banking network is the integration of borrowing to SHGs and microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) into the priority sector. In 2000, the Reserve Bank of India allowed banks to 
lend to MFIs and treated such lending as part of their priority sector obligations. 
From the results it seems, that banks that concentrate on other areas than microfinance 
in the priority sector also lend less to SHGs: Estimated coefficients on the number of 
agricultural credit accounts (as a percentage to total accounts) is significantly negative 
and so is the amount borrowed by the ‘other small industry’ sector31. The negative 
impact of agricultural accounts can further be explained by the fact that banks are 
obliged to have a certain ratio of agricultural to total accounts to ensure operation in 
this sector – keeping in mind that it is the main source of employment in India and 60 
per cent of the labour force work in the agricultural sector. Forty per cent of a banks 
                                                 
31 Small Enterprises is defined by the RBI as small (manufacturing) enterprises engaged in manufacture/ 
production, processing or preservation of goods, and small (service) enterprises engaged in providing or 
rendering of services, and whose investment in plant and machinery and equipment (original cost excluding 
land and building and such items as mentioned therein) does not exceed a certain amount. It furthermore 
includes any person providing inputs to or marketing the output of artisans, village and cottage industries, 
handlooms and to cooperatives of producers in this sector.  
Other Small Business / Service Enterprises include then small business, retail trade, professional & self-
employed persons, small road & water transport operators and all other service enterprises. 
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operation has to take place within the priority sector of which again 18 per cent has to 
go to the agricultural sector.  
In an interview for The Hindu daily newspaper, Mr S.K. Mitra, Executive Director of 
NABARD, said, “the SHG linkage programme is better suited to the Indian scenario 
and we have already laid sound foundations for disbursement of funds through the 
establishment of 196 regional rural banks and 336 district central co-operative banks”. 
(The Hindu, 2005, “NABARD prefers SHG linkage model for microfinance”, New 
Delhi, 25 October) 
Youth Unemployment programme (per household): 
The negative sign of the estimated coefficient suggests that more involvement by the 
district in social protection schemes is associated with a lesser number of SHGs – here 
to be seen through the variable ‘youth unemployment (per household)’. 32 Aiming to 
provide self-Employment to Educated Unemployed Youth Prime Minister Rozgar 
Yojana's programme was announced by the Prime Minister on 15th August, 1993.  
The goal was to provide self-employed opportunities to one million educated 
unemployed youths in the country. The Scheme was formally launched on 2nd 
October, 1993.  The variable has a negative coefficient, which means that an increase 
in Rupees spent (per household) on this program, results in fewer numbers of SHGs 
linked.  
One might have suspected that more “engaged” districts also support the formation of 
SHGs more, but there seems to be a sort of trade-off. The reason for this is 
summarized by Pramod (2006): “Keeping in view the efficacy of the SHG concept for 
organizing and assisting the rural poor, the structure of several government sponsored 
schemes, both centrally sponsored and state sponsored, has been modified to make the 
SHGs the sole or important vehicle for extending assistance to the poor.” 
The Tamil Nadu Human Development Report (2005: 38) states the same idea from the 
opposite perspective: “Unemployment rates are quite high in Tamil Nadu, especially in 
terms of daily unemployment. In the past, poverty alleviation schemes have focused 
more on asset creation – as a result not enough emphasis has been placed on 
employment generation.” This observation underlines the idea that a shift at the policy 
level to put more emphasis on programmes such as the youth unemployment one, can 
stir away from other poverty schemes – such as the creation of SHGs.  
Results suggest that there are districts that see SHGs as an apparently better option 
than other social programmes, though the two are not mutually exclusive.  
 
                                                 
32 This statement is here only supported by the estimate for one variable. Nevertheless, the inclusion of other 
variables (described in Appendix 2.C) lead to the same conclusion. 
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Interpretation of RHO (Influence of “Neighbours”) 
As already laid out above, strong evidence for spatial autocorrelation is found, which 
is now confirmed again by the significant spatial autocorrelation parameter, rho. 
Interestingly, it is the distance between district capitals that plays an influential role 
and not national borders, meaning that accounting for direct neighbourhood through a 
binary indicator or more refined by indicating the length (in km) of shared border is 
not significant. 
As one would have expected, the influence of geographical distance between capitals 
is estimated to be negative, indicating that proximity has a positive influence on the 
spread of the SHG movement. In other words, a change in the number of SHGs in one 
district has a greater influence on neighbouring or close districts than on ones further 
away.  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
A visible body of literature documenting the development of the microfinance sector 
development has grown in recent years. However, there remains a dearth of research 
addressing the spatial dynamics of the observed expansion (Dasgupta 2001). This 
chapter is a first step to fill this void by empirically exploring the spread of the major 
model of microfinance in India.  
The study gives a picture of the geographical inequalities that lie behind an 
enormously growing and successful delivery system of microfinance services. While 
more and more Indian households are being reached, certain areas only very recently 
come into contact with this model, while others are still totally neglected. 
Reasons behind this are of course many fold. Important ones were analyzed in the 
second part of this chapter. The estimation of significant determinants of the prevailing 
spread show several interesting results, some of which of great importance to policy 
making. 
For one, it becomes clear that the programme is predominantly active in areas where a 
banking network exists. This is not an unexpected finding given that the aim of the 
program is to link groups to banks. It implies though that while the programme 
addresses the population that is ‘unbanked’ mainly due to their economic status, it 
excludes those that are (additionally) ‘unbanked’ in a physical sense. To overcome this 
problem the Indian government needs to either push for an extension of the existing 
banking network or for a solution that is less dependent on the formal banking network. 
Perhaps it will be the microfinance institution model that plays a role in solving this 
problem and particularly technological innovations can be the great hope. Or maybe 
this is where NGOs come in. While most still need to enhance their skills and 
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understanding of finance, it is their focus on values such as inclusion, equity, justice 
and democracy that qualifies them to fulfil a function in the process.  
Of greater concern is the second major finding of this study. 
Vijay Mahajan, CEO and Managing Director of the BASIX group of companies, gave 
an account of this problem very much to the point in his speech for Dr. MS 
Swaminathan33 80th birthday: 
“A second risk that the poor may suffer as a result of an over-
emphasis on a microcredit strategy, is the reduction in government 
budgetary allocations for other efforts at poverty alleviation, such as 
the well-tried but less dramatic strategies of investment in human 
capital such as through primary health and primary education 
programs. While there is no denying that such social sector 
programmes can be run more cost-efficiently and that they can be 
better targeted to the poor, the replacement of such programmes 
with microcredit programmes will be double disaster for the poor. If 
the implicit subsidies to microcredit institutions are made explicit, 
then subsidizing microcredit programmes versus subsidizing social 
sector programmes can become an informed policy choice, rather 
than be carried out under the mistaken notion that the former will 
require only temporary and diminishing subsidies. But the implicit 
subsidies to microcredit, legitimate as they may be, are not being 
described or analysed.” 
Results from the model indicate that it is not particularly education programmes that 
one needs to be concerned about. In fact, the SBLP seems to be more dominant in 
areas where literacy rates are above average. 
But, evidence is brought forward that support his general claim, namely that the focus 
on SHGs seems to be a sort of a trade-off with other social schemes. While no clear 
statement can be made as to whether the programme operates in areas where schemes 
are not in place rather than replacing them, the bottom line remains the same: In these 
areas, only a certain part of the population is primarily targeted by social interventions. 
The targeted population is females that are willing and able to become a member of a 
group, to save regularly, and to eventually take a loan (for “productive” purpose!). 
This does not include those with too uncertain or variable income. Think of for 
example migrating households, most often for seasonal wage employment; for 
example in the district of Mahaboonbnagar (Andhra Pradesh), 78% of households have 
                                                 
33 Dr. MS Swaminathan is the chairman of M. S. Swami Nathan Research Foundation in Chennai. Given his 
extensive contributions, he is known as the “Father of the Green Revolution in India” or also described by 
the United Nations Environment Programme as "The Father of Economic Ecology".  
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(seasonal) migrants (Deshingkar, 2004). These are not able to fulfil the minimal 
requirements of being a member of a SHG such as attending the regular meetings or 
contributing the regular savings. Also experiencing high barriers to joining a SHG are 
those that are not able to make these contributions because their economic status is too 
low – the very poor. This can then lead to exclusion – ‘self-exclusion’ but also 
exclusion by group members or SBLP staff. 
But besides excluding some that would actually be part of the target group, of greater 
concern is that a big part of the population gets neglected that would not even be 
eligible to participate – these include for example the elderly, the youth or the 
handicapped: exactly those groups that are typically highly dependent on support from 
social protection schemes. 
The finding that the movement comes with a replacement (or at least modification) of 
government programmes should be of great concern and calls for immediate policy 
reaction.  
The conclusion of this chapter is very much directed at macro-level, policy 
recommendations. The next chapter concentrates on problems that are observed at the 
micro-level and analyses how policies are being implemented in the field. A greater 
focus is placed on the second major model of microfinance, microfinance institutions, 
but also policies of the SHG Bank Linkage Programme are being addressed. It will 
become clear, that also at the micro-level, major shortcomings need to be addressed if 
the ultimate goal of helping the poor is to be achieved. 
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Appendix 2.A  
 
Figure 2.A1: State’s names of India 
 
Table 2.A2: District’s names of Tamil Nadu 
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Appendix 2.B – Descriptive Statistics of the SBLP development in Tamil Nadu 
Pace of microfinanciarization – the period 2000/01-2005/06 
As is the case in India as a whole, where the high growth of the SHG Bank Linkage 
Programme is not undergone by all states, also not all districts experience the same 
pace in this growth as shown in Figure 2.B1. 
For example between 2000/01 and 2005/06, the district Thiruvallur in the far North of 
Tamil Nadu multiplied its number of SHGs by more than 50: from 139 groups in the 
financial year 2000 to 7,033 in 2005. It was the fastest growing microfinance district 
during this period from 2000 to 2006 in Tamil Nadu with an average annual growth 
rate of 119.2 per cent. This number highlights the efforts made by this district’s 
authorities to develop the microfinance sector with the support of the SHG 
methodology. At the opposite end is the Nilgris district in the far west which 
experienced a weak average annual growth rate of 2.9 per cent (from 90 to 104 groups 
but with a peak in 2003/04 at 643); or the case of Nagapattinam on the east coast with 
a growth of 4.1 per cent (from 1182 to 1447 and no peak). Relatively high growth rates 
were experienced in the darkly shaded districts in Figure 2.B1 (Erode, Pudukkottai, 
Theni, Thanjavur and Coimbatore) with their average annual growth rate ranging from 
46.6 to 72.1 per cent. The disparities in number of SHGs across districts in Tamil 
Nadu are apparent.  
Figure 2.B1. Districts variations in the pace of change of Tamil Nadu’s Self-Help 
Groups – 2000/01-2005/066 (measured by natural breaks) (average annual growth 
rate) (%) 
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Relative Strength of the SHG among Tamil Nadu’s district 
 
Figure 2.B2 shows the evolution of relative share of Tamil Nadu’s Self-Help Groups 
from 2000/01 to 2005/06 and highlights the vast variation between districts as to 
where SHG are linked (numbers given in brackets).  
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Areas that show a very fast pace of microfinance coverage are regions in the far north 
and south. In 2000/01 districts such as Thiruvallur and Tirunelveli were among those 
with the smallest proportion of households involved in a linked SHG (about 16 SHGs 
per 1,000 households). Within five years, these districts had increased the number of 
linked SHGs tenfold. 
Districts that did not follow this strong pace of growth are again predominantly 
districts in the west. It can be seen that in districts such as The Nilgris and Coimbatore 
the development over the years is very slow if at all existent. Theni and Coimbatore, 
for example, had only five and one households respectively participating in a SHG for 
every 10,000 households. These numbers hardly changed in the years thereafter. It is 
to be noted that these are all hill districts, which, due to a general lack of awareness of 
social schemes, might explain the comparatively low coverage in these districts. More 
details on determinants will be given in the following section. 
Figure 2.B2 District variations in relative share of Tamil Nadu’s Self-Help Groups 
(measured by standard deviation) 
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Districts that remained very active in linking households to SHGs over five years were 
among other Dharmapuri, Ramanathapuram and Sivaganga. In 2000 (Fig. 2.B2a), 
Sivaganga was ranked first, with more than two units of standard deviation above the 
mean. Dharmapuri and Ramanathapuram also had a relatively strong SHG sector, with 
more than one standard deviation above the mean. Five years later, in 2005 (Fig. 
2.B2c), Sivaganga had lost its leading position being replaced by Dharmapuri, where 
213 out of 1000 households participated in a SHG. Ramanathapuram and Sivaganga 
formed an intermediate group with ratios within one standard deviation above the 
mean with more than ninety-eight households participating in SHG for every 1,000 
households. 
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Appendix 2.C - Table 2.B1: Descriptive Statistics of Regional Characteristics 
   obs mean sd min max 
Area (km2) 28 5,028 3,254 1,685 17,831 
density 28 473 182 275 992 
Rainfall: Deviation from Normal (%) 28 -0.14 0.21 -0.60 0.20 
Area under cereal cultivation (% of total) 28 0.096 0.089 0.00 0.37 
Milkproduction (in 1,000 tons) 28 170 75 60 320 
Population (in 1,000) 28 2,063 1,120 493 5,437 
Population: Rural (%) 28 0.62 0.162 0.34 0.88 
Population: Scheduled Caste (%) 28 0.204 0.062 0.40 0.324 
G
en
er
al
 
Population: Scheduled Tribe (%) 28 0.01 0.012 0.005 0.037 
No. of textbooks per household (hh) 28 0.413 0.141 0.262 1.037 
No. of uniforms per household 28 0.355 0.136 0.185 0.934 
No. of unemployed youth per hh 28 0.132 0.064 0.013 0.359 
No. of rural welfare centres per 10,000 hh 28 0.296 0.111 0.184 0.790 
No. of urban welfare centres per 10,000 hh 28 1.427 0.672 0.422 3.636 
Population: Receiving free houses (%) 28 0.776 0.538 0.168 2.89 
Population: Receiving old age benefit (%) 28 0.767 0.467 0.116 2.592 
Pop. (female): Receiving old age benefit (%) 28 0.968 0.657 0.140 3.373 
Sc
he
m
es
 
Pop. (male): Receiving old age benefit (%) 28 0.567 0.330 0.093 1.793 
No of rural banks per 1,000 hh 28 0.135 0.065 0.051 0.419 
No of urban banks per 1,000 hh 
No of semi-urban banks per 1,000 hh 
28 
28 
0.055 
0.103 
0.060 
0.0516 
0.000 
0.028 
0.197 
0.215 
Operation of Commercial Banks (Rs in 
crores): Agricultural advance as % total 28 33.48 18.35 7.430 85.93 
Credit accounts of agric. activity (% total) 28 0.564 0.135 0.272 0.776 
Credit acc. artisans,village, tiny industry (%) 28 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.027 
B
an
ki
ng
 
Credit acc. other small industries (% total) 28 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.031 
Income Index 2001 28 0.490 0.046 0.417 0.631 
Income per hh 28 0.865 0.243 0.546 1.813 
Income per capita 28 0.249 0.362 0.058 2.048 
Adjusted Average Income (male) 28 0.552 0.045 0.477 0.691 
Adjusted Average Income (female) 28 0.390 0.047 0.318 0.533 
Human Development Index (HDI) 2001 28 0.648 0.034 0.584 0.712 
Gender Development Index (GDI) 2001 28 0.645 0.035 0.582 0.710 
Education Index 2001 28 0.763 0.054 0.628 0.885 
Population: Literacy (%) 28 0.728 0.059 0.634 0.876 
Gross Enrolment Rate (1999) 28 0.823 0.054 0.698 0.932 
Roads Unsurfaced (km/area) 28 0,603 0,461 0,066 1,777 
Roads Surfaced (km/area) 28 1.465 0.673 0.261 3.492 
Commercial Vehicle per 100 capita 28 0.871 1.420 0.136 7.854 
Sqkm of rural habitations fully covered w. 
water supply (min 40 l/consumption/day) 28 16.518 6.959 5.32 32.06 
Sqkm of rural habitations partially covered 
with water supply (10-39 lpcd) 28 11.541 8.154 0.59 30.54 
Same as above but: 0-9 lpcd 28 1,151 3,16 0,000 16,71 
Policestations per 1,000 hh (incl. outposts & 
all-female) 28 0,106 0,040 0,051 0,213 
Hospital Beds per hh 28 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,004 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Doctors per hh 28 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
 34
Appendix 2.D 
 
Table 2.c1Results from testing for local spatial autocorrelation 
Location Ii E(Ii) sd(Ii) z-stat p-value 
26*** (Tirunelveli) -0.467 -0.037 0.101 -4.243 0.000 
23*** (Ramananthapuram) -0.271 -0.037 0.097 -2.415 0.008 
25*** (Sivagangai) -0.291 -0.037 0.108 -2.363 0.009 
27** (Thoothukundi) -0.230 -0.037 0.103 -1.868 0.031 
2** (Tiruvallur) -0.198 -0.037 0.095 -1.689 0.046 
5*  -0.171 -0.037 0.102 -1.312 0.095 
10 -0.161 -0.037 0.107 -1.153 0.124 
3 -0.110 -0.037 0.105 -0.692 0.245 
11 -0.098 -0.037 0.092 -0.665 0.253 
6 -0.092 -0.037 0.108 -0.511 0.305 
28 -0.080 -0.037 0.092 -0.467 0.320 
14 -0.086 -0.037 0.107 -0.452 0.326 
8 -0.080 -0.037 0.113 -0.381 0.351 
7 -0.058 -0.037 0.108 -0.194 0.423 
4 -0.038 -0.037 0.109 -0.005 0.498 
1 -0.025 -0.037 0.100 0.119 0.453 
18 -0.013 -0.037 0.093 0.262 0.397 
15 -0.009 -0.037 0.103 0.269 0.394 
17 -0.008 -0.037 0.103 0.285 0.388 
19 -0.005 -0.037 0.099 0.322 0.374 
16 -0.002 -0.037 0.108 0.323 0.373 
20 0.004 -0.037 0.112 0.371 0.355 
22 0.010 -0.037 0.107 0.439 0.330 
24 0.016 -0.037 0.106 0.501 0.308 
13 0.033 -0.037 0.105 0.664 0.253 
12 0.021 -0.037 0.087 0.673 0.251 
21 0.064 -0.037 0.100 1.018 0.154 
9*** (Dharmapuri) 0.303 -0.037 0.097 3.519 0.000 
Notes: Stars indicate significant spatial autocorrelation (***=significant at 1%, 
**=significant at 5%, *=significant at  10%) 
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Appendix 2.E - Procedure followed for model selection 
Selecting the variables for the final model relied heavily on theoretical grounds since a 
lot of information was available but with 28 observations not many degrees of freedom 
were available to work with. Furthermore, after selecting variables hypothesized to 
influence the distribution of SHGs (summary statistics can be found in Appendix 2.B), 
these could be classified according to the areas of interest. The data used stem from 
official statistics of Tamil Nadu as well as the Tamil Nadu Human Development report 
from 2003, which provides district wise data on indexes such as human development, 
gender development and income. 
OLS regression results of this model can be seen in Table 2.D1: 
Table 2.D1: OLS results – Final Model Specification 
  coeff. se t-stat p>|t| 
Income index -12.08 6.35 -1.93 0.069 
Literacy -0.035 0.06 -0.63 0.538 
Human Development Index 22.25 14.61 1.52 0.144 
No of rural bank branches (per hh) 11.44 4.03 2.84 0.011 
% of amount disbursed  to agricultural sector -1.81 2.57 -0.70 0.491 
% of amount borrowed  to o. small industries -7.38 4.59 -1.61 0.124 
Youth Unemployment programme (per hh) -7.26 3.34 -2.17 0.043 
Area 0.0002 0.0001 3.44 0.003 
Constant -5.104 6.38 -0.80 0.434 
F(8,19) 3.20    
Adjusted R2 0.395       
Notes: Ordinary Least Square Regression 
 
Tests of robustness as well as a jackknife procedure applied to test for outliers. The 
model is subsequently tested for spatial dependence. The results of all three weight 
matrices described above are displayed in Table 2.D2. 
Table 2.D2: Diagnostic Test for spatial dependence in OLS regression 
    Neighbour Border Distance 
    Statistic p Statistic p Statistic p 
Spatial error:             
  Moran's I 2.907 0.004 3.125 0.002 - - 
  Lagrange multiplier 4.968 0.026 6.194 0.013 5.956 0.015 
  Robust Lagrange multiplier 0.293 0.589 0.039 0.844 0.004 0.950 
Spatial lag:       
  Lagrange multiplier 5.224 0.022 8.919 0.003 6.033 0.014 
  Robust Lagrange multiplier 0.549 0.459 2.763 0.096 0.081 0.776 
Notes: “Neighbour” is the binary matrix, indicating border sharing between districts, “Border” 
indicates the length of the shared border as a ratio of total border, and “Distance” indicates the 
driving distance (km) between district capitals.  
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3. Profit Empowerment: The Microfinance Institutions’ 
Mission Drift 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction34 
While the legitimacy of microfinance as a tool of financial inclusion is beyond doubt, 
the optimism that surrounds it seems to have blinded the international sphere. 
Concentrating on the often praised financial indicators, microfinance institutions are 
being pushed to make goals such as financial self-sustainability their primary objective 
– more often than not at the expense of their social mission. International organizations 
play a crucial role in this mission drift. The intention and arguments behind their 
acting may be justified but institutions seem to overlook crucial consequences on the 
micro-level. These are consequences that should be a major concern if the ultimate aim 
is to help the poor.  
At the outset, the key players of microfinance were non-profit, socially motivated 
lenders seeking to reach as many disadvantaged clients with credit as they were able to, 
given their limited budgets. Often coming from the big social movement of the 1970s, 
the focus of these organizations35 was explicitly on reducing inequality and inducing 
social change. It was such grassroot NGOs into which donors initially channelled their 
aid. Nevertheless, in the process, organizations demonstrated that through the use of 
new lending technologies such as joint liability contracts and dynamic incentives, a 
portion of this new market could in fact be lent to profitability. Such realizations drew 
profit-motivated lending institutions into the market and a focus on efficiency and 
effectiveness, monitoring and accounting systems, resulted in a “culture of 
professionalization and depolitization of NGOs” (Kamat 2004:167)36. This progression 
led donors to question the need for continued subsidies, resulting in the recent focus on 
‘institutional sustainability’ in the microfinance sector37. Microfinance has become 
business.  
                                                 
34 This chapter is based on work with Cyril Fouillet, University Lumière Lyon 2, France. 
35 See, for example in India, Assefa in Tamil Nadu coming from the Bhoodan Movement advised by the 
Ghandian principle of sarvodaya (development for all) (see Zadek 1993), or the concept of ‘people 
economy’ of the Sewa cooperative in Gujarat, etc.  
36 On this topic see also Ferguson (1994), Harriss (2001) and Mosse (2005). 
37 In microfinance jargon, sustainability is usually equated with financial self-sufficiency. An intermediate 
step in becoming financially sustainable and consequently able to cover the cost of funds, including 
 37
Incorporated in a historical perspective, microfinance has to be seen as a result of neo-
liberal ideologies.  Development strategies in the late 1980s and early 1990s promoted 
principles that set finance and money as neutral policies and advertised their spread in 
the process of global financial deepening (Schümperli et al. 2007:13). By doing this, 
international organizations follow de facto the “process of justification” (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2006) of a poverty eradication tool, whose limits are not much questioned. 
The ongoing focus can be understood within the context of what Bourdieu (2000) 
coined “Making the Economic Habitus”. As will be explained in this chapter, 
microfinance fully takes part in this process in which a “rationalized economic 
cosmos” (Bourdieu 2000:17) is imposed. One observes the introduction and 
application of a real doctrine of financial discipline. For example the Consultative 
Group to Assist the Poor answers the question “What is needed for successful 
microcredit?” (CGAP 2002:4) 38  with: “Successful microcredit rests on two basic 
principles: client discipline and institutional discipline”. In his study of the Grameen 
Bank Brigg Morgan (2006:79-80) shows how this client discipline is sometimes turned 
into a veritable ritual. When the loan officer arrives every week, the group members 
stand up, welcome him (often even salute him) and recite the MFI slogan: “Discipline, 
Unity, Courage, and Hard Work”, before handing him their loan repayments. 
In this chapter, concern about imposed institutional discipline is raised. 
The debate concentrates on the Indian microfinance sector. India has been and 
continues to be one of the leading countries pushing the development of the 
microfinance sector forward. It has extensive experience in delivering financial and 
non-financial services to the poor – on the positive as well as on the negative side. The 
chapter has a further focus on the State of Andhra Pradesh. This choice is partly 
                                                                                                                      
inflation, is reaching operational sustainability. It is referred to when a microfinance institution covers the 
administrative costs and expenses involved in the non-payment of loans. Sustainability is also the only way 
to attract capital equity and debt, which is needed to achieve the massive outreach that is required, and to 
reduce dependence on donors.  
38 To support the building of an inclusive financial system that serve the poor via microfinance, the World 
Bank Group and a group of 33 public and private founding organizations – bilateral and multilateral 
development agencies, private foundations, and international financial institutions – created the CGAP. 
CGAP serves today, among others, as one of the main producer of studies, guidelines and technical notes on 
microfinance topics and can be seen as a key driver in the development of the sector.  
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determined by the authors’ field experience in this area39, but also by the fact that this 
area has an extremely high concentration of poor population40.  
The next section will lay out the extent to which one can talk about the microfinance 
sector being dependent on donors, whether being local or foreign. This is followed by 
an illustration of practices that microfinance institutions apply in order to reach the 
objectives often pushed for by the international community. These objectives include 
low interest rates which are nevertheless cost-covering, as well as high repayment 
rates which ensure that the organization’s portfolio remains secure. In the third section 
the microfinance crisis that broke out in India in March 2006 will be described. It will 
be shown how private microfinance players are guided by commercial principles while 
public microfinance is being dominated by a populist point of view. The final section 
concludes. 
 
3.2. Dependency on donors 
Sinha and Sinha (2002:279) found in their performance analysis of Indian 
microfinance that “Dependence on subsidies is high”. They found that about 47 per 
cent of the sampled organizations’ net worth is made up of donated equity. A more 
recent estimate by M-CRIL (2007) shows a sharp decline in this percentage over 
recent years. The latter estimate that in 2003 30 per cent of microfinance funds were 
grants, in 2005 eight per cent and in 2007 only 3.4 per cent. Nevertheless, there was 
still a huge increase in institutional debt (34.4 per cent in 2003, 62.2 per cent in 2005 
and 75.4 per cent in 2007). In these numbers, no distinction was made between 
‘normal’ and ‘soft’ loans41, the latter ones – while decreasing – still playing a major 
role in microfinance financing42. Also, the report shows that the general trend in the 
area remains, with South Asia receiving on average 22.5% of their funds as grants and 
                                                 
39 The chapter uses both secondary as well as primary data sources. Regarding secondary data sources, a  
thorough press literature review was conducted (Newspapers, local television, etc. in English and in Telugu), 
and secondary data was used to give also quantitative support to qualitative case studies (in particularly a 
study conducted by APMAS in reaction to the crisis in Andhra Pradesh – APMAS 2006). Primary data were 
collected through (semi directed) interviews mainly done in Andhra Pradesh with leading MFIs and 
government officials. These interviews are conducted on all kinds of levels ranging from high management 
to field staff and clients. In both of our cases, detailed field notes are often complemented by other data 
collected through informal conversations done during several MFI monographs. 
40 According to a UNICEF study, India has a much higher percentage of stunted children and underweight 
babies than for example Pakistan or Bangladesh (UNICEF 2006). 
41 A soft loan is a loan that is given with below-market interest rates - typically by governments or bilateral 
organizations for the financing of development projects. In addition to offering low interest rates, soft loans 
often have extended grace periods during which no repayments are made or only service charges are due. 
Morduch (1999b) calculates for example that the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh received about 40% discount 
on interest on their soft loan from the Bangladesh Bank. 
42 Fisher and Sriram (2002) for example observed that 28% of microfinance funds in India are soft loans 
provided by development banks and microfinance wholesalers. 
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South East Asia 29.7% (note that again, soft loans are not included in these numbers). 
Sinha and Sinha’s comment remains valid. Titus (2002) makes this point: 
 “Most of the promotional resources for developing micro-
finance services still come from donors, often based abroad. 
Many domestic sources are restricted to funding state-
promoted organizations. […] In terms of resources for 
promotion, NGOs and other agencies promoting Self-Help 
Groups (SHGs)43 have at best received Rs. 25 crore (Rs. 250 
million or US$ 5 million) from domestic resources over the 
past decade. Compare this to the over US$ 150 million of the 
grants and soft loans that the Grameen Bank alone has received 
[…]” (p.309) 
Not only are domestic resources available for limited non-state promoted organizations 
but the regulatory environment makes it difficult for organizations to start operations 
without donated equity. In the current Indian context, microfinance institutions have to 
register as non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), being obliged to be in 
possession of start-up capital of about Rs. 20 million. Once they have NBFC status, 
the institution is only allowed to take deposits after having been rated by two different 
rating agencies. This takes considerable time and effort44.  
Based on such observations and the fact that the provision of microfinance services is 
expensive it comes as no surprise that foreign donations play a major role in the 
financial situations of microfinance organizations and that “micro-finance has been 
largely a donor-driven phenomenon everywhere.” (Harper 2002:177). 
While the interest of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies helps NGOs to attract 
more funding and increase their activities, it also poses a dilemma for the 
organizations. For by extending their dependence on official funds they risk losing 
their autonomy and “their identity as a ‘nongovernmental’ institution” (Vahlhans 
1994:22; Petras 1997). Brown et al. (2002) examined the political consequences of 
internationally funded programmes targeting local NGOs and found that: 
 “Injections of international resources into underdeveloped, 
often clientelistic societies can fundamentally change the 
nature of the local political arena, affecting access to economic 
                                                 
43 SHGs, the real cornerstones of the Indian microfinancial system, are savings and leading groups of less 
than 20 persons. Often mono-caste, these groups are working informatively in the form of rotating savings 
and credit associations (tontine) but with a banking link. SHGs cannot claim credits only after a savings 
period about six months during which these groups must show proof of, among others, their capacity to save 
regularly.  
44 Moreover, the reliability of ratings as a mean to attract funds is questionable: In a recent study Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak (Forthcoming) indicate that “not all ratings agencies had equal impact on MFI abilities to 
raise extra funds since rating by some raters helped raise debt or equity, while rating by others did not”.  
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resources, social benefits, and ultimately the quality of 
democratic representation.”45 (P.814). 
A consequence of this growing dependence on funding is that NGOs increasingly 
prioritize economic programmes (mainly microfinance) over activities such as social 
programmes (Devine 2003; Mosse 2005)46. But, while this shift away from traditional 
NGO activities towards a focus on microfinance activities might be a stepping stone 
towards financial sustainability, it has multiple consequences. For one, this change in 
institutional focus tends to absorb the vast proportion of NGO staff time, efforts and 
energies, including the need to recruit more qualified, technically competent and 
professional staff, as observed by Stiles (2002) and Guerin, Fouillet and Palier (2007). 
In addition, simply changing its status from an NGO to a microfinance institution does 
not automatically make funds secure since microfinance institutions clearly feel the 
push by donors towards sustainability and take appropriate actions.  
MFIs are usually given two to three years to achieve financial self-sustainability 
(Goodwin-Groen 2007). Such pressure does not come exclusively from the 
microfinance institutions themselves but is often exerted from their donor 
organizations. Increasingly, funders emphasize financial viability (Mayoux 2000). 
This view is stressed in a review to United Nations Capital Development Fund47 
(UNCDF 1999:19) which states that “a donor’s principal role should be to identify and 
develop strong partnerships with potential MFI “winners”, MFI’s that have the 
potential to reach financial self-sufficiency, maintain outreach to the poor, and a 
credible plan for doing so”.  
Unfortunately, not everyone sees these three aspects as equally important: the CGAP 
has promoted institutional sustainability before poverty reduction. Cases, where 
programmes with excellent development potential and social impact were discontinued 
by donors in favour of sustainability, are no longer just anecdotal. Microfinance 
programmes are currently caught in a ‘financial self-sustainability paradigm’ (Mayoux 
2001b). This is illustrated in the Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project (NAFP), a 
project introduced by CARE in 1993 with funding from the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) to service the needs of poor fishing communities. 
The project had been described as “socially desirable and environmentally sound, 
technically feasible and economically viable. The proposed project is a high priority in 
the poverty reduction strategy of the GOM [Government of Mozambique] and is 
consistent with the Bank Group vision as well as the Bank Group strategy for 
Mozambique.” (De Vletter 2001:8) Nevertheless, despite this excellent developmental 
                                                 
45 On this subject, see also Kamat (2002). 
46 It is not rare anymore to observe NGOs changing their statutes from ‘NGO’ to ‘financial institution’ 
(Glosser 1994; Hulme and Mosley 1996). 
47 The UNCDF offers a combination of investment capital, capacity building and technical advisory services 
to promote microfinance and local development. 
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potential and sought-after social impact, the programme was discontinued by CARE 
for sustainability reasons.  
Further evidence of institutions being pushed to provide financially sustainable 
microfinancial services too fast is given in a report to the FinMarkTrust (Goodwin-
Groen 2007). The report investigates the microfinance situation in South Africa, 
finding that:  
“The problem lies with donors and the state, who are trapped in 
an orthodoxy that prioritizes adherence to ‘market principles’, 
even when the target beneficiaries of many microfinancial 
services initiatives are not ‘in the market’ of the mainstream 
economy.” (P.22). “Donors expect quick results”, they go on 
and state “DTI expects MFIs to be commercially oriented, and 
see no value in a long-term strategy of institutional 
development”48.  
In numerous other cases promising projects are dropped from the portfolios of 
sustainability driven institutions for the simple reason that they are a financial drain on 
the implementing institutions.  
It becomes apparent that microfinance providers are exhorted to aggressively pursue 
sustainability. It is worth repeating again the idea of UNCDF that one of the donors’ 
functions is to identify MFI ‘winners’, that is, “MFIs that have the potential to achieve 
financial self-sufficiency, maintain outreach to the poor, and a credible plan for doing 
so”. 
The next section will follow the line of many donor agencies and concentrate on the 
issue of attaining financial self-sufficiency. The focus lies on practices of microfinance 
institutions that allow sustaining their future operations. 
The section will address three questions that concern microfinance on a day-to-day 
basis. It will be argued that these issues result in practices and techniques that harm a 
sector whose legitimacy is without doubt, a sector with extreme potential to help the 
poor break the cycle in which they often are.  The questions are: 
(1) How– in a market of extremely high transaction costs - can interest rates be fixed 
that are cost-covering but are not so high that institutions can be compared with 
moneylenders who are often portrayed as “coldly preying upon their cultivator clients, 
luring them further and further into debt, and finally sucking them dry of surplus, 
savings, property, and liberty” (Rudner 1994:36)  
                                                 
48 Héloïse Weber (2002:10) argues that microfinance services facilitate financial sector liberalization: “The 
‘dual function’ of microcredit minimalism served well to sustain as well as facilitate the liberalization 
agenda from the ‘bottom-up’”. 
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(2) How – in a market of assetless and “highly risky” clients - can the portfolio be 
secured without having to invest in and experiment with new technologies that drive 
up costs and hence interest rates? 
(3) How – in a market with a very vulnerable clientele – can repayment be secured and 
is it possible to report repayment rates in line with the expectations of the international 
community? 
 
3.3. Mission drift: practitioners between injunctions and the neo-
liberal myth 
Concepts such as group lending, joint liability, dynamic incentives and peer pressure 
applied in microfinance are typically quoted as the ‘secret’ recipe for achieving high 
repayment rates that make financial institutions in developed countries envious. 
Group lending is a mechanism that allows borrowers without collateral, to act as 
guarantors for each other. It was this innovative joint liability condition that allowed 
the Grameen Bank to grow explosively. Practitioners, policy-makers and academics 
alike have been intrigued by Grameen’s contracts, and Economic theorists, such as 
Joseph Stiglitz (1990), devoted a considerable body of literature to the mechanisms of 
joint liability49.  
Dynamic incentives are another often-stated method of assuring repayment. For one, 
only those clients who successfully repaid their loan are eligible to re-apply. And, after 
showing reliability, loan sizes are gradually increased. Such incentives are observed to 
ensure on-time repayment by the customer.  
Other ‘microfinance tricks’ such as small and high frequency installments and door-
step collection help to make microfinance a successful way of reaching and serving the 
poor. 
Nevertheless, there are many other (dubious) methods and resulting (bad) practices 
that deserve attention – methods that are increasingly applied in the sector and 
especially in the field but that are hardly ever – if at all - discussed. These are methods 
that also aim at keeping interest rates low, at achieving high repayment rates, and at 
securing the portfolio of the organization. But contrary to methods such as joint-
liability and a carefully designed loan product, these cannot be claimed to be in the 
interest of the customer. ‘Not being in the customer’s interest’ would be a very mild 
form of describing the methods – ‘harming the customer’ would be much more 
appropriate. More details are given in the following three sub-sections. 
                                                 
49 The literature is surveyed in Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Morduch (1999), Armendariz and Morduch 
(2005). 
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3.3.1. How to have cost-covering and still low interest rates 
Many people are highly concerned by the interest rates that MFIs charge. Due to high 
transaction costs, rates of 24-36 per cent and higher are no exception, but all too often 
and all too easily, such rates are dismissed as way too high to effectively serve the 
poor. These rates are indeed high, if compared to those for loans in developed 
countries. However, it is generally acknowledged that comparisons with rates charged 
by commercial banks are inappropriate, as larger loans mean lower transaction costs 
and result in lower interest rates. 
“The monitoring and collection costs are higher than those for 
other types of credit, more information about customers is 
required and the large number of small customers requires 
more infrastructures and more staff to serve them. To this is 
added the high staff turnover in the microfinance industry, and 
scant methodology that exists to measure risk in the sector. […] 
all adding up to the industry having high administrative 
costs”50,51. 
Nevertheless, while holding the view that cost-covering rates are a necessity in order 
for microfinance institutions to eventually no longer be dependent on donor funds and 
subsidies and making the sector less dependent on outside funding and intervention, 
the purpose is not to discuss whether high interest rates serve or hamper the livelihood 
promotion of the poor. 
The intention is to bring attention to the way interest rates are stated by microfinance 
institutions. Certain ways of reporting are being adopted that allow the institutions to 
state interest rate levels much below the real rate being paid by the customer. While 
this might be beneficial and of help when it comes to attracting donor funding, it for 
sure makes it difficult for the clients to understand the real costs and conditions of the 
loan contract they commit themselves to. 
It is for example common practice in microfinance to quote a ‘flat interest rate’ rather 
than the Annual Percentage Rate (APR), or effective interest rate, as is the banking 
standard in the developed world. Flat interest refers to charging interest on the full 
original loan amount, rather than on the declining balance. For example, with group 
based loans, an interest rate is about 3% per month, flat, for four months. This means 
that a US$ 100 principal amount lent is multiplied by 3%, and then by four months to 
come up with US$ 12 in interest. Thus, US$ 112 would be repaid over four months 
instalments. Based on how frequently the principal is collected (weekly, monthly or at 
                                                 
50  Statement by Efraín Camacho, general administrator of the Bolivian Superintendency of Banks and 
Financial Entities, cited in “Back From The Shadows”, by Samuel Silva. 
51 According to Murdoch (1999b), Grameen Bank in Bangladesh would have to increase their interest rate by 
65% in order to reach full economic sustainability – translating into an annual rate of 33% per year in 1999. 
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the end of the term), and assuming no additional fees, the above loan has an APR of 
between 39% and 71%52. 
The use of flat interest rates is usually legitimized by it being perceived to be easier to 
calculate than a declining balance interest and to facilitate “understanding by poorly 
educated and illiterate clients”53 (CGAP). While this sounds honourable, the reality 
often looks different. The bottom line is that customers are repeatedly deceived by the 
use of flat interest rates, which, depending on the terms of the loan, can result in an 
actual interest rate which is twice as high. A study undertaken by Andhra Pradesh 
Mahila Abhivruddhi Society54 (APMAS) interviewing 130 Self-Help Groups (SHGs) 
from 12 villages in 7 mandals55, finds that “most of the members [two thirds] don’t 
know about the effective rate of interest, method of calculation, or any other loan 
operational charges, sometimes, due to their inability to understand the information 
provided by the MFI and, sometimes, due to a lack of transparency in MFI 
operations.” (APMAS 2006:7) 
3.3.2. How to secure the portfolio 
A further point of discussion, when talking about practices related to the costs of a 
loan, are the amounts collected at the time of loan sanctioning: administrative charges 
are applied and most often a deposit is collected. This latter amount, the security 
deposit, is raised by the borrower in order to have access to a line of credit from an 
MFI and is generally given back to the borrower upon completion of the transaction – 
unless it defaults. As is observed, the deposit is often the first resort of the MFI in case 
of default and hence serves as a mean to secure repayment and increase repayment 
rates. 
Several issues are worth debating when it comes to security deposits. First “it is 
unclear if the interviewees have sufficient knowledge of the charges they are paying” 
as stated in a report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on microfinance in 
Jiangkou County, China (Hickson 2005:37) when discussing security deposits. Those 
that do - in particular repeat borrowers who proved their reliability - perceive the 
charged security as distrust. Furthermore, the security deposit is often as high as one 
loan instalment making it necessary for many clients to use part of the loan itself to 
cover the cost, reducing the loan size by a considerable amount. 
                                                 
52 In India the average microfinance loan size can vary from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 20,000. If an interest rate of 
15% flat, on a declining balance is taken, it will work out to an effective rate of 33% per annum. But in 
many cases, these rates are not to mention all the hidden costs such as insurance, bank and stationery 
charges, but also membership fee, card fee, etc. which, at the end, can give an interest rate of 50 to 80% per 
annum (1 US dollars is equivalent to 50 Indian rupees in 2007). 
53 See on the CGAP website, 07/05/2008:  http://www.microfinancegateway.org/section/resourcecenters/ 
auditcenter/helpdesk/auditors 
54 A microfinance lobbying association at the state level in India. 
55 India is divided into subnational administrative units. Mandals form the third such subdivision below 
states and districts. 
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The severity of such security deposits can be debated but consensus should be found 
that the practice of not paying and in certain cases even charging interest on this 
amount, is very questionable. 
An extreme example of these issues comes from the Andhra Pradesh Rural Poverty 
Reduction Project, called ‘Velugu’ (literally meaning ‘light’ in Telugu), whose key 
institution building strategy is “to organize the poor, particularly the poorest of the 
poor, into Self-Help Groups at the grassroots”56,57. The program, which will be come 
back to in the final section of the chapter, is heavily funded by the World Bank. 
Unfortunately, while being able to produce numerous success stories, certain bankers 
and DRDA Officials (District Rural Development Agency, the implementing agency) 
have made the process a mockery. 
The acknowledged success of the SHG approach in reducing poverty led to a huge 
amount of money being channelled into the program. Yearly targets increased 
tremendously, even double in certain areas, which left DRDAs with the task of linking 
too many groups in too short a time. In order to still meet these targets, SHGs were 
being “advised” to repay their current loan by taking out a new and bigger loan. New 
and bigger loans were indeed sanctioned, but in many cases, only 80% of the amount 
was (and is) actually disbursed. The remaining amount was kept as a security deposit, 
with no documents given, but with the full loan showing up in the Savings Account 
Pass Book and members expected to repay the whole amount, which they had not 
really taken out. 
These practices have a considerable impact on the actual interest rate of a loan, the 
actual amount of loans disbursed and also on the increase in debt-burden, which not 
only results from the new ‘bigger’ loan but also from the debts incurred in order to 
repay the previous loan, which in turn then allowed the new big loan to be taken. 
As mentioned, the intention of this chapter is not to judge whether or not such security 
deposits are or are not a necessity but to make people understand what is going on in 
the sector and to voice the issues that are often not being said. Statement such as 
“During the period April 2005 to March 2006, 620,109 new SHGs were financed by 
banks to the tune of Rs 44.99 billion by way of loans.” need to be understood in the 
right context, meaning that they cannot be read as “NABARD having provided Rs. 
44.99 billion working capital to the rural poor” – a crucial difference when referring to 
the ultimate goal of microfinance as being a tool to empower the poor. 
                                                 
56 http://www.velugu.org/What_Velugu/velugu_genesis.html?id=0_1, accessed 25.04.2008. 
57 The Indian SHG Banking Linkage Programme is the microfinance model that reaches the most clients in 
India by far and can also be credited with being one of the most important microfinance programmes across 
the world. 
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3.3.3. How to secure Repayment and high Repayment Rates 
One of the key determinants of the observed success of microfinance lies in the 
existence of high repayment rates (Morduch 1999a:1571). While rural credit 
programmes from the early 1950s through to the 1980s experienced repayment rates 
below 50%58, most microfinance programmes usually report loan repayment rates of 
above 95%, often even as high as 100% – not least since this is what is nowadays 
expected from them and can serve as a door-opener to donor funding. To reach the 
objective of near to perfect loan recovery, organizations working in the microfinance 
sector have been using various techniques – most of which do not relate to the special 
features of microfinance services outlined above (i.e. group lending, joint liability, 
small and frequent instalments, doorstep policies and dynamic incentives). 
In case a customer is not able to repay an instalment, one of the first measures 
(especially practiced with SHGs) is to charge a fine. The amount of this fine is often 
decided by the groups themselves and can range from Rs. 1 to 80. In case of continued 
delay, pressure is exerted. This can take several forms but usually starts with the 
group’s leader or MFI staff visiting the defaulting borrower. Such a visit can already 
have the desired effect since other village members become aware of the borrower’s 
inability to repay, which strongly influences his or her socio-economic status as well 
as other credit opportunities in society. Other methods of damaging the defaulter’s 
reputation are to publicly announce their failure - sometimes the announcement is done 
by a board specifically created for this purpose59. One consequence that is frequently 
observed as a means to avoid such public humiliation is that the poor take up a second 
loan in order to repay the first one, which pulls them into a vicious circle, making them 
go deeper and deeper into debt – an issue whose consequences will be elaborated on in 
the following section. 
In cases where making public or ‘simple’ visits are not enough, other methods are 
being used. These can range from sending a whole “recovery team” to harass the 
defaulter to even hiring others to take over the bullying. “If someone is unable to pay 
the instalment, we come in the village and can be rude to him. (…) We try to 
intimidate him and it is also as a warning to other clients” a loan officer confided. 
These comments are confirmed by several sources and notably by T. Vijay Kumar, 
Chief Executive Officer of the government-sponsored Society for the Elimination of 
Rural Poverty (SERP), when they were looking into the activities of some prominent 
MFIs in Andhra Pradesh. In fact, recruiting some hired hand to recover 
loansinstalments is not rare and, private money lenders, commercial banks, 
                                                 
58 Such as the Integrated Rural Development Programme in India (Pulley 1989). 
59 When the importance of reciprocal system in which are engaged all households in rural India is known, it 
is possible to measure effects due to a reputation of bad debtor. On this subject of debts and debtors and 
more generally the phenomenon of indebtedness, see the book edited by C. Malamoud (1983).   
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landowners and contractors all turn to this practice instead of instituting legal 
proceedings from time to time.  
In some cases, even physical force and manhandling are used as indicated in the 
APMAS study initiated by the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and 
Indira Kranti Patam/Velugu (IKP) in 2006. 
The last recovery method to be discussed is the one of a non-asset based collateral. 
Such collateral includes, for example, promissory notes. A promissory note is simply a 
written promise by the borrower to pay a stated amount of money in accordance with 
certain terms, which includes the principal amount of the loan, a specified rate of 
interest, and a maturity date. Such a note is common practice when issuing a loan and 
should not be of great concern. Nevertheless, some of these promissory notes are 
unwritten. A promissory note contains an affirmative undertaking to pay the amount 
stated. If the lender is free to fill in any amount, this can put immense pressure on the 
borrower since severe consequences would result, which are highlighted below. Of the 
130 borrowers interviewed in the APMAS study, 33.8% reported having signed empty 
papers. According to the authors, it is evident from their responses “that most of the 
members think that non-asset based formalities are part and parcel in the loan 
documentation process. Because of their illiteracy and pressing financial needs, they 
do whatever is required to avail a loan. […] Members did not understand what would 
happen with those documents and because of the lack of transparency in loan 
documentation, were not told so by the loaning institution.” (APMAS 2006:8)  
Even worse than unwritten promises is the fact that some institutions make the 
borrowers sign blank checks. Besides the fact that these make the institution have 
unlimited assets and hence liabilities on the balance sheet60 , such checks can be 
extremely dangerous for the borrower, because whoever obtains the check could write 
in any amount and would legally be able to cash it, as could the MFI. One might 
wonder why MFI staff would involve themselves in such underhand practices, 
knowing that the checking account does not contain such funds and that consequently 
the money could not be obtained – and as a result the check would bounce back. But it 
would not simply bounce back: when a check bounces, the police immediately gets 
involved and pays the owner of the bank-account a visit. In the worst case, the client 
ends up in prison. This threat is highly efficient in making the customers repay – 
whatever it takes and hence is seen as an effective tool to be (unofficially) used by 
MFIs. 
                                                 
60  A leading microfinance institution in India actually had to deal with the head of their accounting 
department at some point refusing to sign the balance sheet when finding out about the practices of issuing 
blank checks. (Informal interview in fall 2007 with a former employee of this institution). 
 48
One much easier method of achieving high repayment rates that does not involve any 
harassment of the client or similarly underhand practices, is to simply issue the client 
another loan, which can be used to repay the first. 
Our own observations, when joining agents on their daily ‘credit rounds’, confirmed 
that the moment an outstanding loan appears, it is easier for the agent to grant a new 
loan to cover the outstanding one than to try to solve the problem61. This makes it 
possible to ensure repayments above 95%. In Southern India, people make it a point of 
honor to repay their debts. MFIs know this and count on this fact to find a way to 
balance the accounts. 
As explained before, the volume of credits granted and the height of repayment rates is 
one of the criteria used in evaluating the quality of a program; a ‘good’ MFI is 
obviously one which guarantees repayment. By the cascade effect, staff passes on such 
objectives to field agents by imposing strict repayment standards. These field agents in 
turn pass on this pressure to the clients, sometimes to the group leader, who in turn 
passes it on to the members. “It is also possible, as some experience in Bangladesh has 
shown that pressure for high recoveries can lead the bank workers to act even more 
oppressively than fellow members.” (Harper 2002:191). This statement underlines the 
need for concern about this chain reaction. 
The next section describes the microfinance crisis that broke out in India in March 
2006. It is an example of how above described practices can have severe consequences 
if cumulated and unaddressed. It at the same time illustrates the clash between private 
microfinance players that are guided by commercial principles and public 
microfinance following a discourse of populism. 
 
3.4. The Crisis in Andhra Pradesh (AP) 
The international (as well as the national) press is one of the main drivers of the 
observed microfinance enthusiasms. Nevertheless, it was the problem of debt and debt 
burden that triggered a tremendous amount of talk in the Indian media about 
microfinance in February and March 2006. For once, the headlines were no longer 
flattering – microfinance institutions were accused of charging usurious interest rates 
and being the cause of 10 to 60 suicides in the Krishna district (Andhra Pradesh): 
“MFI harassment: 60 suicide cases reported”; “MFIs liable for prosecution”, “Official 
enquires into row over functioning of MFIs in State”, “Micro-finance victims petition 
rights panel”, “MFIs recover Rs. 200 crores as ‘hidden costs’”, “Multiple loans land 
SHGs in debt trap”, etc.  
                                                 
61 While in some cases, it is the credit agent’s own initiative, such practices are politically imposed by the 
organization itself in other cases. 
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3.4.1.  The Events 
Just preceding this outbreak, in the short period of November 2005 to end of February 
of 2006 several cases of suicide were recorded in the district of Krishna (Andhra 
Pradesh) – all of these were MFI clients of the private sector. In November 2005, a 
couple committed suicide by consuming cyanide. Kumari had borrowed Rs. 25,000 
(US$ 500) from an MFI for her husband’s business. To compensate for the financial 
difficulties encountered by her husband, Kumari took on two new loans for the same 
amount from two other MFIs. The situation quickly became difficult and the 
repayment of the loans turned out to be impossible. With the pressure from the other 
group members as well as the organizations increasing, the couple committed suicide. 
This is just one of many cases that tell a similar story, where MFI clients experience 
repayment difficulties and non-repayment result in verbal and sexual harassment, 
culminate in prostitution, imprisonment and confiscation of goods – and finally suicide. 
Following many cases of this type in the district of Krishna, several village 
organizations decided to make their concerns heard by the district collector so that he 
could start proceedings against MFIs accused of being responsible for these suicides. 
Local councillors, the Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), found themselves 
under pressure from village organizations and the media. Fingers were pointed at MFIs 
and their responsibilities were started to be questioned.  
 
3.4.2. Between Sustainability, mercantile interest rates and populism 
These events clearly exemplify the possible consequences of using the recovery 
methods described in order to be able to report high repayment rates and secure the 
portfolio. 
But the calamity experienced in Andhra Pradesh also underlines the dire consequences 
of not facing the real costs of providing microfinance services. It was the issue of 
interest rates that has been at the heart of this crisis. (See Ghate (2007b) for a detailed 
analysis). 
There has, in fact, been a long discussion in the sector as a whole, about the costs of 
microfinance services and while many understand and support the need for charging 
higher interest rates than in other financial markets, others deny this need and 
denounce the practice as being unfair. These competing views are mirrored in the 
crisis, which turned out to be a fight between public and private microfinance. 
To understand how such a fight could come about, one needs to know the basic 
conditions of the microfinance sector in the state of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, during the 
process of banking sector reforms in the early 1990s in India, microfinance became an 
important part of bank intermediation and Andhra Pradesh is today the Indian state 
with the most extensive microfinance network in the country. The variety of 
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microfinance models which took hold there - SHGs, Grameen, co-operatives and 
micro-banks - and the growth of this movement, gave Andhra Pradesh a prime spot on 
the world microfinance map. Together, public microfinance – mainly in the form of 
the SHG model – and private microfinance – mainly in the form of the microfinance 
institution model - secured an unprecedented linkage of the poor to the formal 
financial sector. Civil society, private financial institutions (increasingly refinanced by 
the private banking system) and governmental institutions promoted more than 28,000 
village organizations and more than 1,000 SHG federations registered under the 
Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act (MACs). This act was passed in favour of 
a new environment for the co-operatives in Andhra Pradesh and taken up by five other 
states after a long struggle. According to C.S. Reddy, General Manager of the APMAS, 
each village in Andhra Pradesh has at least one SHG. According to data of the 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), the number of 
SHGs having received credit rose from less than 6,600 for the financial year 1998-
1999 to more than 294,300 in 2005-2006. That is a ratio of 1 to 45. At the national 
level, in 2005-2006, this state represented nearly 33% of all the financed SHGs 
(Augsburg and Fouillet 2007). Even if the preponderance of Andhra Pradesh in terms 
of number of SHGs is decreasing, its place in the field of Indian microfinance remains 
very significant in volume as well as in diversity, innovation and studies of the 
financial tools used. Harper & Nath (no year) show that AP is home to one SHG per 
22 rural below poverty line (BPL) families, which needs to be compared to an all Indi 
average of one group per 269 rural BPL families. 
The two main microfinance delivery models in Andhra Pradesh (and India as a whole 
for that matter) are the SHG model and the microfinance institution model: the former 
being dominated by the public sphere: the latter by the private one. In the 
aforementioned crisis, these two clashed – the gist of the clash boiling down to the 
issue of interest rates. 
Given the pressure exerted by the media and the public in reaction to the farmer 
suicides, officials did not take long to react: On March 11, the administration of 
Krishna district in Andhra Pradesh, under the influence of its district collector (prefect) 
Navin Mittal, made the decision to close 50 agencies of two MFIs, Share Microfin 
Limited (SML) and Spandana. Besides accusing MFIs of resorting to strong-arm 
methods to recover their loans, their recourse to excessive interest rates was the 
principal reason invoked. 
Some of the executives of the private MFIs, who agreed to share their point of view, 
said that the microfinance private sector had made the mistake of protesting against a 
governmental programme called Pavala Vaddi. According to certain MFIs, the scandal, 
which shook the region, has now given the government an excuse to swing into action. 
It was not only Spandana and the SML that were under attack, but all MFIs in the 
region. The government was clear and did not hesitate to say that Andhra Pradesh did 
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not require MFIs and that these should rather operate in states where the government is 
not able to manage credit distribution in rural areas. 
To understand how this political power struggle links to the issue of interest rates, one 
needs to go back to the late nineties, when the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh 
Chandrababy Naidu62, established partnerships with the World Bank in order to create 
a network of SHGs throughout the state63. This programme was already mentioned in 
the context of securing the portfolio by means of extremely high security deposits – 
deposits that, if taken into account when calculating real interest rates, would drive the 
rates up by a considerable percentage. Leaving this point aside, loans granted through 
Velugu are highly subsidized, which allows low interest rates of around nine per cent 
per annum. The row between public and private actors first began at the time of the 
2004 elections when the new government of Rajshekhara Reddy64 set-up the famous 
Pavala Vaddi65 program. This programme was introduced to supplement the Velugu 
subsidies, making it possible to offer credit to SHGs no longer at nine per cent, but at 
three per cent. SHGs applied the nine per cent rate and once the loan was repaid, six 
per cent was to be credited to their account. One year later, the state wanted to go even 
further and invited SHGs to pay only three per cent directly. The state would pay off 
the remainder. 
At that time, the representatives of several private sector MFIs were horrified by these 
announcements and did not fail to let it be known. For them, these artificially low 
interest rates made the private sector unattractive to SHGs. Moreover, what would 
happen if people started to create SHGs in order to use these loans to lend them to 
non-SHG members? (In fact this had already happened in several places, for example, 
Rao 2005.)  Even more significant in their eyes, this programme was going to attack 
the very core of the SHG ideal. With this level of subsidies, the financial discipline 
related to the practices of credit and savings could go completely off the rails.  
                                                 
62 Chandrababu Naidu was Andhra Pradesh’s Chief Minister between 1995 and 2004. After to making his 
debut in the ranks of Congress Party, he joined the Telugu Desam Party (party funded by his brother in law 
Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao) of which he is the actual president. Sometimes considered as one of the most 
dynamic Indian leaders (Business World, 1999), Chandrababu Naidu embodies above the example of the 
« control freak » in opposition at some Chief Minister advocating more of politic pluralism as Digvijay 
Singh in Madhya Pradesh or S.M. Krishna in Karnataka (Manor 2000:821) 
63 Mainly through two schemes, the District Poverty Initiatives Project and the Rural Poverty Reduction 
Program. To manage funds allocated by the World Bank, the Government created the Society for the 
Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP). These schemes are in line with a development architecture 
called “Vision 2020” and driven by the researchers of the neoliberal institute Adam Smith, the World Bank 
and the management consultants McKinsey and Co. 
64 Also Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, he represents the Congress party. His brother, Vivekananda 
Reddy, also a member of the Congress, represents actually Cuddapah district at the Lok Sabha, the lower 
house in the Parliament of India.  
65 In Telugu, Pavala Vaddi means 3% interest.  
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And indeed, comparing these nine per cent to the official average rate of 24 per cent 
charged by microfinance institutions (and a rate that is typically accepted as just cost-
covering), one can easily understand the worries of private institutions – but also how 
a point could be made of these private organizations charging excessively large, 
basically exploitative interest rates. The general manager of the Society for the 
Eradication of Rural Poverty (SERP), and thereby SERP itself, went as far as accusing 
private MFIs of not having followed a strategic vision but rather a random 
development strategy. Congress Party leader P. Venkat Rao told the press that “The 
government should have taken measures against these companies five years ago, when 
they organized the ‘pillage’ of the lending activity in the name of microfinance. The 
government must identify the microfinance companies which misled people and acted 
fraudulently to get their loans repaid” (Guntur 2006). For others, Pavala Vaddi was a 
very good media coup in view of the elections, but did not make sense financially. In 
the eyes of the private MFI, this programme could – and did – create dissension and 
instability between private and public sectors, causing unfair competition.  
Whichever side one takes, the crisis makes clear that transparency of operations needs 
to be a priority concern in order for a stable microfinance environment to be 
established. Such transparency will then help the appropriate setting of priorities. 
Kamat’s (2004:171) comment about NGOs holds equally strong for microfinance 
institutions:  
 “Thus, rather than deepening the gains made on the basis of popular 
democratic struggles, NGOs are being re-inscribed in the current policy 
discourse in ways that strengthen liberalism and undermine democracy. 
Given this trend, it is unlikely that NGOs can be the honest brokers of 
people’s interests.” 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, caution is raised regarding the overwhelming push for microfinance 
institutions to become financially self-sustainable, a push more often than not exerted 
by donor organizations. Such a push can have severe consequences, ranging from a 
substantial one like a mission drift to questionable practices employed by institutions. 
And, especially when being aware of some of these practices, one becomes clairvoyant 
when reading comments by development agencies such as “But once such loans have 
fallen delinquent, the fact that they are unsecured justifies requiring them to be 
provisioned more aggressively than a conventionally collateralized portfolio.” (CGAP 
2002:21). 
In the microfinance sector, the key words became autonomy, financial viability and 
sustainability, overdue, outstanding loans, repayment rates, rate of investment returns. 
Actors in the field seem to believe that the satisfaction and emancipation of the clients 
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follow naturally. This link is taken for granted and even misused. The financial 
performance of a microfinance institution, whether it is positive or negative, is only 
one effect among many of a particular program. That an institution can survive 
autonomously is regarded as the best proof of its impact. This presupposition seems 
naive, to say the least. The repayment rate or the rate of investment returns do not tell 
us anything about the quality of services delivered, particularly when there is no 
competition in the sector.  
Furthermore, there is a proliferation of articles, conferences and books about the 
question of refinancing MFIs and their accession to private markets in order to widen 
their potential. The largest MFIs engage marketing specialists to develop promotional 
campaigns targeting the poor for loans and insurance. But who bothers to know 
whether clients are able to absorb these new loans, or rather all that comes with the 
debt?  
The question is especially important in the context of India, where the visible 
microfinance crisis is just the tip of the iceberg.  In 1997 India experienced its best 
publicised spell of farmer suicides – a reaction to a number of agricultural hardships 
that led to the irreversible indebtedness of small and marginal farmers. Rising costs of 
cultivation, degenerating input quality66, rapidly decreasing prices of farm products, 
and a lack of formal credits for small farmers, driving them to alternative and much 
more expensive lending sources, were some of the major determinants of the crisis. 
Between 1997 and 2006, more than 250,000 Indian farmers committed suicide among 
others, due to bad harvests and their inability to keep up with debt repayment 
schedules (Assadi 2006).  
The microfinance crisis that on the one hand originated from the generally hard 
conditions for Indian farmers at the same time reflects a frenzy of private and public 
actors, driven by motives that are hard to relate to a fight against poverty: A new 
commercial niche for the private actors and a collection of vote banks for public actors. 
Microfinance is far from being the panacea it is made out to be by media and 
international organizations. Being subject to reinterpretation and reappropriation, 
microfinancial services are permanently distorted – resulting in their being pushed to 
move away from their social objectives67. 
                                                 
66 In 1998, following structural adjustment policies, India opened its seed sector to global agribusiness and 
with that to genetically engineered seeds which are non renewable, i.e. they have to buy new seeds every 
year At the same time, under pressure from seed international companies, the Indian government reduced the 
minimum germination rate for seeds from 85 to 60%. As a result, in numerous small household farms, these 
changes lead to severe indebtedness.  
67 See the anthropological case study of Célina Jauzelon (2007) which describes a microfinance project 
carried out by an Indian NGO in Tamil Nadu and attempts to demonstrate the complexity of the solidarity 
practices and their representations. Also, for a description of the limits of the Grameen model, see Aminur 
Rahman (1999), and for an ethnography of aid policy and practice in India, cf. David Moose (2005).   
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One needs to ask the question of whether the crisis in Andhra Pradesh is a minor 
phenomenon or whether it reveals that the ‘microfinance machine’ has gone berserk. 
Whatever the answer, it as an occasion to trigger a collective and widespread reflection 
on the dysfunction of microfinance, not only in India but within the worldwide sector 
as a whole68.  
This chapter’s purpose is to highlight consequences of the observed widespread 
microfinance mission drift and by doing so to call for putting the welfare of the client 
back on top of the agenda. Today, microfinance is far from being the panacea of 
poverty which it is made out to be by the public sphere, media and international 
organizations. Microfinance is indeed a powerful tool to face the challenge of poverty 
eradication. The second part of this dissertation discusses an intervention that has been 
designed and implemented with care and – while still with limitations – helps their 
customers to improve their livelihoods. But, it is exactly these limits that need to be 
acknowledged. Only by doing so can the limits be pushed backwards or even be 
eliminated totally. 
 
                                                 
68 On April 20th 2007, the Mexican MFI Compartamos put 30% of its capital up for sale on New York and 
Mexican stock markets. The following day, the trading volume reached 321 million Euros, i.e. 12 times the 
nominal value, and ensured at the shareholder to store up huge profit to the detriment of clients whose 
credits are among the most expensive ones of the country (annual interest of 100%). Nevertheless, despite an 
announcement, grants and subventions of several million Euros were not passed on to clients by the MFIs 
shareholders. 
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PART II 
 
Lesser Evil or Greater Good? 
 
 
 
This second part of the dissertation looks at milk as an extra income generating 
activity for the poor with a focus on a microfinance programme that gives loans for 
their clients to engage in this livelihood strategy. The main aim is to evaluate this 
strategy and the intervention in particular. 
The general analysis is part of chapter four where special focus is placed on the 
subjective expectations of those involved in the activity. Chapters five and six 
concentrate on evaluating the programme offered by the microfinance institution. A 
thorough description of the latter is given in chapter five placing emphasis on the non-
financial component of the program. 
The core data source for the analysis is the household survey I conducted in the course 
of my PhD. Chapters four and five make use of the data and give information that is of 
specific interest for the respective study. A complete description of the survey design 
and a copy of the questionnaire are provided in Appendix nine, including the 
questionnaire.  
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4. Using expectation data to model expected income and 
expenditures in rural India 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Beliefs and expectations play a major role in (investment) decision-making processes 
especially when a high degree of uncertainty is involved. However, only limited 
research addresses the nature of beliefs of financial actors and tries to measure the 
expectations that investors hold – especially when potential investors are the rural poor 
in least and less developed countries (LDCs). 
Latest since Paul Slovic’s (1972) paper on individual’s misperceptions about risk and 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman’s (1979) papers on heuristic-driven decision 
biases and decision frames do we know that beliefs and expectations of agents play a 
major role in the process of deciding to invest or not. Daniel et al. (2002) reviews the 
literature on recent research in behaviour finance. 
Despite advances in especially the field of behavioural economics, most 
(conventional) financial models and studies in the field concentrate on actual objective 
circumstances and on realized outcomes of human behaviour and assume that all 
investors have homogeneous expectations of the joint distributions of investment 
returns. 
This chapter is concerned with investigating subjective expectations of the rural poor 
with respect to income as well as investment returns and costs. Contrary to the bulk of 
the literature on the issue, the focus will not be exclusively on actual outcomes and be 
constrained to homogeneous beliefs. The study will on the other hand address the 
subjectiveness of perception. The information the agents possess and the beliefs they 
have determine the possible outcomes foreseen and their subjective probabilities.  
The major part of this chapter lies in describing the elicitation process of subjective 
expectations and in validating the answers provided by the respondents. Thereafter, 
respondents’ fitted subjective mean is modelled to learn how expectations vary with 
individual attributes.  
The extensive focus on the way expectations were collected and on showing that the 
answers provided are ‘reasonable’ and conform to basic probability laws is justified 
given two major concerns – academic vindication as well as the specific context of the 
study. Considerable scepticism as well as criticism of this approach exists and most 
often economists prefer to avoid its use. This is often based on studies working with 
measurements of expectations stemming from vaguely worded qualitative questions 
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though – as Dominitz & Manski (1997) put it “There is no empirical evidence 
supporting condemnation of all expectations data”. Given the widespread scepticism 
of the approach, validation of answers by respondents to expectation questions was 
and still remains the initial focus of research (Manski, 2004). This is even more 
important given that respondents in this study are the rural poor in India. These are 
agricultural labourers or farmers, most of which have no or very little education. The 
ability to use probabilities in the form of a number between zero and 100 cannot be 
naturally understood. 
Up to date, most of these studies that make use of subjective expectations data 
concentrate on high-income countries. Only a few researchers have started to apply the 
approach in the developing world, where its use is impeded by individuals being 
generally less (if at all) educated and hence less or not familiar with the concept of 
probabilities. Notable exceptions are studies by Attanasio et al (2005) on the use of 
probability distributions of future income in Colombia, Delavande (2004) on the 
efficacy of contraceptive methods in Ghana, and Luseno et al. (2003) and Lybbert et 
al. on pastoralists’ rainfall expectations in East Africa.  
This work distinguishes itself and improves on the studies that relate to LDCs in two 
important matters. First, subjective expectations not only on household income but 
also on specific investment returns and costs were collected, the importance of such 
information for investment decisions outlined as above. Secondly, elicited data goes 
beyond point-probabilities, which allows calculating an individual expected outcome 
distribution.  
This latter distinctive attribute of these subjective expectations is of particular interest 
in the context of this study since it allows – contrary to cross-sectional realization data 
– to distinguish between uncertainty and heterogeneity. To exemplify this consider a 
population of two individuals with a standard deviation in realized income of σy > 0.  
This tells us that the population is heterogeneous; the expected value of income differs 
for both individuals. It does not tell us anything about the uncertainty in their income 
streams though: While one individual might earn a much higher income than the other, 
both might be very certain about the amount they are going to receive. The subjective 
expectation data on the other hand allows calculating the standard deviation of the 
subjective individual expected income distribution. This standard deviation reflects the 
uncertainty in income as perceived by the individual. The data hence gives information 
on heterogeneity within the population as well as on uncertainty of individuals. 
To start with, the next section provides information on the context of the study. 
Thereafter, details on what data are used and how information on the respondents’ 
expectation was collected is given. This is followed by a comprehensive description of 
the elicited probabilities and a validation of the same; the response rate to the 
expectations questions is examined as well as the coherence of answers. Assuming a 
distributional form of the expectation data allows calculating moments of the expected 
outcome distributions, which are compared to realizations of the same variables. 
Thereafter, estimates of these potential subjective outcomes, which are conditional on 
observed attributes are presented. Estimates will be interpreted as best linear predictors 
for these outcomes. Before concluding, the income distributions are used to look at 
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welfare ranking, addressing the question of whether engaging in dairy is indeed a 
mean to reduce inequality within society. The final section concludes. 
 
4.2. Background 
Expected prospective outcomes are a central component to models of intertemporal 
choice. Especially the distribution of future income has continuously been of major 
concern to economic theory and economic policy. Income and expectations thereof 
among others influence consumption and savings decisions, schooling decision, 
insurance purchase, enrolment into welfare programs and investment decisions. The 
importance of taking action in response to beliefs about what will happen in the future 
further increases when future outcomes are uncertain. 
The beliefs that are being analysed in this study relate to perceived costs and benefits 
of engaging in milk-production as an extra-income generating activity.  
Milk production plays a pivotal role in the livelihoods of the rural poor, particularly of 
women, in India. It is one of the few possible means of supporting themselves and 
their families.  Especially in areas that are dominated by agricultural activities 
characterized by high seasonal dependency, milk production offers a way of ensuring 
an additional income stream. In fact, it is not only the milk production that offers 
return to the families; “all body parts are used including horns and hair. A buffalo 
forms a part of the property, possession and profession of rural farmers. Not only that, 
they are an easily ‘convertible currency’ and a reliable ‘living bank’ to serve the 
immediate needs of the rural masses in several communities.” (Nanda & Nakao, 2003) 
It therefore comes as no surprise that this extra income generating activity highly 
promoted by the Indian government as a means to improve the living conditions of 
farmers in rural areas and it is estimated that the underprivileged families constitute 
about 70 to 80 per cent of total livestock production in India (Kurup 2004). In 1965 the 
National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) was created based on the initiative of Lal 
Bahadur Shastri, the then Prime Minister of India. Its mandate was to replicate the 
Amul (Anand Milk Unit Limited) dairy model, which is a genuine example of a 
successful long-standing cooperative organization, credit only being a small part of the 
intervention. Amul is said to have spurred the White Revolution in India, which has 
made India the largest producer of milk worldwide. Supportive of this development 
was a rural development programme, called Operation Flood, which NDDB under 
called Operation Flood started and led in the 1970s. In 2008, it involved 13.4 million 
farmer-members supplying an average of 23,000 metric tons of milk per day. 
Especially in Gujarat, the state where Anul was established, the programme is still 
very present and successfully running. 
More recent action was taken in February 2008 when the chief minister of the state of 
Andhra Pradesh announced to set-up bulk milk chilling units in 31 mandals of Kadapa 
district by the end of the year and started parallel to distribute several thousands of 
milk cattle. It is interesting to note that the political support in the livestock sector is 
mainly constrained to the market of milk. Especially anti-cow slaughter politics 
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prevent livestock owners from realizing the full potential of their animals. This is 
unlikely to change in the near future as great social pressure is exerted given the 
popular understandings of Hinduism – cow slaughter being seen as contrary to what 
the Hindu religion dictates. See Turner (2004) and Jha (2004) for a review of the 
livestock sector in Andhra Pradesh and an illuminating description of the issue of cow 
slaughter. 
The chapter looks into the legitimacy of promoting this livelihood strategy by 
analyzing the distributions of three outcome indicators. The first indicator is overall 
household income and the other two are directly related to the intervention, namely 
income from dairy and animal health expenditures. Of special concern are the 
respondents’ expectations of these outcome indicators. 
Beliefs of investors play a major role in this decision-making process especially due to 
the high degree of uncertainty that is involved. On the one hand, the population under 
consideration in this study faces extreme volatility and uncertainty in their household 
income streams. This is mainly attributed to the fact that households depend on 
agricultural activities as their major source of earnings. Agricultural activities in 
themselves are uncertain but become even more so for the respondents of this study 
since they are living in the second most drought-prone area of India. Furthermore, 
engaging in milk-production incorporates an investment decision – namely to endow 
livestock. This investment decision is a risky one given that livestock is a particularly 
risky asset; not only can the animal fall ill or even die, but the owner needs knowledge 
in keeping and raising the animal and needs to be able to provide fodder on a regular 
basis. Given the uncertain setting in which the investors live, especially the issue of 
fodder-provision increases the riskiness of the investment.  
The distribution of future outcomes is usually derived from the analysis of frequentist 
distribution of realizations (Dominitz, 2001). In order to infer such a distribution, 
assumptions on information individuals possess and on how they make use of this 
information necessarily have to be made. Typically, a single model of the income 
generating process is put forward which assumes individuals to form rational 
expectations. 
Given the unique attribute of a primary data set collected, it will be possible to avoid 
making such stringent assumptions in this study. Instead of inferring the income 
distribution from realizations, this study uses data on households’ subjective 
probability distributions, collected by asking respondents specifically about their 
beliefs.  
 
4.3. The Data 
The data used in the analysis stems from the household survey undertaken from 
January to March 2008 as described in more detail in chapter five as well as in 
Appendix 9.1. In brief, 1,041 households were interviewed on information related to 
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their household composition, income, assets, consumption, risks and special sections 
on livestock and on credit, savings and insurance. 
Data on expectations was elicited at three times during the interview – in the income 
section on total expected future household income and in the livestock section on 
expected future income from dairy activities as well as expected medical expenses for 
the animal. 
The question format to elicit the subjective expectations is based on the ones used in 
the surveys undertaken for the evaluation of Familias en Accion in rural Colombia, 
which asks about the expected household income. 
The expectations questions were worded as follows: 
How likely do you think it is that your income in the coming year will be 
higher than _________ (A/B/C) Rupees?69 
The thresholds A, B and C, were determined by prior asking the respondents about the 
minimum and maximum amount they expect to earn within the coming months. This 
range was then equally divided into four sections, the thresholds being named A, B 
and C. 
The questions for the minimum and maximum had the following format: 
Maximum: Imagine that you have a very good year, every member of 
working age in the household managed to have work, and there were 
no droughts or anything the like. What would be the maximum 
amount of income your household would receive in such a situation in 
one year? 
Minimum: Now imagine the total opposite: the harvest is bad; animals get 
sick, finding work is not possible. What would be the monthly income 
of your household in such a situation?  
As the majority of respondents had no or very little schooling it could not be expected 
for them to know the concept of probabilities and the probability laws that these follow 
– and hence to answer the question about their income with a number between zero 
and 100. Therefore, again following the format of the survey conducted in Columbia, a 
short introduction to percentages was given to the respondents in the form of a ‘game’. 
This was done after asking about the minimum and maximum expected income and 
before eliciting the probabilities of the thresholds (A, B, C) occurring. 
The game that was played had the subsequent format: 
 
                                                 
69 For the expected animal-health costs the wording was as follows: How likely do you think it is that you 
will have to spend more than _________ (A/B/C) Rupees on health services for your animals in the coming 
month? 
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We have a ruler here with a scale from 0 to 100. We will use this as an 
indicator of how sure you are that a situation will happen in the future.  
Let's take rain as an example: 
How sure are you that it will rain sometime tomorrow? 
1. If you are absolutely sure that it will rain, point to the 100 on the ruler. 
2. If you are absolutely sure that it will not rain tomorrow, point to 0 on 
the ruler. 
3. If you are not sure whether it will rain or not but think that it is more 
likely to rain than not, point somewhere on the ruler between 0 and 100 
but closer to 100 than to 0. 
4. If you are not sure whether it will rain or not but think it is more likely 
that it will not rain, point somewhere on the ruler, but closer to 0 than 
to 100. 
A visual aid – namely a ruler - was employed to help the respondent.70 
Subsequently, respondents were asked to give their belief on the probability of rain the 
coming day.  
The understanding of the concept of probabilities is one important factor for the 
elicitation process; a second one is the understanding of certain basic probability laws. 
Important in this context is the concept of monotonicity. Since the income thresholds 
A, B, and C are increasing, the probability of earning these thresholds should not 
increase. In order for respondents to grasp this concept, an extension to the survey 
conducted in Columbia was employed. Respondents were not only asked about the 
probability that it would rain tomorrow but also how high the probability was that it 
would rain within the coming week and within the coming month. The probability of 
these occurrences should not decrease for monotonicity to hold. 
Interviewers were trained to take a lot of time when explaining the concept of 
probabilities and were also allowed to give further explanations in case the 
respondents gave answers to the rain questions that did not obey the probability laws. 
Only when this concept was understood did interviewers go on asking about the 
probabilities of income reaching a certain threshold. Here, interviewers were not 
allowed to prompt and were supposed to note the answers as provided by the 
respondent. This was made clear in their training, which included a special section on 
these expectation questions. Nevertheless, while it was not done when interviews were 
supervised, some prompting cannot be ruled out. 
As mentioned, not only subjective expectations on future household income were 
elicited but also on income from dairy and health expenditures for the animals. These 
                                                 
70 Although the survey was conducted in one of the most drought-prone areas in India and outside the 
monsoon season, it was possible to get variation in the responses to questions on the probability of rain. 
During the time the survey was conducted, it rained several days – contrary to what is typical in the area. 
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are hence subjective expectations on returns specific to the investment. Eliciting 
probabilities on such specific returns is new in the literature on subjective expectations, 
which mainly concentrates on income figures.  
Some studies exist that work with subjective expectations on outcomes other than 
income. These  include Hurd & McGerry (1995) who evaluate the subjective 
probabilities of survival, working with the probability of living to 75 or 85, Van der 
Klaauw (2000) who uses self-reported expected future occupation to estimate a 
structural dynamic model of teacher career decisions under uncertainty, Delavande 
(2005) who studies women’s subjective expectations regarding existing birth control 
methods, and Delavande and Kohler (2007) who look at probabilistic subjective 
expectations about HIV infection. Most of the studies that deal with non-income 
related subjective expectations are constrained in that information is not rich enough to 
construct a probability distribution of future events. 
The data collected on expected income from dairy and expected health costs is hence 
unique in the sense that specific investment returns are looked at and that several 
points on the cdf are available to construct a probability distribution as will be 
explained in section 4.4. 
The way this data was collected is in line with the previous description on expected 
income. The exact wordings of the questions were as follows: 
Expected Income from Dairy: 
Minimum: Imagine all your animals stay healthy and give quality milk. What 
would be the maximum amount of monthly income your household would 
receive in such a situation from selling by-products of your animals? 
Maximum: Now imagine the total opposite: your animals fall ill and give no 
milk. What would be the monthly income of your household in such a 
situation from selling by-products of your animals? 
Expectation Question: How likely do you think it is that your typical monthly 
income from selling products of the animals in the coming month will be 
higher than _________ (A/B/C) Rupees? 
Expected Animal Health Costs: 
Minimum: Imagine that your animals do not get any serious illness during 
the coming month. What would be the minimum amount of money you 
would have to pay for health-related costs of your animals? (this does not 
include normal day-to-day costs such as fodder) 
Maximum: Now imagine the total opposite: your animals fall seriously ill and 
you need to have them treated. What would be the maximum amount you 
would have to pay on health related costs in such a situation? (include 
possible transportation costs) 
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Expectation Question: How likely do you think it is that you will have to spend 
more than _________ (A/B/C) Rupees on health services for your 
animals in the coming month? 
 
4.4. Validation 
4.4.1.  Willingness to respond  
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the questionnaire was administered to 1,041 households, 
682 of which owned any type of cow or buffalo (including calves and bullocks) and 
585 of these owned female animals that were old enough to reproduce and hence to 
produce milk. Out of these 1,041 households, 1,012 (97 per cent) gave answers to the 
questions on minimum and maximum expected overall household income as well as to 
the questions on probabilities. Of the 29 households whose probabilities were not 
elicited, 15 gave answers on the expected minimum and maximum income. In terms of 
characteristics, the respondents that did not give any answers do not seem to own less 
land and have a statistically significant lower income but are not significantly different 
in key characteristics such as education level, caste, primary activity of household, 
household composition and wealth (savings and assets) of the household. These 
response rates (which are even higher for realizations) therefore do not corroborate the 
common finding of substantial non-response for income questions.  
Table 4.1: Response Rates 
    Income Dairy Income Health Costs 
Total # of Obs.   1041 585* 682** 
no % given but answers to min/max given 15 11 6 
  total 29 18 29 
Wrong answer violation of monotonicity 5 2 6 
  wrong 'direction' 2 4 7 
  total 7 6 13 
TOTAL no. of Obs. Available 1005 561 640 
* Number of respondents with milch cattle                 ** Number of respondents with any type of cattle 
Unfortunately, the respondents’ willingness to respond does not imply meaningful 
answers. Given the environment the respondents live in and the uncertainty they face, 
it would be crude to believe that these people do not think probabilistically about 
uncertain events. Nevertheless, a major concern in the elicitation of probabilities is that 
respondents may not make full use of modern probability theory when thinking about 
uncertain events (see for example Walley (1991)). This concern becomes especially 
relevant when talking about the rural poor in developing countries of whom many are 
not able to write their own name, having no or very little education.  
The way the data was elicited tried to account for this knowledge gap and experience 
in the field confirmed their understanding. Nevertheless, it remains important to 
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validate responses and to judge whether expectations are reported coherently. This will 
be done following Dominitz & Manski (1997) and analysing the rate of logical 
response errors and the extent of bunching of responses. 
4.4.2. Logical Response Errors 
Numbers provided in Table 4.1 show that seven of the 1,012 respondents that provided 
probabilities related to the expected overall household income thresholds, gave 
answers not conforming to the basic probability laws; five respondents violated 
monotonicity and two reported increasing probabilities although, the way the questions 
were posed, the likelihood should have decreased or stayed the same. Nevertheless, 
these violations make up less than one per cent of the sample.  
A similar pattern can be observed for subjectively expected income from dairy. More 
respondents reported violating probabilities in the later section on animal health costs. 
It is not clear why this is the case, given that respondents were faced with questions 
about subjective probabilities twice before getting to this question. It might be 
attributed to the fact that respondents learned to consider events where something is 
received and had problems applying it to the opposite situation of expenditures. 
4.4.3. Bunching of Percentages 
A clear pattern of bunching around multiples of tens and to a lesser extent around fives 
can be observed. Table 4.2 gives the frequencies of probabilities stated for the 
household income thresholds. This form of bunching can be explained by the ruler 
used to elicit probabilities. The ruler had marks only for steps of ten and these numbers 
were written on the ruler. Respondents might therefore have been induced to point to 
these marks instead of in-between them.  
Of more interest is the extent of bunching of the percent chance responses at 0%, 50%, 
and 100%. When asked for the percentage chance that next year’s overall household 
income will be higher than the first (and lowest) threshold, no respondent answered  0 
per cent and two gave the mid-value of 50 per cent. For the second threshold (the mid-
point) there were again no 100s or 0s stated but a clear bunching is apparent with more 
than half of the sample believing in a 50-50 chance of earning more than the midpoint 
in-between their expected minimum and maximum income. 71  Finally, only one 
respondent sees a zero probability of earning an amount between this threshold and the 
expected maximum, 51 respondents (five per cent) state a 50 per cent probability and 
none 100. All in all the pattern of responses across thresholds is sensible, which also 
holds for the pattern of responses given to the questions on dairy income probabilities 
                                                 
71 Note that there is no consistent difference in reporting 50 per cent between respondent that engage in dairy 
and those that do not. 
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as well as expected medical expenses for the animal. The Tables are given in 
Appendix 4.A.72 
Table 4.2: Tabulation of Reported Probabilities 
thr A thr B thr C % 
No % No % No % 
0         1 0.1 
3         1 0.1 
5         1 0.1 
10         57 5.67 
15         5 0.5 
20         391 38.91 
25         32 3.18 
30     9 0.9 353 35.12 
40     99 9.85 106 10.55 
45     10 1     
50 2 0.2 544 54.13 51 5.07 
55     1 0.1     
60 33 3.28 259 25.77 6 0.6 
70 114 11.34 79 7.85 1 0.1 
75 6 2.59         
80 248 24.68 4 0.4     
85 2 0.2         
90 573 57.01         
100 7 0.7         
4.4.4. Correlation of Probabilities 
Finally, answers to the probabilities of rain occurring are correlated with the 
probabilities of earning (or paying) a certain threshold (A, B, C). The purpose is to see 
whether these variables vary sensibly with each other. 
With data from developing countries and the probability of rain tomorrow, one would 
naturally expect there to be no significant correlation. Only for very few people would 
the yearly household income depend on short-term rain prospects. The content of this 
study differs. For one, as will be elaborated on in section 4.5 (see Table 4.5), the 
primary income source of respondents is from agricultural activities – respondents 
have their own farm or work as agricultural labour. It can hence be expected that the 
probability of rain and the probability of earning a certain amount is not totally 
independent – especially if a longer perspective is taken. It is possible to do the latter 
since respondent were not only asked about their beliefs of how likely it is that it will 
rain tomorrow, but also how likely it is within the next week and the next month.  
                                                 
72 Expected medical expenses experience a higher incidence of bunching at 0 per cent. This lies in the fact 
that an NGO operates in the area that provides health services free of charge. The issue will be elaborated on 
in more detail later in the study. 
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Table 4.3a-c shows the pair-wise correlations and the corresponding significance level. 
Correlations are indicated with a star if the significance level does not exceed five per 
cent. Looking at correlations with probabilities of earning at least a certain amount of 
household income next year (Table 4.3a), it can be seen that no matter what time 
horizon and income threshold combination is considered, a significant and negative 
correlation exists. Intuitively, this is an unexpected result. Given that the survey was 
conducted in the second most drought-prone area in India, one would expect any 
prospect of rain to be positively correlated with income. Three possible explanations 
can be brought forward: for one, the survey was conducted when the harvesting period 
was coming to an end and during the harvesting period, rain can have a negative effect 
on the yield. The right panel of Table 4.3a supports this hypothesis – one can see that 
the correlation is insignificant for households whose main income source is other than 
from agricultural activity. Secondly, these are households that rely on labour work 
since they do not have their own land. Rains during crop harvesting reduce the scope 
to get harvesting and post harvesting related work to their family members. 
 
Table 4.3a: Correlations of Probabilities – Total Household Income 
 Total Household Income 
 Full Sample 
Households whose primary 
income is not derived from 
agricultural activity 
 probability of… prob>A prob>B prob>C prob>A prob>B prob>C 
-0.161* -0.11* -0.10* -0.167 -0.013 -0.113 …rain tomorrow 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.89) (0.26) 
-0.091* -0.11* -0.11* -0.105 -0.186 -0.36* …rain within the next week  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.06) (0.00) 
-0.096* -0.16* -0.17* -0.114 -0.185 -0.30* …rain within the next month  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.06) (0.00) 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors; stars indicate significance at a 5% significance level. 
Nevertheless, the third – and pessimistic - reason that can be brought forward is best 
put in the words of Mohan Onteddu, employee of BASIX India, whom I would like to 
thank for going back to the farmers to discuss this finding first-hand: “Rural Indians' 
immediate response to any such surveys is that they try to tell you that they are the 
most unfortunate people in the country. They express frustration in answering that 
whether it rains or not, their lives would not change.” It is important to note that this 
statement is based on discussion with farmers and not landless labourers. Nevertheless, 
one should not neglect such opportunistic behaviour of respondents – like taking the 
opportunity to voice their exasperation. 
A similar finding holds for the correlation between rain probabilities and probabilities 
of earning a certain threshold from dairy activities. As can be seen in Table 4.3b lower 
threshold probabilities correlate significantly with rain within the next week and 
higher threshold probabilities with the likelihood of rain in the coming month.  
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Table 4.3b: Correlations of Probabilities – Income from Dairy 
 Income from Dairy 
 Full Sample 
Households that primarily buy 
the fodder for their animals and 
have also their own land 
 probability of… prob>A prob>B prob>C prob>A prob>B prob>C 
-0.035 -0.004 -0.025 0.47* 0.379* 0.146 …rain tomorrow 
(0.43) (0.92) (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) 
-0.09* -0.01* -0.073 0.198 0.185 0.183 …rain within the next week  (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) 
-0.005 -0.10* -0.07* 0.257 0.234 0.223 …rain within the next month  (0.92) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors; stars indicate significance at a 5% significance 
level. 
Again, the correlations are negative. This negative correlation does not mean that the 
rain reduces income from dairy – which would be a hypothesis difficult to defend. The 
explanation lies in a major factor of risk that cattle owners face – availability of 
fodder. It is not uncommon for landless households to turn to animal husbandry – most 
of these depend on fodder that they collect on other people’s land or, if they can afford 
it, on fodder that they buy. The right panel in Table 4.3b again shows the same 
correlation for a sub-set, namely for those households that buy at least some of their 
fodder and at the same time own agricultural land. For these, the correlation is positive 
and only significant with probability of rain tomorrow. These are households that own 
their own land. Rain increases the availability of quality fodder on their own land so 
that they can feed their animals with this. This puts landless households in the need to 
find another source of fodder for their animals.  
And, finally the correlations of rain probabilities and the probabilities of having to pay 
a certain amount on animal health costs. As before, some negative and significant 
correlations are found. These are driven by cost expectations from households that 
derive income from selling milk – and not from households that only own non-milk 
cattle (as can be seen in the right panel of Table 4.3c). As will be shown later, the 
expected costs incorporate expected foregone earnings so that the significant positive 
correlations are in line with the results on correlations found when looking at expected 
income from dairy as just discussed. 
Taking the negligible percentage of logical response error, the sensible pattern of 
probabilities for different thresholds, and the expected correlations between stated 
probabilities, one can be relatively certain that the answers provided conform to the 
basic laws of probability and that respondents did not give random answers for the 
sake of answering. 
 
 
 
 68
Table 4.3c: Correlations of Probabilities – Animal Health Costs 
 Animal Health Costs 
 Full Sample Households that do not derive income from selling milk 
 probability of… prob>A prob>A prob>A prob>A prob>B prob>C 
-0.032 -0.015 -0.020 -0.037 -0.005 -0.028 …rain tomorrow 
(0.44) (0.71) (0.62) (0.75) (0.97) (0.81) 
0.122* 0.129* 0.105* -0.14 -0.104 -0.131 …rain within the next week  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.37) (0.26) 
0.140* 0.122* 0.066 -0.153 -0.137 -0.172 …rain within the next month  (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.19) (0.24) (0.14) 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard errors; stars indicate significance at a 5% significance 
level. 
 
 
4.5. Fitting a Subjective Income Distribution 
The above conclusion allows interpreting answers to the percentage chance questions 
as points on the subjective cumulative distribution function of future household 
income (dairy income and medical expenses respectively). 
One can hence fit a respondent-specific subjective income (cost) distribution, which 
can then be used to analyze how income (cost) expectations vary with respondents' 
realized income (cost). 
This study assumes a piece-wise uniform probability distribution and focuses on the 
means and standard deviations of these distributions. Other, more complicated 
distribution functions can be thought of. Dominitz and Manski (1997) for example 
assume a log-normal income distribution fitted via non-linear least squares. The three 
probabilities elicited from each respondent are not sufficient to determine which 
distribution most closely describes the shape of the respondent’s subjective outcome 
distribution. Therefore, the piece-wise uniform distribution was chosen and can, if 
need be, interpreted as an approximation to more complex distributions. 
Table 4.4a shows the average probabilities assigned by respondents for the four 
sections of the expected household income distribution. The first block gives statistics 
for the whole sample. Below, the sample is divided into respondents for whom one 
source of overall income is dairy activities and into respondents who do not get 
income from selling milk products. The former are labelled ‘DI’ (=Respondents with 
Dairy Income) and the latter ‘no DI’. 
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Table 4.4a: Probabilities Assigned to Sections of Income Distribution 
   Income 
    obs min max median mean sd 
Min – LQ 1005 0 50 10 16.13 8.48 
LQ – Midpoint 1005 10 60 30 30.81 8.28 
Midpoint – UQ 1005 0 57 30 26.11 6.87 
Total 
UQ – Max  1005 0 70 30 26.95 9.71 
Min – LQ 550 0 40 10 15.45 8.06 
LQ – Midpoint 550 10 60 30 30.93 8.57 
Midpoint – UQ 550 0 57 30 26.14 7.16 
DI  
UQ – Max  550 0 70 30 27.49 10.17 
Min – LQ 455 10 50 10 16.96 8.89 
LQ – Midpoint 455 10 50 30 30.67 7.93 
Midpoint – UQ 455 10 50 30 26.08 6.51 
No DI 
UQ – Max  455 10 60 25 26.30 9.09 
Notes: “DI” are all respondent households that receive income from dairy. “No DI” 
are all households receiving income from other sources only. 
 
Consistently for both of these groups, the first section (Minimum expected income, 
Min, to the lower quartile, LQ) has the lowest mean (and median) probability and the 
second section (Lower Quartile, LQ, to the midpoint) the highest. Income appears 
slightly right skewed, while the probabilities of the two intervals among the midpoint 
add up to the highest value (around 57 per cent). Figure 4.1a gives an idea of the 
average individual income distribution derived from the answers to the expectations 
questions. 
Figure 4.1a: The Piece-wise Uniform Distribution – Household Income 
 
 
The average probabilities assigned to the sections of the Dairy Income distributions (as 
displayed in Table 4.3b) follow a similar pattern. As in the case of overall income, one 
finds all the section LQ-Midpoint to have the highest probabilities and the first interval 
(Min-LQ) to consistently have the lowest probability; although the latter probabilities 
are higher than the ones for the overall income distribution. Also, dairy income seems 
to be slightly right skewed, although somewhat less than overall household income. 
Numbers are reported in Table 4.4b. 
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Table 4.4b: Probabilities Assigned to Sections of Dairy Income and Medical Cost 
Distributions 
    obs min max median mean sd 
Min – LQ 562 0 60 10 17.48 9.40 
LQ – Midpoint 562 10 50 30 30.12 8.47 
Midpoint – UQ 561 10 50 30 25.91 6.84 
Dairy Income 
  
  UQ – Max  561 2 60 25 26.44 8.79 
Min – LQ 604 0 100 20 33.31 30.39 
LQ – Midpoint 604 0 60 30 25.51 13.57 
Midpoint – UQ 604 0 50 20 20.99 10.91 
Medical 
Expenses 
  
 UQ – Max  604 0 50 20 20.19 11.79 
The distribution of expected Medical (Health) Costs exhibits a greater right-skewness 
than the expected income distributions. The average probability of the first interval 
(Min-LQ) has the highest probability among the four intervals, followed by the 
interval LQ-Midpoint, as depicted in Table 4.3b. The remaining probability is 
distributed equally over the upper half of the distribution. This right-skewness of the 
distribution stems from the fact that many observations (11% of the overall sample, 
17% of respondents owning cattle) do not expect any expenditures for their animals’ 
health. The Rural Development Trust (RDT) operates in many of the survey villages, 
an NGO that among others offers free health services (including emergency services) 
for livestock. Therefore, villagers can be sure that, even if their animal falls ill, they 
will not have to pay for the needed services. Note that when excluding these 
observations– as in the case of income - one observes the first interval (Min-LQ) to 
have the lowest and the second interval (LQ-Midpoint) to have the highest 
probabilities. A typical individual specific distribution of expected medical expenses 
for the animal (including observations that expect zero costs) is depicted in Figure 4.1b. 
Figure 4.1b: The Piece-wise Uniform Distribution – Medical Expenses 
  
 
Based on the assumption of this piece-wise uniform distribution, means and standard 
deviations of the expected distributions of household income, income from selling 
milk and of medical expenses on cattle are derived. 
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In what follows, these moments of expectations will be compared to realizations of the 
same variables. 
 
4.6. Simple comparison of expectations and realizations 
As already described above, expectations were elicited with respect to three outcome 
variables, namely total yearly household income, monthly income from dairy activities, 
and yearly medical costs for the owned animal(s). 
More specifically, total household income is the sum of all income sources for the 
whole household of the respondent over the last year. The respondent was then asked 
whether this sum is his typical income and if not, what the typical income would be. In 
the analysis to follow, these variables will be referred to as ‘last year’s’ and ‘typical 
income’. A distinction is being made because one might expect typical income to be 
less noisy than last year’s income. One might interpret typical income as representing 
the permanent component of income. Typical income was equal to last year’s income 
for 48 per cent of the sample, higher for 35 per cent and lower for 18 per cent of 
respondents.  
The same distinction between typical and last period was made for income from dairy. 
Typical health costs for the animal were not asked for. In additional to questions on 
medical expenses, respondents were asked about other losses they experienced due to 
the animal falling ill, such as foregone earnings or transport costs. A distinction is 
being made between purely ‘medical’ and ‘full costs’, the latter one including 
additional costs such as for transportation. Respondents were asked not to include day-
to-day expenditures such as fodder. 
All results presented are transformations of the variables. Given the skewedness of the 
data, overall household income was transformed using the Box-Cox power 
transformation73, for income from dairy and medical expenses a log transformation 
with zero skewedness was applied.74 Note also that income is on a yearly and income 
from dairy on a monthly basis. Initially, both overall as well as dairy incomes were 
asked for on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, during piloting it was understood that 
respondents could most easily estimate their overall income on a yearly basis. This 
stems from the greatest part of respondents’ income being from agriculture and hence 
strongly varying with harvesting seasons. In Table 4.5 it can be seen that for the whole 
sample on average 37% of overall income is from farm profit and 20 per cent from 
wages as agricultural labour. 
                                                 
73 Transformed variable TL = (exp^L-1)/L, where L is chosen so that the TL exhibits a skewness of zero. 
74 Statistics of data in levels as well as in natural logarithms are available on request. So are statistics of 
income per household member as well as income from dairy and health costs per animal. As interpretations 
remain the same, only one set of results is presented. 
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Table 4.5:  Income from different sources as percentage of overall income 
INCOME SOURCE mean sd 
Wages from non-agricultural sector - formal  0.02 0.10 
Wages from non-agricultural sector - informal  0.01 0.06 
Wages (possibly in-kind) from public relief work 0.05 0.12 
Non-farm self-employment (net-income) 0.13 0.26 
Farm profit 0.37 0.31 
Wages from agric. labor (not on own farm)  0.20 0.25 
Income from Dairy Activities 0.16 0.21 
TOTAL 0.9475  
 
Table 4.6 describes the household income variables concentrated on in this study. 
Looking at the empirical means and medians of the variables shows that the data 
consists of a sample of households that experienced a higher income in the previous 
year than they typically do and that they expect this increase to continue in the coming 
year. The mean of typical income is 71,184 Rupees (equivalent to approximately US$ 
1,82076), the mean of last year’s income was slightly higher with 72,901 (US$ 1,860) 
and the sample mean of expected income for the coming year is 73, 948 (US$ 1,890). 
In levels, these differences are not statistically different. Realizations and expectations 
differ significantly when considering the box-cox transformation.77 
The expected standard deviation of income indicates an overwhelming uncertainty in 
income, especially when considering the sample mean. As Dominitz (2001) points out, 
these means are sensitive to just a few outlying fitted expectations and can hence be 
misleading. The box-cox transformation is more robust to this type of measurement 
error and will hence be the focus of further analysis.  
From the lower two panels of Table 4.6 as well as from Figure 4.2 one can see that 
respondent households who derive part of their income from selling milk had, 
typically have and also expect a significantly higher overall household income stream. 
In addition, their expected standard deviation in income is significantly lower for 
respondents who derive income from dairy than for those who do not. This lower 
expected standard deviation is also reflected in the smaller range between the average 
(and median) expected minimum and maximum incomes. As already explained in the 
introduction, this statistic provides a measure of idiosyncratic risk, something that 
cannot be extracted from the standard deviation of realized income. It gives a first 
indication that this income diversification strategy indeed helps in reducing volatility 
                                                 
75 Remaining percentages are distributed among the following income sources: Sales of handicrafts or other 
non-agricultural, Traditional hereditary occupation, Migration income / remittances, Benefits from 
government schemes, Pensions, Dowry income, Other income sources (e.g. gambling) 
76 Doing simple calculations not adjusting for household composition but only for numbers of household 
members shows that the sample households typically live on just above one dollar a day (US$ 1.05). 
77 With the log transformation, expectations do not differ from last year’s income but do from typical 
income. 
 73
in the overall household income stream – besides an increase in income, another major 
objective of the intervention. 
 
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for Household Income Variables 
  Income Box-Cox Income 
    
Obs 
min max med. mean sd min max med. mean sd 
Typical 1013 0 3,200,000 50,000 71,184 122,112 8.20 14.98 10.89 10.91 0.73 
Last 
year's 1019 0 637,000 55,400 72,901 63,505 7.93 13.37 10.97 10.99 0.68 
Expected 
Income 995 1,388 1,145,000 56,250 73,948 70,547 9.04 13.42 11.04 11.07 0.63 
Expected 
sd. 995 1,502 8,189,208 74,418 119,947 321,103 0.11 8.47 1.48 1.65 1.10 
Min 1019 1,000 500,000 40,000 54,112 49,074 8.44 13.13 10.68 10.71 0.71 
Midpoint 1019 1,250 650,000 55,000 71,517 59,673 8.79 13.39 11.01 11.04 0.64 
T
ot
al
 
Max 1019 1,500 800,000 70,000 88,921 73,088 9.11 13.60 11.26 11.28 0.62 
Typical 549 1,000 3,200,000 60,000 87,996 155,955 8.44 14.98 11.06 11.12 0.70 
Last 
year's 551 10,000 637,000 67,000 89,454 73,946 9.46 13.37 11.15 11.21 0.63 
Expected 
Income 542 1,388 1,145,000 66,750 88,630 84,479 9.04 13.42 11.15 11.23 0.64 
Expected 
sd. 542 1,502 8,189,208 84,662 133,497 367,558 0.15 7.56 1.43 1.60 1.09 
Min 551 1,000 500,000 50,000 65,503 57,712 8.44 13.13 10.89 10.89 0.71 
Midpoint 551 1,250 650,000 65,000 85,921 70,118 8.79 13.39 11.16 11.21 0.65 
D
I 
Max 551 1,500 800,000 80,000 106,338 85,428 9.11 13.60 11.38 11.44 0.63 
Typical 464 0 850,000 40,000 51,291 55,440 8.20 13.66 10.68 10.67 0.69 
Last 
year's 468 0 402,400 43,400 53,412 40,586 7.93 12.91 10.74 10.73 0.65 
Expected 
Income 453 2,288 360,250 46,500 56,382 42,836 9.15 12.65 10.87 10.87 0.55 
Expected 
sd. 453 3,603 3,455,249 56,862 103,735 254,089 0.11 8.47 1.55 1.71 1.10 
Min 468 1,500 240,000 30,000 40,701 31,524 8.55 12.40 10.42 10.50 0.64 
Midpoint 468 2,250 300,000 45,000 54,559 37,935 8.93 12.63 10.83 10.84 0.57 
N
o 
D
I 
Max 468 3,000 450,000 60,000 68,416 47,648 9.26 13.03 11.12 11.09 0.54 
 
 
 74
Figure 4.2: Typical, Last year’s & expected household income (total sample, DI & No 
DI) 
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            Income from Dairy 
........... Sample withOUT 
            Income from Dairy 
It is interesting to note that respondents who do not sell any products from milk cattle 
expect a much higher increase in their overall household income than the 
approximately other half of the sample as is depicted in Figure 4.3. The left graph 
shows typical, last year’s and expected income for respondents with income from 
dairy and the right one for those without. This higher difference in expectations from 
realizations for the latter group is confirmed when testing for the difference in these 
variables to be zero. The t-statistics are above ten. 
Figure 4.3: DI & No DI (Typical, Last year’s and expected household income) 
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It appears however that the expected increase in overall household income is not 
driven by an expected increase in income from dairy activities as depicted in Table 4.7. 
Considering the transformed variable of dairy income, less sensitive to outliers, mean 
expected income from dairy is slightly below last year’s income but above the typical 
income. The difference between expectations and last year’s income is insignificant 
though; the difference between typical and expected income on the other hand is 
significant. 
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics for Dairy Income Variables 
  Dairy Income Log-ZeroSkw - Dairy Income 
    
obs 
min max med. mean sd min max med mean sd 
Typical 556 0 45,000 2,000 2,396 2,954 6.36 10.73 7.85 7.80 0.59 
Last year's 560 0 38,333 2,250 3,003 3,339 5.92 10.56 7.87 7.87 0.70 
Expected 
Income 561 190 125,750 2,450 4,011 7,887 5.26 11.74 7.86 7.85 0.80 
Expected sd. 560 265 152,091 3,250 6,994 14,556 0.31 12.45 1.66 1.96 1.23 
Min 562 100 110,000 1,800 2,903 6,432 2.22 11.61 7.44 7.31 1.01 
Midpoint 562 200 125,000 2,500 4,043 7,998 2.33 11.73 7.75 7.65 1.00 
T
ot
al
 
Max 562 300 140,000 3,000 5,183 9,872 2.76 11.85 7.91 7.88 1.02 
 
Table 4.8 shows summary statistics for experienced and expected veterinary expenses 
for the cattle owned. Respondents were asked to include in the expected health related 
expenditures possible transaction costs but to exclude day-to-day expenditures for the 
animal (such as fodder). This is reflected in a much closer mean as well as median of 
realized full costs to expected costs. These costs bear great uncertainty though, as 
reflected in high standard deviations as well as in considerably high expected standard 
deviations. Figure 4.4 graphs the variables. The first hump reflects customers that are 
able to make use of the free services offered by the non-governmental organisation 
RDT already mentioned before. 
Table 4.8: Summary Statistics for Animal Health Costs 
  Animal Health Expenses 
Log-ZeroSkw - AnimalHealth 
Expenses 
    
obs 
min max med mean sd min max med mean sd 
Last year's 627 0 300,000 200 1,228 12,080 1.91 12.61 5.33 4.83 2.18 
Last year's-full 583 0 300,000 1,000 4,108 16,681 3.74 12.61 6.95 6.42 2.02 
Expected 
Expenses 598 0 8,100 820 1,301 1,372 4.75 9.02 6.88 6.76 1.02 
Expected sd. 598 0 57,910 1,568 3,026 4,744 0.55 9.19 2.24 2.53 1.14 
Min 627 0 6,000 500 695 888 4.50 8.71 6.38 6.16 1.04 
Midpoint 627 0 8,000 750 1,131 1,284 5.48 9.02 6.90 6.86 0.87 
T
ot
al
 
Max 627 0 10,000 1,000 1,568 1,736 5.74 9.24 7.18 7.17 0.89 
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Figure 4.4: Realized and Expected Cattle Health Costs 
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Finally, Figure 4.5 puts the three expectation distributions into relation. It can be seen 
that income from dairy bears a higher uncertainty than overall income, as reflected in a 
higher standard deviation of the distribution. 
 
Figure 4.5: Expected Incomes and Costs 
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A finding of greatly differing realization and expectation distributions would have 
been no proof of expectation data being wrong, but finding them moving closely 
together can be seen as support for their validity. Comparing expectations and 
realizations implicitly assumes that observed behaviour of individuals is conditioned 
on expectations about future consequences of decisions. In other words, individuals act 
according to their beliefs and outcomes are contingent on the decisions taken. Their 
beliefs on the other hand depend on their experiences and hence on previous 
realizations. And, this latter dependence is expected to be especially dominant in an 
environment where income is very uncertain. These uncertainties emanate from 
various sources, but are especially noteworthy in the context of rural India, since 
climatic shocks can affect product prices and yields. In such contexts, where the 
livelihood of households depends heavily on sources they cannot control, last year’s 
income might be the best predictor of future income.  
The next section estimates a respondent’s one year ahead expectations of income 
making use of expectations data available. The aim is to quantify the dependence of 
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expectations on realizations and to relate the expected income distribution to a set of 
exogenous characteristics of the respondent households. It is of interest to see whether 
these relationships fit the predictions of theory. 
 
4.7. Empirical Predictions of income expectations – a time-series 
model 
The most common way of inferring an individual’s expectation of future income is to 
estimate the relationship between income and characteristics from the previous year. 
Making assumptions on information available to the individual and how this 
information is used then allows making statements about expectations. 
One would hence estimate a model such as the following: 
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t uxyy ++= −− 11 βα ,     (1) 
where y is income, x are individual or household characteristics, α and β are unknown 
parameters and u are idiosyncratic, mean zero, iid income innovations. Information on 
subjective uncertainty is typically inferred from the residual variance of realized 
income. If one is willing to assume that the stochastic component of first-differenced 
income follows a moving average process with heteroskedastic innovations, additional 
information on subjective uncertainty can be extracted from the squared residuals 
(note that this subjective uncertainty will be biased upwards if the individual possesses 
more information than the analyst in addition to the presence of a measurement error 
in income). It is common practice in the literature to either assume that the error of 
first-differenced (log) income follows such an MA(q) process or that the error of the 
equation estimated in levels, as given in (1), follows an AR(1) process. 
This analysis will proceed without placing any structural assumptions on the error 
terms. Instead, elicited subjective expectations are used directly as the dependent 
variable in the model. Hence, instead of estimating (1), ity  will be replaced by 
i
ty~ , the 
tilde above the variable indicating subjective expectations. Equation (1) becomes: 
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t xyy εβα ++= −− 11~ ,     (2) 
Table 4.9 gives summary statistics for some of the explanatory variables used in the 
analysis. Statistics for the total sample is given and in addition a distinction between 
respondents who receive income from dairy and those that do not is made. The last 
column gives the t-statistic for the test of the difference in the mean of the two groups 
being zero. 
A typical sample household consists of almost five members, belonging to the 
backward caste and engaging in agricultural labour as their primary activity. The 
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household head is on average 44 years old, the spouse approximately seven years 
younger and in most cases, both have no formal education. In terms of household size, 
age and education, households seem not to differ, whether they engage in dairy as an 
income generating activity or not. Nevertheless, those that do engage in dairy activities 
seem to have a significantly higher consumption pattern, more engage in farming as 
their primary source of income and less belong to forward castes. 
Table 4.9: Summary statistics of selected explanatory variables 
Overall Sample With Income from Dairy 
No Income from 
Dairy Variable 
med mean sd med mean sd med mean sd 
ttest 
total consumption (log) 11.01 11.02 0.54 11.08 11.12 0.51 10.92 10.90 0.55 -6.48 
food consumption (log) 10.40 10.41 0.45 10.47 10.48 0.43 10.33 10.33 0.46 -5.71 
other nondurable cons (log) 9.14 9.21 0.96 9.30 9.36 0.91 8.94 9.03 0.98 -5.47 
durable consumption (log) 9.46 9.44 0.82 9.56 9.56 0.86 9.30 9.29 0.75 -5.22 
no. Of hh members 4.00 4.73 1.72 5.00 4.80 1.70 4.00 4.65 1.74 -1.45 
caste: scheduled caste 0.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.17 0.38 3.67 
caste: scheduled tribe 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.06 0.24 2.16 
caste: backward 0.00 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.44 0.50 1.00 0.54 0.50 2.99 
caste: forward 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.17 0.38 -7.66 
primary activity: farmer 0.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.14 0.35 -7.44 
primary activity: self-
employed 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.09 0.29 4.08 
primary activity: 
agricultural labour 1.00 0.64 0.48 1.00 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.71 0.46 4.47 
hhhead: age 45.0 44.3 12.1 42.0 43.9 11.8 45.0 44.9 12.5 1.25 
hhead: no education 1.00 0.63 0.48 1.00 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.69 
hhead: some primary educ. 0.00 0.10 0.31 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.35 
spouse: age 35.0 36.9 11.1 35.0 36.7 10.9 35.0 37.2 11.4 0.73 
spouse: no education 1.00 0.69 0.46 1.00 0.70 0.46 1.00 0.68 0.47 -0.48 
spouse: some primary educ. 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.01 
4.7.1. Estimates from Expectations Data 
Least squares estimates of expected income (box-cox transformation) on realizations – 
typical income, last year’s income and both are presented in Table 4.10 respectively. 
Note that standard errors presented are clustered and bootstrapped to account for 
interclass correlation on the village level.78 Since explanatory variable data are drawn 
from respondents living in 67 different villages they exhibit a grouped structure. It is 
hence likely that errors of a regression model using the data are correlated within these 
groups 79  (see Moulton 1986 for a detailed analysis group effects on regression 
estimates). 
                                                 
78 Nonparametric bootstrap with replacement is applied. 
79 For example a dummy indicator for a respondent that engages in dairy as an income-generating activity 
becomes insignificant when clustering the standard errors. 
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It can be seen that both realization variables have a high explanatory power in 
determining expectations, last year’s income more so than typical income. Both 
variables remain significant when included in the model together. The subjective mean 
increases strongly with typical and more so with last year’s income. 
Table 4.10: Least Square Estimates of expected income conditional on realizations 
(9-1) (9-2) (9-3) Regress: Expected 
box-cox (bc) income 
on: coeff se t-stat coeff se t-stat coeff se t-stat 
typical income (bc) 0.67 0.04 15.57       0.20 0.06 3.34 
income last year (bc)       0.80 0.02 44.89 0.63 0.06 10.48 
Constant 3.75 0.49 7.72 2.32 0.20 11.88 1.99 0.17 11.55 
Adj. R2 0.63     0.775     0.80     
Notes: OLS estimates with clustered and bootstrapped standard errors at the village level 
Table 4.11 shows results of the above regressions, accounting additionally for yearly 
household consumption expenditures. Consumption expenditures are divided into 
three categories: food consumption (including the market value of home-produced 
food), other non-durable consumption (including for example alcohol and tobacco, 
transport costs and water/electricity bills) and durable consumption. The consumption 
variables on their own are all significant in determining income expectations. Durable 
consumption becomes insignificant when typical income is accounted for, which 
especially seems a sensible finding when interpreting typical income as the permanent 
component of income. All consumption variables lose their explanatory power once 
last year’s income is accounted for in the model. What can be concluded from these 
results is that consumption variables seem to do badly as a proxy for typical income. 
As before, presented standard errors are clustered and bootstrapped. 
Table 4.11: Estimates of expected income conditional on realizations and consumption 
(10-1) (10-2) (10-3) (10-4) Regress: 
Expected box-cox 
income on: Coef se t-stat Coef se t-stat Coef se t-stat Coef se t-stat 
typical income    0.67 0.05 14.00    0.20 0.06 3.57 
income last year       0.79 0.02 32.91 0.63 0.06 10.81 
food consumption -0.36 0.11 -3.27 -0.20 0.05 -3.96 -0.03 0.05 -0.56 -0.06 0.04 -1.59 
other nondurable 
cons 4.85 0.85 5.74 0.95 0.39 2.44 0.47 0.54 0.87 0.41 0.37 1.10 
durable cons. 0.55 0.22 2.46 0.10 0.12 0.86 0.06 0.11 0.56 0.00 0.10 -0.03 
No. of Obs. 992   986   992   986   
Wald Chi (.) 52.4   476   2253   2902   
Adj. R2 0.09   0.63   0.77   0.80   
Notes: OLS estimates with clustered and bootstrapped standard errors at the village level 
Estimates of an extended model, including a number of attributes of the respondent, as 
presented in Table 4.12, some of which were already presented in Table 4.8 and 
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briefly discussed.80 In addition to those, information on housing, asset ownership, 
credit and debit sources and experienced risk is included. In line with the previously 
presented results, two models are shown. The first one (11-1) includes only last year’s 
income and the second one (11-2) last year’s income as well as typical income. 
Table 4.12: Least Square Estimates of expected income – extended model 
(11-1) (11-2) Regress: Expected income on: 
coeff. se t-stat. coeff. se t-stat. 
typical income (box-cox)       0.233 0.059 3.970 
income last year (box-cox) 0.763 0.018 41.920 0.561 0.059 9.580 
caste: scheduled caste -0.062 0.025 -2.440 -0.062 0.023 -2.660 
hh head: age2 0.000 0.000 -0.970 0.000 0.000 -1.780 
hh head: some prim education 0.015 0.025 0.610 0.024 0.022 1.100 
spouse: age -0.004 0.002 -1.700 -0.003 0.002 -1.790 
spouse:age2 0.000 0.000 1.840 0.000 0.000 2.550 
spouse: no education 0.038 0.027 1.400 0.030 0.026 1.170 
spouse: some second. education -0.055 0.045 -1.210 -0.061 0.041 -1.490 
primary activity 1: farmer 0.072 0.026 2.750 0.062 0.023 2.660 
primary activity 2: farmer 0.043 0.023 1.830 0.034 0.020 1.660 
primary activity 1: self-employed 0.118 0.040 2.920 0.081 0.029 2.760 
Floor material: Tiles 0.195 0.051 3.840 0.211 0.050 4.200 
Floor material: Stone 0.134 0.038 3.510 0.173 0.038 4.560 
Floor material: mud/cow-dung 0.079 0.034 2.340 0.111 0.032 3.520 
bathing facility: closed in/outside house -0.066 0.020 -3.360 -0.029 0.022 -1.340 
no. of bicycles owned -0.018 0.017 -1.030 -0.015 0.016 -0.980 
no. of motorcycles owned 0.077 0.025 3.080 0.061 0.025 2.470 
no. of Radios owned 0.088 0.047 1.860 0.075 0.040 1.870 
no. of Sewing Machines owned -0.071 0.034 -2.090 -0.047 0.028 -1.670 
no. of Clocks owned 0.087 0.038 2.320 0.096 0.029 3.310 
no. of Steel utensils owned 0.013 0.009 1.490 0.051 0.016 3.200 
no. of Irrigation equipment owned -0.027 0.027 -0.990 -0.038 0.022 -1.760 
Meals of adults cut In last year (y/n) -0.324 0.121 -2.670 -0.162 0.038 -4.250 
risk experienced: illness 0.034 0.018 1.870 0.032 0.016 1.980 
Credit from Public Sector Bank (y/n) 0.055 0.017 3.170 0.049 0.017 2.890 
Credit from SHG -0.061 0.030 -2.000 -0.037 0.032 -1.160 
Credit from Relatives/Friends 0.009 0.065 0.140 0.087 0.044 1.980 
Deposit with Post Office (y/n) -0.095 0.051 -1.870 -0.086 0.046 -1.880 
Deposit with SHG 0.056 0.019 2.980 0.050 0.016 3.040 
Constant 2.460 0.201 12.250 2.027 0.185 10.970 
No. of Obs. 971     965     
Wald Chi (29) 7923     7621     
Adj R2 0.819     0.850     
Notes: OLS estimates with clustered and bootstrapped standard errors at the village level 
As before, the subjective mean increases significantly with realized income. The 
dependence is quantitatively smaller though once conditioning on other explanatory 
variables. 
                                                 
80 Descriptive statistics of these variables are included in the Appendix 6.A-1 and 6.A-2 of the fifth chapter. 
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And, conditional on realizations, the increase is higher when the household head has 
some primary education (remember that most of those respondents without primary 
education have no and not more education). A somewhat surprising finding is the fact 
that expected income increases when the spouse has no education, all else equal. 
Furthermore, the availability and use of the credit and savings market is considered. 
These play a crucial role through their direct effect on asset accumulation. The use of 
investment assets helps to generate income and to smooth consumption. It can be seen 
that the income expected by respondents who borrow from a formal source and that 
are able to receive credit from friends or relatives, both seen as safe and relatively 
inexpensive credit sources, are positively influenced. Respondents that borrowed 
money from Self-Help-Groups (as well as from moneylenders, but this estimate was 
insignificant) on the other hand have lower expected income, all else equal. 
In terms of savings, estimates on two sources are presented – deposits with a post 
office and deposit with SHGs, both saving sources that the better-off part of the 
population would typically not turn to. The coefficient on savings with a post office is 
(while insignificant) negative and the one for SHGs positive. This can be related to the 
fact that SHGs offer loans. Members might hence anticipate being able to borrow in 
the future and translate this into a positive outlook on their expected income. 
 
4.8. Is engaging in Dairy Welfare Improving? 
Before concluding, this section again turns to the distinction of having income from 
dairy or not. The question of concern is whether the livelihood strategy of adopting 
dairy as an extra-income generating activity can indeed be placed higher in a welfare 
ranking. A stochastic dominance ordering is applied to the strategy specific income 
distributions in order to answer this question. More specifically, the focal point of the 
analysis is the (Generalized) Lorenz Curve. 81 In line with the previous analysis the 
realized as well as expected income distributions are looked at.  
The concept is hence extremely appropriate in the setting at hand: Two groups are 
compared, one of which engages in dairy as an extra-income generating activity, while 
the other one does not. Given that this activity is highly promoted by the state as a 
welfare improving activity, the concept’s property of giving a welfare ranking through 
information on inequality is suitable. Secondly, given that those households that 
                                                 
81  The Lorenz curve shows the cumulative distribution of income against the cumulative frequency 
distribution of households earning this amount of income. Comparing this concentration of ownership-
curves of different groups in the society gives insight into which group exhibits greater inequality. A clear 
statement can be made when the curve of one group (A) lies above the curve of the other group everywhere 
(B). In such a situation A is said to Lorenz dominate B. This idea of Lorenz Dominance is equivalent with 
the concept of second order stochastic dominance; a stochastic dominance rule giving a partial ordering of a 
set of alternative investments. 
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engage in the activity made an investment into a milk animal, calls for the concept’s 
property of ordering alternative investments. 
Figure 4.6a displays the Lorenz curve for households with income from dairy (dashed 
line) and those without (solid line). The curve for the population with income from 
dairy lies above the curve of the one without until a population share of about 55 per 
cent and below thereafter. Given that the two distributions cross and the way they 
cross it is very difficult to gauge which one of the two displays greater inequality. 
Figure 4.6a: Lorenz Curve (Realized and Expected Household Income, by having 
income from dairy or not) 
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According to Shorrocks and Foster (1987), one can turn to the coefficient of variation 
in such a situation. If and only if the coefficient of variation for the with-milk-income 
distribution is smaller than the one for the without milk-income distribution can one 
conclude that the distribution of income for household that engage in milk-selling is 
more equal. As can be seen from Table 4.13, the coefficient of variation is slightly 
lower in the Dairy-Income distribution. Also the Gini Coefficient is slightly (but 
insignificantly) lower.  
Table 4.13: Inequality Measures 
Income Expected Income 
Inequality Measure 
DI No DI DI No DI 
relative mean deviation 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
coefficient of variation 0.72 0.77 0.71 0.76 
standard deviation of logs 0.64 0.70 0.75 0.68 
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 
Notes:’DI’ stands for respondents who derive income from dairy, ‘No DI’ are 
respondent who derive from other sources only. 
Since the differences are still quite small – especially when considering expectations – 
an alternative representational tool is turned to. Instead of considering inequality one 
can look at social welfare. This can be done by scaling the Lorenz Curve by mean 
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income at each point, which is called the Generalized Lorenz Curve. These are 
displayed in Figure 4.6b below. 
Here, the picture is very clear, for realizations as well as expectations: the distribution 
of income from households that sell milk lies everywhere closer to the 45° line than 
the one of households that do not get income from selling milk products. This result 
implies that the livelihood strategy of diversifying income into dairy 2nd order 
stochastically dominates not engaging in dairy. From a welfare perspective this is the 
preferred strategy, social welfare being improved due to this activity. 
Figure 4.6b: Generalized Lorenz Curve (Realized and Expected Household Income, by 
having income from dairy or not) 
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4.9. Conclusion 
For approximately two thirds of the Indian population, land and livestock are the major 
assets of livelihood support. Low levels of these assets in combination with a low 
return and high uncertainty are the main sources of poverty within the country, which 
today stands at almost thirty per cent of the population. The challenges lie in reducing 
these people’s vulnerability and in increasing their opportunities through strategies that 
fit within the prevailing system.  
Several empirical studies provide evidence that it is the livestock sector that can offer 
such opportunities rather than the land holdings. Ali (2007), Adams & He (1005) and 
Birthal & Singh (1995) for example show that the distribution of livestock is more 
equitable than the one of land so that livestock rearing reduces income and 
employment inequalities. 
This chapter gives further empirical support to this claim by using unique data to 
analyse household income of rural poor in India, comparing those that engage in dairy 
as an extra income generating activity to those that do not receive income from this 
livelihood strategy. The households studied live in the second most drought prone area 
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of India 82  where diversification of income, away from pure dependence on the 
traditional primary activity of direct or indirect agriculture is seen as detrimental to lift 
people out of poverty. In line with previous studies, the Lorenz-curve analysis 
undertaken in this chapter, shows that the strategy of engaging in milk-selling as an 
(extra) income-generating activity is indeed welfare-improving in terms of 
households’ income. 
This welfare improvement evolves since households which derive part of their income 
from selling milk had, typically have and also expect a significantly higher overall 
household income stream and they furthermore experience lower uncertainty in their 
income streams.  
This latter statement can be made despite dealing with cross-sectional data due to the 
information on subjective expectations that was specifically collected.  
A thorough analysis of this data on subjective expectations is conducted in the first 
part of this chapter in order to be able to make inference on respondent’s beliefs of 
what will happen to their income stream in the future. All validity checks give 
confidence in the answers provided conforming to the basic laws of probability and 
that the respondents did not give random answers for the sake of answering. 
The result of decreased uncertainty gives an indication that this income diversification 
strategy indeed helps in reducing volatility in the overall household income stream and 
hence decreases vulnerability – besides an increase in income, another major objective 
of the intervention. 
To gain further insight into factors that influence expectations and with that 
uncertainty, the expected income distribution is related to a set of exogenous 
characteristics of the respondent households in a time-series regression analysis. 
Estimated coefficients show that the subjective mean of expected future household 
income increases significantly with realized income. Tested explanatory variables for 
example include information on education as well as access to credit and saving 
services. It is found that education positively affects the level of expected income; as 
does access to formal credit and saving sources. 
Overall, results from this chapter greatly support the idea that dairy as a livelihood 
strategy deserves much attention as a tool for poverty eradication. The following two 
chapters address this issue in more detail. An intervention in the dairy sub-sector by a 
microfinance institution is analysed and the main focus lies on quantifying the impacts 
experienced by the program participants. 
                                                 
82 www.indiastat.com: Meteorological Data; Rainfall. 
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Appendix 4.A 
 
Tale 4.A1: Bunching of Percentages (Dairy Income and Health Costs) 
 
Dairy Income  Health Costs 
  thr A thr B thr C    thr A thr B thr C 
  No % No % No %    No % No % No % 
2         1 0.18  0 111 17.7 111 17.7 111 17.7 
3         1 0.18  10         77 12.28 
8         1 0.18  15         12 1.91 
10         22 3.92  20     12 1.91 217 34.61 
15         4 0.71  25     1 0.16 1 0.16 
20     1 0.18 240 42.78  30 4 0.64 48 7.66 155 24.72 
25         17 3.03  35     1 0.16     
30     7 1.25 184 32.8  40 7 1.12 89 14.19 47 7.5 
35     1 0.18 1 0.18  50 28 4.47 244 38.92 7 1.12 
40 1 0.18 59 10.5 76 13.55  60 62 9.89 110 17.54     
45     5 0.89      65 1 0.16         
50 3 0.53 306 54.45 12 2.14  70 63 10.05 11 1.75     
55     3 0.53      80 135 21.53         
60 21 3.74 150 26.69 2 0.36  85 1 0.16         
65 1 0.18 1 0.18      90 210 33.49         
70 92 16.37 25 4.45      100 5 0.8         
75 9 1.6                 
80 146 25.98 4 0.71             
85 3 0.53                 
90 279 49.64                 
100 7 1.25                 
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5. The impact of BASIX’s Dairy intervention:  Evidence from 
realized outcomes and expected returns to investment 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
“Credit is important for development. It capitalizes farmers and entrepreneurs to 
undertake new investments or adopt new technologies.” (Khandker & Faruquee, 2003) 
Nevertheless, a huge part of the population has no access to formal financial services. 
These are the poor – often also referred to as the ‘unbankable’: ‘unbankable’ in the 
sense that they are deemed to be too risky and too expensive to serve, having no 
collateral to offer, demanding very small loans, and often living in difficult to access 
areas. 
As elaborated on in the introduction of the dissertation, such unmet demand in 
combination with new delivering technologies led to what is sometimes referred to as 
the ‘microfinance revolution’83, Unfortunately, it is estimated that still only 16 percent 
of those that could benefit - only one sixth of the three billion poor people of working 
age - have access to such formal financial services (CGAP, 2005). 
Studies show that it is typically the very poor who are being left out of microfinance 
(Coleman, 1999, 2000). Such observations lead practitioners and academics alike to 
the realization that not only microcredit but also microfinance alone is not enough; that 
microfinance is not a replacement for jobs that are not there, education and skills that 
do not exist, or markets that are inaccessible.  
A new approach to microfinance developed. It carries names such as ‘holistic’, 
‘integrated’ or ‘credit plus’. Typically, microfinance is combined with complementary 
services with the aim of having an impact on the lives and livelihoods of poor men, 
women and their families. Such holistic approaches are complex but more and more 
examples can be named. Common to all approaches is that complimentary services, 
such as informal training and business and financial management, evolve around the 
client and aim to develop practical and relevant skills and knowledge.  
In India, the debate between minimalist credit and integrated sectoral promotion 
approaches began to converge in the 1990s, when Vijay Mahajan, founder of BASIX 
                                                 
83 According to Robinson (2001) the term was coined by María Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne in 1993. 
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India84, together with Thomas Dichter stressed the importance of a holistic and in-
depth understanding of the interplay between economic, social and cultural layers of 
the developmental process. They initiated the debate and put their ideas into practice, 
making this more complex strategy to combat poverty as part of BASIX’s mission.85 
The way the institution proceeds is to conduct studies on sub-sectors with the goal of 
identifying constraints on low-income actors within the sector. An intervention is then 
designed that creates opportunities for these poor through credit, technical assistance 
and if necessary, the establishment of market linkages.  
This chapter is concerned with a programme that puts this complex mission into 
practise.  The way the delivering livelihood promotion institution under consideration 
in this study, BASIX India, proceeds is to conduct studies on sub-sectors with the goal 
of identifying constraints on low-income actors within the sector. An intervention is 
then designed that creates opportunities for these poor through credit, technical 
assistance and if necessary, the establishment of market linkages.  
The sector analyzed here is the dairy sub-sector. The next section of this paper gives 
more details on the circumstances that made the organisation intervene in this specific 
sector and how their intervention is precisely designed, explaining the financial as well 
as non-financial components. In brief, households get access to loans to invest in a 
dairy animal – a buffalo or a cow. They have the option to buy insurance for the 
animal, to be trained in livestock rearing and to be visited regularly by a veterinarian. 
Where needed, the organisation established market linkages so that households can 
actually sell the milk their animal produces. 
The intention of this chapter is to analyze the effect of this intervention on customers – 
hence on households that borrowed from BASIX to invest in a dairy animal. Besides 
looking at more standard outcome indicators such as household income and 
consumption, investment specific returns – benefits as well as costs – are estimated. 
One of the innovative contributions of this study is the distinction between realized 
and expected returns. Primary data was collected that allows to construct moments of 
                                                 
84 BASIX India is a new generation livelihood promotion institution in Hyderabad, India. It was established 
in 1996 and is one of the first institutions to follow the holistic approach, adopting it after an impact study 
conducted by Indian Market Research Bureau (IMRB). Assessing BASIX services revealed that about 52% 
of clients expressed a positive impact, 23% no change and approximately 25% reported decline in their 
income. Clients ascribed this decline to the presence of unmanaged risk. To address this, BASIX chose the 
strategy of offering programmes that combine aspects of Livelihood Financial Services (Savings, short and 
long-term Credit, Insurance - for lives and livelihoods, Fund transfers, Commodity Derivatives, Financial 
Orchestration – ranging from grants to equity for livelihoods), Institutional Development Services 
(Formation of producers’ groups, federations, cooperatives, mutual benefits, etc., Capacity building, 
including entrepreneurship development.), and Agricultural/Business Development Services (Credit 
Productivity enhancement, Risk mitigation (non-insurance), Alternate Market Linkages – Input supply, 
output sales), the latter ones being the main interest of this study.  
85 “BASIX mission is to promote a large number of sustainable livelihoods, including ones for the rural poor 
and women, through the provision of financial services and technical assistance in an integrated manner.” 
(www.basixindia.com, accessed July 2008) 
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expected future outcome variables with which this study can go a step further than a 
traditional impact evaluation study, namely estimating the subjective expected returns 
to investment. 
A further contribution to the literature is made by estimating not only the effect of the 
intervention as a whole, but also the specific effect of additional services that the 
organisation offers alongside the loan – distinguishing between the financial and non-
financial services. Estimates of the impact of such additional services hardly exist in 
the literature. Those microfinance impact studies that do exist focus almost exclusively 
on the effect of loans. If other services are being offered, then the effect of these is 
engulfed in the overall programme impact.  
Two known exceptions are McKernan (2002) and Karlan & Valdivia (2006). The 
former looks at the overall programme impact and also the non-credit effects of the 
programmes by controlling for the level of productive capital. These non-credit aspects 
are mainly the general training of the customer, including issues such as vocational 
training, information in areas of health and civil responsibilities and rights. McKernan 
(2002) finds these to have a positive impact on productivity. Karlan & Valdivia (2006) 
assess the impact of business training on female microfinance clients in Peru. 
Applying a randomized control trial, they find a positive impact of training on business 
knowledge, practices and revenues. Additionally, the institution seems to benefit as 
well through improved repayment and client retention rates. 
While also this study finds positive effects of the intervention and its components, 
these are not experienced by the customers where one would initially expect them 
most. In fact – cost reductions related to the investment are insignificant and income 
from the activity is estimated to be significantly lower than for the control group. Still, 
looking at other outcome indicators, it is concluded that the intervention plays a crucial 
role in consumption smoothing of the household and that it has the potential to lift 
customers above the poverty line. This effect is stronger for those customers who 
additionally have non-financial services. Also results on customers who have 
additional financial services (here livestock insurance) indicate that this service 
effectively insures household against the loss of their important asset, the milk-animal. 
Despite having only cross-sectional data available, several indications are provided 
that support the hypothesis of the importance of taking a longer-term perspective. Such 
a positive outlook is also reflected in the beliefs of the customers as captured by the 
above mentioned expectation data. 
The next section gives more detail on the intervention and its design. After a 
description of the methodology used, the treatment effects – experienced as well as 
perceived by the customers – are presented and the final section concludes. 
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5.2. The programme under consideration 
The programme under consideration is an intervention in the Indian dairy sub-sector 
offered by the livelihood promotion institution BASIX India. An analysis of the sector 
helped BASIX to identify an opportunity for an intervention that would favour the 
low-income producers.  
In the late 1960s, the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) had made extensive 
country-wise investments in basic infrastructure such as chilling centres, feeder-
balancing dairy plants, cattle-feed plants, and veterinary medicine and vaccine plants. 
Nevertheless, many of these had to be closed down due to low procurement. BASIX 
decided to step in and to offer loans for cattle investments to the economically poor 
and to establish linkages between these new milk producers and the previously shut-
down milk-chilling plants. In view of their complex livelihood promotion mission 
BASIX offers services alongside the loan, namely financial services (life, health and 
livestock insurance) as well as non-financial services, such as regular visits by a 
veterinarian, health camps, milk fat-testing, etc. In brief, these additional services 
address issues related to knowledge dissemination, risk mitigation and productivity 
enhancement. 
The need for such services is stressed in a study undertaken in Pondicherry, India. It 
reveals for example that “the poor landless livestock keepers do not possess 
knowledge on many aspects of livestock rearing especially on animal health. […] Lack 
of information on animal health practices (ignorance, one of the prime constraints of 
development) ultimately results in production losses through morbidity and sometimes 
mortality - all resulting in economic losses to the livestock owners.” 
BASIX started its microcredit operation in 1996 and adopted their current strategy of 
the so-called ‘livelihood triad’ in 2001. The three corners of this triad are made up of 
Institutional Development Services (IDS), Livelihood Financial Services (LFS), and 
Agricultural and Business Development Services (Ag/BDS). The dairy intervention 
under consideration in this study encompasses all three of these aspects. IDS in the 
context of this intervention include for example the formation of producers’ groups, 
federations and cooperatives. The loan itself falls under LFS. The conditions are 
typically a loan period of on average 18 months, implying 18 loan instalments with an 
interest rate of 24 per cent per annum. An additional security deposit of 10 per cent of 
the loan (with an average loan size of 11,500 Rupees, approximately US$ 290) is 
retained. Besides this security deposit no collateral is asked for but the loan is joint-
liability and it comes with health and life insurance for the client as well as the spouse. 
In addition, the customer has the option to buy insurance for the animal, covering its 
death. Ag/BDS covers in brief credit productivity enhancement, non-insurance risk 
mitigation and the establishment of alternate market linkages, where needed. Currently, 
all customers that decide to buy these services are being charged a rate of 300 Rupees 
(~US$7) for one year. For this amount, they can expect timely advisory services on 
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preventive measurements to reduce and deal with the risks involved in their selective 
livelihood at his doorstep/village on fixed dates by a Livelihood Service Provider.86 
Besides the overall programme effect, this study analyses the particular effect of these 
latter additional services on outcome indicators. A summary of the services that 
comprise BASIX’s intervention are given below: 
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  • the provision of credit for the purchase of buffaloes/cows; 
• the provision of insurance for animals, collaborating with insurance 
companies.  
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• training and awareness camps 
• monthly medical check-ups, vaccination,… for the animals; 
• the identification of areas, where collection efficiency can be improved; 
• the purchase of electronic milk testing kits for quick fat testing; 
• assisting milk-chilling-plants in the automation of accounting and 
payments. 
 
BASIX initially started this intervention in 1997 (at that time not part of the triad 
strategy) in Mahaboobnagar in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and a few months 
later also in the district of Anantapur, the most southern district in the same state. This 
latter district is the area of reference in this study. 
This district was chosen for several reasons. For one, it is one of BASIX’s oldest units, 
having been established in 2000.87 This results in BASIX having a certain presence in 
the state, which again implies more customers and hence a bigger sample which 
facilitates econometric analysis. More importantly, BASIX actually started its 
operation in that district due to the opportunity to become involved in the dairy sub-
sector and the potential it saw for livelihood promotion. Furthermore, Anantapur is one 
of the most backward provinces in the state of Andhra Pradesh (Sreeramulu, 2006), 
which to a great extent results from it being the second most drought-affected district 
                                                 
86 In more detail this implies that customers pay for regular and timely access to the physical presence of a 
Livelihood Service Provider (LSP) at his doorstep for a 12 months period (24 visits by LSP in a year), 
timely advisory services on their animals management aspects, which are appropriate at that time, exposure 
on latest technologies and market prices connected to his commodity, practical demonstrations on selected 
themes/activities by LSP (ex. disease identification method), possible facilitation for inputs supply of their 
choice and also for market linkages, and preventive vaccination for FMD or HS/BQ for 2 animals at free of 
cost/customer will be done apart from regular health check-ups, first aid treatment on need based, de-
worming etc.. 
87 The unit office in Anantapur city was opened in 2000 but it was a split off from the office in Adoni 
(Anantapur district), which had been established about two years before, in April 1998. Once a unit office 
gets too big, implying that loan officers have to cover too many clients as well as too many kilometers to 
reach these, BASIX opens a new unit that takes over part of the clients. 
As of December 2006, Anantapur unit’s staff includes three field executives (FX), seventeen Livelihood 
Service Assistants (LSA) and four Livelihood Service providers (LSP) as well as ten other employees. Every 
LSA was responsible for 471 accounts, of which the unit had distributed 4,431 loans (44,045,000Rs) by the 
end of Dec 2006. The disbursed average loan size was 9,940 Rupees, as compared to an overall average for 
BASIX of 10,315 Rupees. The unit had an on-time repayment rate (OTRR) of 88.7%, which lay below the 
general average of 98.2%. 
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of India. Depending on agricultural activities as their major source of earnings, the 
population faces extreme volatility and uncertainty in their income streams. This 
makes living conditions very hard; people are extremely vulnerable and poverty is 
highly prevalent. Aspects such as these make holistic microfinance interventions even 
more important but at the same time also much harder to implement. It is of interest to 
estimate the impact that an intervention like the one from BASIX has on these rural 
poor as well as what the customers expect themselves from undertaking the 
investment. 
 
5.3. The Data 
This section provides information on the data used for analysing the program’s impact. 
A full description of the survey and the questionnaire are provided in Appendix 9. 
5.3.1. Survey Design 
For ethical considerations of denying benefits to eligible beneficiaries, the programme 
was not randomly assigned across localities or across eligible individuals. To evaluate 
its effect, outcomes of interest of non-customers are compared to those of customers. 
About half of these non-customers reside in areas in which BASIX offers its services 
and the other half where the programme was not implemented at the time of the 
survey.  Evidence on the similarity between treatment and control groups within these 
areas are provided and it will be argued that suitable control households could be 
found for the majority of treated households in this experimental set-up. 
In the beginning of 2008 a survey was conducted of BASIX clients with the unit office 
in the district capital of Anantapur district. As mentioned above, this is one of BASIX 
most established units.88 The advantage of choosing a unit where the programme under 
consideration has already been in place for several years lies in the fact that given the 
longer term experience, one can expect the program, and hence the effect on the 
customers to be close to the steady state. The idea is that the programme is already 
well established and programme effects are unlikely to be downward biased, or maybe 
even negative, due to initial start-up problems of the programme as well as an 
unsuitable design. The advantage at the same time poses challenges in the statistical 
analysis. Given that no baseline data is available, it is not possible to account for initial 
differences in outcome variables. This makes it even more important to place 
considerable emphasis on the choice of the control groups in the design stage of the 
survey, as well as in the later stage of the analysis. 
                                                 
88 At the time of writing BASIX operates in 70 districts in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa, 
Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, Chattisgarh, West Bengal, Delhi and Tamil 
Nadu. 
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5.3.1.1. Village Selection 
Programme villages for the survey were selected based on information obtained from 
the organisation’s Management Information System (MIS). A list of all active dairy 
clients was extracted on the 28th of December 2007. Out of the 92 villages that these 
active clients lived in, only those villages were chosen where BASIX had at least nine 
customers. Dairy-loans are being given as joint liability with group sizes ranging from 
four to seven members. Choosing a minimum of nine customers per village hence 
ensured that at least two different joint-liability groups would be present in the 
village.89  
Control villages were chosen to be located in areas that are closely comparable in 
selection criteria to the area where the intervention is being implemented. The strategy 
that was followed was to have staff of BASIX identify villages with ‘dairy potential’ – 
those that are seen to be suitable for dairy intervention but where no such services 
were offered at the time of the survey. Reasons for this absence can be among others 
capacity or time constraints. This pre-selection assures that villages are more likely 
suitable counterfactuals for the programme villages. Thirty villages were identified 
through this process, so that altogether, respondents were drawn from 68 villages. This 
relatively higher number of villages is desirable since the variation in behaviour and 
outcomes across Indian villages is typically much larger than within them (Janssen, 
2007). This implies that relatively few households are needed to represent a given 
township, while a larger number is appropriate in order to reflect the diversity among 
villages (Deaton, 1997). 
5.3.1.2. Household Selection 
The unit of analysis for the survey was chosen to be a household. The rationale behind 
choosing household is that microenterprises “exist as part of a larger portfolio of 
economic activities, and that decisions with respect to microenterprises - whether 
made jointly or individually vis à vis other members of the household - can be 
understood more clearly when considered in relation to tradeoffs within the overall 
household economy” (Sebstad et al. 1995, p. 1). In other words, economic activities 
are part of a larger, dynamic household economy – which holds particularly true in the 
survey area. 
The program participants interviewed were selected from a list of all customers as 
obtained from the organisation’s Management Information System (MIS).  
The data set that was used for the sampling of 250 non-clients and 250 controls comes 
                                                 
89 This decision was taken due to resource constraints. It should be noted that excluding villages with a very 
low number of dairy clients limits the representativeness of results for the program as a whole. This is the 
case if excluded villages differ systematically from survey villages. No data was available to test this. 
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from the Rural Poverty Reduction Program, a programme funded by the World Bank 
and implemented by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.90 As part of the program, an 
independent society, the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), was 
established in 2001. The chairman is the serving Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and 
the CEO is the Senior IAS Officer. The programme is implemented in 22 out of 23 
districts of Andhra Pradesh, only Hyderabad having been excluded as it is 
predominantly urban. 
Box 5.1: The ‘Participatory Identification of the Poor’-Approach 
The poor were identified using the so-called Participatory Identification of 
the Poor (PIP) approach, which is based on extensive interaction with and 
participation of all interested villagers. 
As a first step, a meeting with villagers was organised to explain the purpose 
and give information on the programme as well as to lay out the process of 
the ‘Social Mapping’ that was to follow. This ‘Social Mapping’ was the 
main tool to identify the poor and poorest of the poor in villages of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
To start with, villagers were asked to draw their village on the ground – 
including the main infrastructure such as roads and bus stops as well as other 
landmarks. Next, a card for each household was written and placed at the 
appropriate place on the village map. 
As a next step, indicators for the World Bank categories were discussed. The 
categories are (1) Poorest of the poor, (2) Poor, (3) Not so poor and (4) Non-
poor, where the first two categories combined make up households living 
below the poverty line (BPL) and the latter two the ones living above (APL). 
Villagers were asked to identify which characteristic or indicator would 
contribute to which category – non-poor would own their own bathing 
facility, poorest of the poor would have no access to drinking water facilities 
and the like. After agreement of these characteristics for each category, card 
by card, each household was placed into one of the four categories. This was 
done by taking one card at a time and villagers deciding on a category for the 
respective household. Once the decision was taken, the characteristics of that 
category were read out: Housheold XY is…. After doing so, the 
categorization of the household was reconsidered and finalized. This way, 
about 45 per cent of all households in rural Andhra Pradesh were identified 
to live below the poverty line (20 per cent in category one and 25 per cent in 
category 2). 
The main strategy of the Programme is to implement targeted poverty reduction 
programs. Special effort was hence put into the division of the population into the 
World Bank categories, namely (1) Poorest of the poor, (2) Poor, (3) Not so poor and 
(4) Non-poor. A description of the process is given in Box 5.1. Most of BASIX’s dairy 
                                                 
90 I would like to greatly thank Mohan ONteddu for helping me to obtain this data. 
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customers fall into the second and third of these categories. Therefore, the random 
sample of non-customers was only drawn from households that had been classified by 
their fellow villagers into one of those two categories. 
The survey questionnaire includes details on the household and its composition, 
income, assets, consumption, risks as well as one special section for customers and one 
for non-customers. 
The final sample is composed of 513 customers, 277 non-customers in operating 
villages, and 251 respondents in non-operating villages, from now on referred to as 
‘controls’. The analysis to follow will concentrate on these ‘controls’ as these 
households constitute the appropriate control group in the evaluation (to be elaborated 
on below). The collection of information on non-customers in operating villages was 
done for two main purposes: for one, the group can be used to estimate possible spill-
over effects from the intervention. The second purpose was in anticipation of a second 
survey round. Non-customers in operating villages are potential customers and might 
self-select themselves into the program before the follow-up. 
 
5.3.2. Characteristics across treatment and control groups 
Section 5.4 describes the evaluation technique applied in this study. In brief, 
propensity score matching is applied, a methodology for which the choice of an 
appropriate comparison group ultimately determines the credibility of results. 
With this in mind, Appendix 5.A displays median and average values as well as the 
standard deviation of an extensive range of household characteristics, including 
information on the household composition (number of household members, number of 
kids in different age groups) and proxies for household wealth (such as education 
levels for the household head and the spouse, conditions of the dwelling, household 
ownership and ownership of several asset variables, etc.).  
The tables show sub-sample statistics (BASIX customers, non-customers and controls) 
as well as statistics for the test of difference in means of these variables between the 
groups. As can be seen from those last columns in the tables, the different groups are 
very close to each other on the basis of the available dimensions. As for those 
variables that do show statistically significant differences in means, given that the 
intervention was not randomly assigned, this is not an unexpected finding. It is mainly 
visible in education levels: BASIX customers seem to have spent more years in school 
than controls. This needs to be kept in mind, in order to control for these observed 
characteristics in the analysis – especially in the participation equation and when 
estimating over the common support. This issue will be taken up when discussing the 
evaluation technique applied and the choice of the control group will be revisited in 
section 5.2. 
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5.3.3. Outcome variables  
The effect of the programme on several outcome indicators is estimated. These are for 
one indicators that are directly linked to the intervention under consideration 
(investment returns) and second more general economic household level indicators. 
For the investment returns and for one general indicator, a distinction between 
previous year realizations and coming year expectations is made (to be elaborated on 
below). 
Table 5.1 displays summary statistics for the outcome indicators directly related to the 
intervention. T-tests for the equality of means between customers and controls are 
provided. The first outcome indicator is the income the household receives from the 
dairy activity (conditional on getting income from this source) and the second relates 
to expenses incurred because the animal(s) got sick (conditional on having at least one 
cow or buffalo). These costs include foregone earnings. Interestingly, these summary 
statistics indicate that participants of the intervention earn significantly less from 
selling milk (products) than controls.91 Veterinarian expenses are on the other hand not 
statistically significantly different for the groups, c having a higher mean though. 
Table 5.1: Income Sources (% of overall) 
Variable Customers (B) Control (C ) ttest B vs. C 
  med mean sd med mean sd t-stat 
REALIZATIONS 
income from dairy 18,000 19,593 12,916 24,000 25,138 15,663 3.08 
medical expensed 
for animals 1,000 2,731 5,509 825 2,123 4,538 0.47 
EXPECTATIONS 
expected income 
from dairy 19,140 22,688 18,703 23,750 29,488 26,401 0.95 
expected medical 
expenses 800 1,177 1,150 775 1,199 1,145 0.14 
 
The lower panel of Table 5.1 gives summary statistics for the same variables, the 
difference being that they do not reflect what the respondents experienced previously 
but what their expectations are for the future. 
A description of how this data was obtained, a detailed analysis validating responses 
and an explanation of how moments of distribution functions are constructed is given 
in Augsburg (2009). To briefly summarize, the question format to elicit the subjective 
expectations was based on previously implemented surveys that asked about the 
expected overall household income. The first step in the strategy followed is to ask the 
                                                 
91 Please note that conclusions do not change when considering variables per owned animal. 
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respondent to envision worst and best case scenarios for the coming year and to state 
corresponding minimum and maximum income streams. This range was then divided 
into equally spaced intervals and the respondent is requested to give the probability 
that household income will exceed the interval-thresholds.92  
Validation of this data showed negligible percentage of logical response error, a 
sensible pattern of probabilities for different thresholds, and expected correlations 
between stated probabilities, which implies that one can be relatively certain that the 
answers provided conform to the basic laws of probability and that respondents did not 
give some random answers for the sake of answering. This conclusion allows 
interpreting answers as points on the subjective cumulative distribution function of 
future household income (dairy income and medical expenses respectively). A 
respondent-specific subjective income (cost) distribution is fitted, assuming a piece-
wise uniform probability distribution. This study focuses on the means of these 
distributions. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the average survey respondent expects an increase in 
income from dairy as compared to the previous year.93 Both groups also expect lower 
veterinarian costs, the difference being bigger for customers. These results imply that 
the difference between means of outcome variables is expected to be smaller in the 
coming year than they were in the previous one. 
Estimating the effect of programme participation on such subjective outcome 
indicators could be interpreted as the subjective programme effect. Nevertheless, one 
can expect this subjective effect to inherit an endogeneity bias that is not accounted for 
through the propensity score matching (to be described in the next section) – the so-
called ‘optimism bias’. The fact that clients made the decision to borrow money from 
the institution and to invest it into a risky asset shows that the hope of success is one of 
their characteristics. Independently of their degree of risk aversion, they are most 
likely optimistic about one or several things, including for example outside events 
(believing that market factors will develop in their interest), their own capabilities, or 
                                                 
92  Two extensions were implemented. The first one was integrated when explaining the concept of 
probabilities - thorough understanding of which is a crucial precondition for the elicitation of sensible 
expectations. Questions were integrated that facilitated the understanding of the concept of basic probability 
laws, such as monotonicity. In order for respondents to grasp this concept, an extension to the survey 
conducted in Columbia was employed. The second extension was that not only expected income was asked 
about but also expected income from selling milk (products) and the expected expenditures on animal 
health. Both these latter variables are directly related to the investment and are therefore hypothesized to 
have a major influence on the investment decision.  
93  Please note that data collected on expected income from dairy was on a monthly basis, while the 
corresponding realization refers to a period of one year. This is due to the fact that overall household income 
was easier for respondents to give information on a yearly basis and income from dairy was one of the 
sources. The expectations and realizations were made comparable by multiplying the monthly expectation 
figures by the average number of month that animals give milk per year. For animals of customers this are 
8.1 months a year, for non-customers 9.4 months and for controls 9.5 months. 
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about what others tell them (in this case 'others' could for example refer to the field 
executive of BASIX or the veterinarian suggesting vaccinations).  
While such bias is a problem if one were to estimate the subjective programme effect, 
it is important to realize that in the context of expected returns to investment this bias 
is actually of interest. This is because it (partly) reflects the underlying decision-
making process of the respondents. 94 
The second set of indicators that are being looked at are more general ones, including 
overall household income, assets and savings and consumption data. The relevance of 
these outcome indicators in the context of microfinance are briefly explained next. 
Microfinance is most often promoted as an opportunity for the poor to engage in an 
(extra) income-generating activity and an effectual means for increasing the poor’s 
income as well as asset base. Income and assets are hence obvious indicators to 
analyse when evaluating a programme falling under the microfinance-umbrella.  
The survey collected data on the households’ income by asking the amount the 
household receives from a number of different activities and sources. The most 
important sources are displayed in Table 5.2. It can be seen that the greatest part of 
respondents’ income is derived from agriculture and hence strongly varying with 
harvesting seasons - on average nine per cent of the household income is derived from 
farm profit and 39 per cent from wages as agricultural labour. 
Information on asset was similarly determined, asking about all owned assets and their 
current market value. 
Table 5.2: Income Sources (% of overall) 
BASIX Control 
Income Source 
mean sd mean sd 
Wages from non-agricultural sector - formal  0.147 0.203 0.273 0.273 
Wages from non-agricultural sector - informal  0.017 0.093 0.019 0.111 
Wages (possibly in-kind) from public relief work 0.004 0.031 0.009 0.085 
Non-farm self-employment (net-income) 0.036 0.087 0.067 0.138 
Farm profit 0.089 0.201 0.097 0.237 
Wages from agric. labour (not on own farm)  0.403 0.298 0.386 0.305 
Income from Dairy Activities 0.260 0.220 0.089 0.175 
Total** 0.956  0.94  
Notes: **Remaining % are distributed among: sales of handicrafts or other non-agricultural , 
Traditional hereditary occupation, Migration income/remittances, benefits from government 
schemes, pensions, dowry income, other income sources (e.g. gambling) 
 
                                                 
94 One caveat needs to be brought forward: evidence suggests that ‘optimism bias’ reduced with experience. 
Since the length of time that clients are with the LPI and that clients engage in the activity varies, the 
estimated effect will reflect an average of the expected return. Unfortunately, data does not allow 
distinguishing how long a client is with the LPI.  
 98
Also increasingly stressed in the microfinance literature is the role of savings – another 
mean for capital mobilization. It might be a slower mean but at the same time it is less 
risky and especially important when talking about long-term growth objectives. The 
third outcome indicator considered is therefore savings of the household. Savings are 
the sum of several deposit options, including deposits with banks, private financial 
institutions, the post office, chit funds95, Self Help Groups (SHGs)96 and cash at home. 
The latter two are the dominant saving sources in the sample. Table 5.3 shows that 
almost 60 percent of savings are held with SHGs and 23 percent of the savings are 
kept as cash at home. Official saving sources are hardly used by the sample population. 
 
Table 5.3: Saving Sources (% of total) 
BASIX Control 
Deposit Sources 
mean sd mean sd 
Bank 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.26 
Private Financial Institute 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15 
Post Office 0.07 0.24 0.04 0.19 
Chit Fund 0.07 0.24 0.01 0.09 
Cash at Home 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.41 
SHG 0.56 0.47 0.59 0.47 
Other 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09 
Total 1.00  1.00  
 
While microfinance is predominantly promoted for its role to improve economic 
indicators, it plays a major – probably even more important - role in consumption and 
risk smoothing. In a context where people are threatened in their livelihoods (if not in 
their survival) due to the absence of certain goods, increased income is important but 
secured consumption is vital. And especially when analysing a programme that 
stresses the importance of livelihood promotion, a programme where credit is only one 
of several components, it is of interest to see whether an effect on disposable income 
for consumption of food and other basic needs can be observed. To do so, the 
expenditures on certain consumption goods (food, other non-durable, durable, the 
latter one including for example educational expenses, repairs and dowries) are 
considered as outcome variables in the analysis. Note that food consumption includes 
the market value of home produced goods. 
                                                 
95 A Chit Fund is comparable to a savings scheme, which has originated in India. 
96 A SHG is a homogeneous group of on average fifteen poor people that voluntarily forms to save small 
amounts. These pooled resources are on-lent to members for meeting their credit needs, either for 
consumption or income generating activities. Once the groups show mature financial behaviour, banks are 
encouraged to make loans to them (Seibel and Dave 2002).  
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Table 5.4 shows summary statistics by groups for the just described general outcome 
indicators and, as before, t-tests for the equality of means between groups are provided. 
It is worth noting that for all of these variables – including subjective expectations 
about future household income, customers have a higher mean than households not 
engaging in the intervention – statistically insignificant only for savings. While this 
might be interpreted as an indication that households benefit from taking a dairy loan 
with BASIX, these differences could be simply due to underlying differences in 
characteristics between the groups. The following analysis concentrates on singling 
out the effect that can be attributed to the intervention and not to such differences in 
groups. 
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Indicators - General 
Variable Customers (B) Control (C ) ttest B vs. C 
  med mean sd med mean sd t-stat 
GENERAL OUTCOME INDICATORS - REALIZATIONS 
Total yearly 
household income 63,400 79,321 53,292 47,400 55,417 39,867 -6.25 
Total asset value 230,100 323,665 281749 153,700 214,516 213530 -5.35 
Savings 500 2,023 3,520 0 1,616 2,964 -1.53 
Total yearly food 
consumption 
expenditure 
36,374 40,119 18,337 28,938 32,687 17,791 -5.27 
Total yearly other 
non-durable 
consumption exp. 
10,400 17,010 20,088 6,760 11,763 16,258 -3.58 
durable consumption 
exp. 13,900 16,903 11,410 10,250 12,403 9,214 -5.42 
GENERAL OUTCOME INDICATORS - EXPECTATIONS 
Total yearly 
household income 61,275 77,512 53,275 50,000 56,975 36,247 -5.34 
 
5.4. Evaluation Technique 
The study uses Propensity Score Matching (PSM) techniques to estimate the effect of 
programme participation on above described outcome variables. This technique has 
been widely applied in the non-experimental evaluation literature, especially in the 
context of labour market policies. The key idea and assumption is that conditional on 
observable variables, the assignment of a programme is random. Since conditioning on 
all relevant variables implies in most settings a high dimensional covariate vector, it is 
common practice to make use of a result by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which 
suggests that instead of conditioning on all covariates one can use a single function of 
these same variables – such as the propensity score. A propensity score of which the 
distribution is the same for treated as well as non-treated individuals can be used to 
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match pairs within the two groups. The average difference in outcomes between these 
pairs is then the so-called average treatment effect on the treated. 
PSM improves over OLS Regressions that include a dummy variable to estimate 
treatment in three respects: For one, it is a semi-parametric estimation method and 
hence avoids distributional and functional form assumptions; second, one does not 
need to assume homogeneous effects and third, the method does not extrapolate 
outside the common support, meaning that one avoids comparing the incomparable. 
The crucial aspect of propensity score matching is hence the estimation of the 
propensity score itself. As is usual in practice, this study estimates the probability of 
programme participation using a probit model. Variable selection followed mainly 
theoretical consideration, including only those variables that are hypothesized to 
influence simultaneously the participation decision as well as the outcome of interest – 
and that are not affected by the treatment. This latter is especially important given the 
drawback that no baseline data is available for outcome indicators. The set of variables 
that has been used to estimate propensity scores in this study can be seen in Appendix 
B, which provides detailed information on the propensity score model used in the 
analysis of the overall effect of the intervention97.  
For one, predetermined variables such as education and caste and household 
composition are included in the participation equation. Also considered are variables 
related to BASIX’s appraisal policy as well as the program placement decision. Loan 
appraisal includes for example a brief assessment of household indebtedness (in terms 
of present sources and amount of credit) as well as an estimate of household income 
from different sources. The institutions also prefers to give loans to households that are 
less likely to move - such as for example married women or those households that 
have lived in the village all their life. Furthermore, the institution works in poorer 
districts, but where certain factor conditions are met (see Datta et al (2005) for a more 
detailed discussion). To the extend possible, such variables were accounted for as well 
by including mandal-level98  characteristics such as for example the percentage of 
villages on a main road. The importance of accounting for geographical conditions 
will also be taken up in the following chapter. 
Propensity score matching has the advantage of being able to discard those individuals 
from the analysis for which the control group does not offer a suitable counterfactual. 
Since the effect of treatment cannot be estimated for the discarded individuals the 
results of the evaluation will be more meaningful, the lower the decrease in sample 
size due to this exclusion. Checking the overlap and the region of common support 
                                                 
97 Regression results for the other models (where treatment are participation with additional financial and/or 
non-financial services) can be obtained from the author on request. 
98 Mandals are the third subnational administrative units below states and districts in India. 
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between treatment and comparison group is therefore an important step in the analysis. 
These indicators as well as graphs of the propensity score distribution for the treated 
and for the untreated are provided together with the propensity score estimates in 
Appendix B. For estimated scores, the overlap is around 87 per cent, implying that 
estimated effects is close but not totally representative for the impact of the program. 
But, the graphs also indicate that the propensity score distributions are still quite 
different between the groups. To bring the means closer together and thereby find 
better matches, the tails are trimmed in the analysis. Doing so, a further 28 per cent of 
observations on the common support are discarded. Overall, about 60 per cent of 
observations on the common support are used in the analysis. This is important to be 
kept in mind as it influences the generalizability of results. 
Once the propensity score is specified, several matching estimators can be applied. 
Results presented in this study are Kernel estimates. In this setting, all treated units are 
matched with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely 
proportional to the distances between the propensity scores of treated and 
comparisons. 99  A major advantage of Kernel matching over for example Nearest 
Neighbour matching is the lower variance resulting from more information being used. 
Nevertheless, one risks using ‘bad’ matches, which again stresses the importance of 
the common support condition.100 
The standard errors presented are bootstrapped, taking into account the clustered 
nature of the data on village-level. Note that some caution has to be taken when 
making inference based on these standard errors. To date, no formal evidence to justify 
bootstrapping in this context seems to exist.101 Yet, studies do report and base their 
inference on them (see for example Heckman et al., 1997a; Black and Smith, 2004; 
Sianesi, 2004). 
 
                                                 
99 Results for Nearest Neighbour estimates are available on request. Note that interpretations of results do 
not change. 
100  One might furthermore choose a narrower bandwidth which then places more weight on ‘close’ 
observations. The bandwith used throughout the following analysis is 0.06. 
101 Abadie and Imbens (2008) developed a formula for standard errors, which only applies though when the 
true propensity score is known. This implies that the smaller the original sample, the more unlikely it is that 
the distribution of the sample represents the entire population. This makes it quite difficult to compute 
trustable confidence intervals as bootstraps rely heavily on the tails of the distribution for the computations. 
Hence, unless one is confident about the quality of the data and its ability to reflect the characteristics of the 
population being sampled, one should not accept unquestioningly the validity of the computations. Invalid 
statistical estimations are possible due to sampling error when performing the random sampling in the 
bootstrap procedure. 
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5.5. Impact evaluation of BASIX’s dairy intervention 
The interest lies in the impact of BASIX's intervention in the dairy sub-sector. To The 
interest lies in the impact of BASIX’s intervention in the dairy sub-sector. To begin 
with, the overall effect of participating in the programme is considered. The ‘overall 
effect' hence looks at participants that took a loan for the purpose of buying a cow or a 
buffalo. Here, no distinction is being made as to whether the participant receives credit 
only or whether they opted for additional (non) financial services. This will be 
considered later, estimating first the effect of receiving (and having paid for) 
Agricultural and Business Development Services (Ag/BDS) and then narrowing the 
treatment sample further to those participants that have Ag/BDS as well as livestock 
insurance.  
The main considerations led to the choice of putting more emphasize on Ag/BDS 
services rather than on livestock insurance is that with Ag/BDS one can be more 
certain that whether a participant has these services or not actually reflects a choice. It 
is not uncommon to bundle products with the loan to reach targets. Nevertheless, 
experience showed that making Ag/BDS mandatory (in practise rather than on paper) 
resulted in a higher probability of loan default, which is risky and obviously not 
desirable for the organisation. In addition, an increase in Ag/BDS registration for non-
loan participants is observed.102 
 
5.5.1. Impact of being a dairy customer of BASIX (in Anantapur) 
Table 5.5a displays results for the impact analysis of being a dairy customer of the LPI 
on outcomes indicators directly related to the intervention, the investment returns.  
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is shown in column (i). The signs of 
the estimated effects on income from selling milk and on veterinarian costs indicate 
that customers, while incurring lower costs, also earn less from this activity when 
compared to the control group. The effect of lower costs is statistically insignificant. 
Surprisingly, the lower return from the activity is on the other hand significant – 
participants earn on average Rs. 11,900 per year less than comparable non-
participating households. As was already seen in the simple summary statistics, the 
difference between groups is considerably smaller when considering the respondents’ 
subjective future outlook, show in the lower panel of Table 5a. 
Several possible explanations can be brought forward for this unexpected negative 
effect on income from the intervention activity. 
                                                 
102 I would like to thank Mendu Sreenivasulu, (Manager-Samruddhi Centre for Livelihood Promotion, KBS 
BANK, BASIX Group) for a discussion and information on this issue. 
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First, it is possible that as a result of the intervention, less productive and less efficient 
households engage in the dairy activity. These lower skills could result in households 
earning on average less than the more productive households in control villages, who 
engaged in the activity without the support of BASIX. This observation is underlined 
by the sample size – the control group consists here only of around 40 households – 
only those households that do have milk-producing animals. 
Table 5.5a: Effect of participating in BASIX's Dairy Intervention  
Effect of participating in the Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. t-stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
BASIX 238 18498 12907 income from 
dairy 
Control 42 30404  16230 
-11,900* 3203 -3.72 (-16639;-5004) 
BASIX 239 2083 3653 total health 
costs for 
animal Control 43 3293  5238 
-1,210 1416 -0.85 (-3444;1831) 
Expectations                 
BASIX 231 2585 2065 income from 
dairy 
Control 40 3637  3303 
-1,051 1053 -1 (-4466;75) 
BASIX 223 1164 1245 total health 
costs for 
animal Control 38 1463  1279 
-300 284 -1.06 (-785;310) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the 
village level (300 replications), propensity score includes geographical characteristics, satisfies the 
balancing property, and is trimmed at its tail (pscore<0.85). 
 
Another reason is related to the establishment of market linkages that is sometimes 
part of the intervention. Personal observations and preliminary primary data collection 
indicated that intervention participants would sometimes sell their milk to milk-agents 
established by BASIX despite receiving a lower price103. They did so in order not to 
jeopardize the presence of BASIX in the village. This could result in a lower income 
from dairy in comparison to households selling their milk to local vendors. This issue 
will be picked up again when looking more specifically at customers that have 
additionally (non)financial services. 
                                                 
103 A milk agent collects milk from customers and sells it on to a milk chilling plant. Mostly, these agents 
use – or are supposed to use - an instrument for fat and SNF-testing which is purchased through a loan from 
the LPI. The higher the fat and SNF percentage of the milk, the higher the price per litre should be. 
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Finally, it is possible that participants consume more and sell less of their produced 
milk. This mechanism would imply an increase in the households’ food consumption. 
Some descriptive statistics support this hypothesis: The ratio of yearly home 
consumption of milk to milk production is 0.09 for participants as compared to only 
0.03 for controls. The same conclusion holds for absolute numbers: Participants 
consume 0.95 litres of milk per day while controls consume only 0.8.  
The next results presented – effects on general outcome indicators - show that 
participants have indeed a significant increase in their consumption. 
 
Table 5.5b: Effect of participating in BASIX’s Dairy Intervention - General 
Effect of participating in BASIX’s Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. 
t-
stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
BASIX 283 77163 50705 total hh 
income Control 164 61152 40854  
16,011 9726 1.65 (-3794;32714) 
BASIX 275 322717 288742 assets 
Control 161 232116  226164 
90,702 43956 2.06 (-15995;155014) 
BASIX 264 1926 3725 
savings 
Control 157 1579  2231 
345 613 0.56 (-753;1502) 
BASIX 281 39690 15775 food 
consumption 
Control 163 30822  13619 
8,868* 2732 3.25 (3986;14304) 
BASIX 286 17336 22857 other non-
durable 
consumption Control 165 10484  15225 
6,852* 1541 4.45 (3623;9699) 
BASIX 283 17309 11637 durable 
consumption Control 164 13356  9484 
3,954* 1637 2.42 (-579;6106) 
Expectations                 
BASIX 269 76934 52554 total hh 
income Control 155 61664 38150  
15,270 10274 1.49 (-6485;32688) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the 
village level (300 replications), propensity score includes geographical characteristics, satisfies the 
balancing propoerty, and is trimmed at its tail (pscore<0.85). 
 
It can be seen in Table 5.5b that all estimated programme impacts are positive: total 
household income, the asset base and savings are estimated to be higher due to 
participation, but the effects are not significant. As hypothesized above, participants do 
experience a significant increase in their consumption pattern though. This holds for 
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all three categories considered: food, other non-durable and durable consumption. The 
quantitatively biggest effect is found for food consumption: the estimated effect 
translates into a food consumption increase equivalent to Rs. 24 per household per 
day. This is a considerable amount when keeping in mind that the average daily wage 
for an agricultural wage labourer is about Rs. 90 for men and Rs. 60 for women. This 
result stresses the importance of programmes like the one under consideration in 
helping families to self-insure consumption 
The lower panel of Table 5.5b shows that participants themselves expect the positive 
impact of participating in the intervention on their household income to prevail in the 
coming year. This expected return is slightly smaller than the estimated impact on 
realization data and also insignificant. 
The increase in household income is at first sight a counterintuitive result given that 
the intervention activity does not seem to yield a positive impact on income from 
selling milk. This might be explained by a substitution effect taking place:  no data 
was collected on this issue but experiences during field work, discussion with LPI stuff 
and participants, confirmed that often women who stayed otherwise at home (either 
without working or undertaking an activity with lesser return such as for example bidi 
rolling) now contribute to household income through the dairy activity. Hence, total 
household income increases but income from dairy might still be less compared to 
people that engage in the activity and did not borrow from the LPI to do so. 
The differences between effects on realizations and expectations are much sharper for 
income from dairy than for overall household income. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
participants earned much less from selling dairy in comparison to the control group but 
they expect this difference to almost disappear in the coming year.  
Figure 5.1: Effect on Realized and Expected Incomes 
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Two reasons can be brought forward to explain this difference. On the one hand, the 
optimism bias is expected to play a greater role for variables that are directly linked to 
the intervention – income from dairy being the most obvious one. On the other hand, 
since the expectations refer to the coming year and the realizations to the previous year, 
it is possible that the differences in effects reflect a perceived long-term effect of the 
program. If this is the case, estimated results suggest that income generated from the 
supported activity is currently lower for participants than for controls but that this 
changes with time and experience. In the discussion to follow it will be argued that the 
second reason seems more plausible. 
 
5.5.2. Average versus Intention to Treatment Effect) 
In the just presented results, intervention participants are compared to households 
living in villages where, at the time of the survey, BASIX was not operating. This 
implies that it is not known which of the households in these control villages would 
choose to participate in the intervention if they had the possibility to do so. Therefore, 
in the previous analysis, households that decided to participate are compared to 
households similar in characteristics, but of which it is not known whether they would 
actually self-select themselves into the intervention as well. 
This section addresses the issue by looking at the Intention to Treatment Effect (ITT) 
rather than the Average Treatment Effect (ATT). Such an intention to treat analysis 
provides information on the potential effects of the intervention – the potential effect 
of the LPI offering its services in a village on households. 
To do so, the treatment group considered now consists not only of participants of the 
intervention but includes also other households living in the same villages. These are 
compared to households living in non-intervention villages (the same control group as 
above). 
Table 5.6 shows the ATTs from Tables 5.5a and 5.5b alongside the newly estimated 
ITTs. It can be seen that for all variables the effects are remarkably similar; this holds 
especially for the investment returns and costs: the ATTs and ITTs for expectations of 
investment returns and costs are almost identical. This gives indication that 
participants do not decide to participate in the intervention because they are overly 
optimistic about the returns to the investment.   
For the more general outcome indicators, the ATTs is slightly higher than the ITTs. 
This is not an unexpected finding as it can be attributed to self-selection into the 
programme. Note though that none of the effects are statistically significant different 
from each other – this holds for investment return and general variables. From this, it 
can be concluded that the propensity score matching accounts well for the possible 
self-selection into the intervention. Therefore, the remaining results presented in this 
paper – the effects of having additionally (non)financial services – will be ATTs rather 
than ITTs. 
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Table 5.6: ATT versus ITT 
Outcome  ATT & ITT bias corr CI 
ATT -11,900* (-16639;-5004) income from dairy 
ITT -10,700* (-15052;-5228) 
ATT -1,210 (-3444;1831) 
R
ea
liz
at
io
ns
 
total health costs for 
animal ITT -1,083 (-3003;1542) 
ATT -1,051 (-4466;75) income from dairy 
ITT -1,091* (-2923;-57) 
ATT -300 (-785;310) In
ve
st
m
en
t R
et
ur
ns
 
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
total health costs for 
animal ITT -293 (-815;280) 
ATT 16,011 (-3794;32714) total hh income 
ITT 12,883 (-5463;27159) 
ATT 90,702 (-15995;155014) assets 
ITT 62,800 (-12605;140116) 
ATT 345 (-753;1502) savings 
ITT 130 (-935;1054) 
ATT 8,868 (3986;14304) food consumption 
ITT 7,033 (1640;11727) 
ATT 6,852 (3623;9699) other non-durable 
consumption ITT 5,280 (2167;8324) 
ATT 3,954 (-579;6106) 
R
ea
liz
at
io
ns
 
durable 
consumption ITT 3,649 (371;5863) 
ATT 15,270 (-6485;32688) 
G
en
er
al
 O
ut
co
m
e 
In
di
ca
to
rs
 
Ex
p.
 
total hh income 
ITT 12,355 (-3941;26811) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account 
for clustering on the village level (300 replications), propensity score includes 
geographical characteristics, satisfies the balancing propoerty, and is trimmed at its 
tail (pscore<0.85). 
 
5.5.3. Impact of receiving additional (non-financial) Services 
This section discussed estimated effects on the same outcome variables as above, now 
the treatment group being those participants that not only have a loan but also paid Rs. 
300 to receive additional services over the period of the loan. As described in section 2, 
these services include for example regular check-up by a veterinarian and training on 
how to keep and feed the animal. Some of these clients might additionally have 
livestock insurance, which will be discussed further in the next section. Table 5.7a 
presents results for those participants who had these services at the time of the 
survey.104  
                                                 
104  Results where the treatment group consists of participants who ever had these additional services 
(whether at the time of the survey or at any time before) are available on request. They are not presented 
here as they are very comparable. 
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Also for customers with additional services, income from selling milk (products) is 
estimated to be significantly negative. Explanations for this negative effect were 
already discussed above. To recap, it is likely that especially participants who decide 
to take non-financial services alongside the loan are those less experienced and less 
productive in dairy activities and would experience a lower income due to this. The 
second explanation – the one related to the established market linkages deserves a 
more detailed account at this point. It was argued that field work revealed indication of 
some milk-agents operating on milk routes initiated by the LPI paying a lower price 
per litre of milk than local vendors. In addition, in some villages the milk agent would 
take a sample of the participants’ milk for testing but would not return it to the 
participant. By doing so, the agent could make a personal profit through selling the 
samples as his own milk but would at the same time reduce the participants’ income. 
Such practices led to an average loss of Rs. 2 per litre of milk for the participant. 
While Rs. 2, which is just 0.05 US Dollar might sound like a negligible amount, it is 
not considering the price of milk: A milk agent pays on average Rs. 10 for one litre of 
buffalo milk and Rs. 8 for one litre of cow’s milk – a participant can consequently 
experience losses of up to 20-25 per cent. Why would a participant still sell milk to the 
milk-agent and not directly to the local vendor? In an interview one woman explained 
that she sold some of her milk to the local vendor – since he would pay a higher price - 
and some to the milk agent – in order not to jeopardize BASIX’s presence in the 
village.105 
Table 5.7a: Effect of additional Non-financial services – Investment Returns 
Effect of participating in the AgBDS Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. t-stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
AgBDS 161 18852 13605 income from dairy 
Control 45 29484  15552 
-10,600* 3192 -3.331 (-15968;-2226) 
AgBDS 159 2271 4623 total health costs 
for animal Control 46 3092 5399  
-821 1252 -0.656 (-2693;2232) 
Expectations                 
AgBDS 154 2721 2209 income from dairy 
Control 44 3767  3278 
-1,046 962 -1.087 (-3878;-98) 
AgBDS 150 1171 1314 total health costs 
for animal Control 42 1475  1289 
-304 321 -0.948 (-900;398) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the village 
level (300, for border cases 1000 replications), propensity score includes geographical characteristics and is 
trimmed at its tails (pscore<0.82). 
                                                 
105  An impact analysis combining administrative of the LPI and geographical data (Augsburg, 2009) 
addresses the issue further and finds quantitative confirmation of this hypothesis.  
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Further, results presented in Table 5.7a suggest that receiving a loan and non-financial 
services reduces costs and foregone earnings experienced when the milk animals fall 
ill – as before, the effect is insignificant for participants that have non-financial 
services. As before, expectations indicate that the difference in outcomes between 
groups will become much smaller for both outcome variables. 
The most important difference to the overall program effect (when looking at general 
outcomes indicators as presented in Table 5.7b) is that the effect on household income 
is less than half in size. The most plausible explanation for this is the higher effect on 
consumption that is found. Households that have added services to the loan consume 
for example food worth Rs. 28 more per day than the control group – this number was 
estimated to be Rs. 24 for the average customer as presented above.  
Also in line with previous findings are positive but insignificant effects on savings and 
assets.  
 
Table 5.7b: Effect of Add. Non-financial Services – General 
Effect of participating in the AgBDS Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. t-stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
AgBDS 183 76100 49877 total hh 
income Control 162 68208  44364 
7,892 11764 0.671 (-12371;30871) 
AgBDS 178 317176 248669 assets 
Control 159 247262  224781 
69,914 58338 1.198 (-24574;192026) 
AgBDS 169 2475 4254 
savings 
Control 156 1784  2405 
691 722 0.958 (-657;1997) 
AgBDS 181 40395 16175 food 
consumption 
Control 162 30115  13230 
10,280* 3038 3.384 (4142;15431) 
AgBDS 183 17363 22405 other non-
durable 
consumption Control 163 10773  15782 
6,589* 2181 3.021 (2485;11289) 
AgBDS 183 17332 11759 durable 
consumption Control 162 10708  9680 
3,624 2034 1.782 (-1340;6541) 
Expectations                 
AgBDS 170 72321 50858 total hh 
income Control 154 67712  39206 
4,609 11273 0.409 (-13103;27958) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the 
village level (300, for border cases 1000 replications), propensity score includes geographical 
characteristics and is trimmed at its tails (pscore<0.82). 
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5.5.4. Impact of having Livestock Insurance and receiving Ag/BDS 
In this section, treatment is defined as having Livestock Insurance together with 
Ag/BDS and the loan from BASIX. Tables 5.8a and 5.8b show the results.  
Three important differences to the previous results are to be pointed out.  
 
Table 5.8a: Effect of having loan, livestock insurance & Ag/BDS – Investment Return 
Effect of participating in the Livestock Insurance and AgBDS Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. t-stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
BASIX-LI 100 18455 12985 income from 
dairy Control 44 28750 15554  
-10,300* 3282 -3.136 (-17579;-4370) 
BASIX-LI 98 2992 5597 total health 
costs for 
animal Control 45 2985  5209 
7 1291 0.005 (-2422;2365) 
Expectations                 
BASIX-LI 97 3032 2468 income from 
dairy Control 43 3622  2925 
-589 809 -0.729 (-2216;682) 
BASIX-LI 91 1659 1559 total health 
costs for 
animal Control 41 1512  2369 
147 290 0.506 (-393;754) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the 
village level (300, for border cases 1000 reps), propensity score includes geographical characteristics and is 
trimmed at its tails (pscore<0.82). 
 
Firstly, in terms of investment returns it can be seen that customers who have life 
insurance for their animal experience a quantitatively similar negative effect on 
income from selling milk. Nevertheless, they at the same time have higher veterinarian 
costs and expect these to further increase in the coming year as compared to the 
control group. This finding might be explained by the fact that many customers decide 
to take up the insurance product only when they anticipate a higher risk: talking to 
insurance clients, it became clear that many of them for example only chose to pay the 
premium when their animal was (or was about to be) in calf. The risk of the animal 
dying increases under these circumstances. It is hence likely that those livestock 
owners with insurance also experienced more health shocks to their animals. This is 
confirmed when looking at the percentage of households of whom an animal died in 
the previous year – 17 per cent of households with livestock insurance experienced a 
loss in the previous year compared to three per cent of households in the control group 
(conditional on having animals). This percentage is slightly smaller when excluding 
calves but the difference remains with 12 compared to three per cent. 
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Table 5.8b: Effect of having a loan & Livestock Insurance & Ag/BDS – General 
Effect of participating in the Livestock Insurance and AgBDS Dairy Intervention (vs. CONTROL) 
     ATT se. t-stat bias corr CI 
Outcome Group Obs Mean Std.Dev. (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Realizations                 
BASIX-LI 104 75186 51289 total hh 
income Control 157 70338  42933 
4,848 12550 0.386 (-17369;29489) 
BASIX-LI 101 383861 322751 assets 
Control 154 261661  237088 
122,000 58731 2.081 (13376;237752) 
BASIX-LI 97 1798 2954 
savings 
Control 150 1790  2460 
8 822 0.01 (-1689;1471) 
BASIX-LI 105 39320 16317 food 
consumption 
Control 157 31279  13679 
8041 3166 2.54 (1015;13012) 
BASIX-LI 107 19743 24350 other non-
durable 
consumption Control 158 10837  15655 
8906 2771 3.214 (4585;16139) 
BASIX-LI 104 17086 11605 durable 
consumption 
Control 157 14231  9450 
2,854 2552 1.118 (-5121;6292) 
Expectations                 
BASIX-LI 99 70114 48462 total hh 
income Control 148 68448  37875 
1,667 11992 0.139 (-17209;25471) 
Kernel estimates over common support, bootstrapped standard errors that account for clustering on the village 
level (300, for border cases 1000 reps), propensity score includes geographical characteristics and is trimmed at 
its tails (pscore<0.82). 
 
The two other differences with respect to previous results are to be found in the 
general outcome indicators to be seen in Table 5.8b. For one, the effect on household 
income is much smaller in magnitude – about one fourth of the overall program effect 
on the same variable. And second the effect on assets is bigger – and contrary to the 
effect on household income, the effect on assets turns to be significant for participants 
with livestock insurance. This could be explained by the fact that household who have 
insurance and lost an animal get the premium and are able to buy a new (and maybe 
even more valuable) animal. This is again supported when looking at how many of 
those households that had an animal dying bought a new one – 55 per cent of those 
with livestock insurance did as compared to eight per cent without. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter is concerned with evaluating the impact of BASIX’s intervention in the 
dairy sub-sector. This intervention falls under the umbrella of integrated microfinance 
services, offering non-financial services alongside the loan and insurance services. 
Given the specific feature of this microfinance intervention, special emphasise is 
placed on estimating the effect of the additional non-financial services. Several 
outcome indicators are considered to accredit the holistic approach that focuses not 
only on income-generation. 
The results indicate a positive program effect on the conventional five per cent 
significance level on consumption of participants as well as on the income they receive 
from selling milk (products). These significant effects are consistent for all treatment 
groups considered – are hence independent on whether the customer takes only a loan 
or in combination with (non)financial services. 
This finding confirms that the primary goal of integrated microfinance services is 
reached, namely reducing risk and uncertainty and by doing so helping to smooth the 
participants’ consumption and in increasing the ability to cope with shocks. 
In the intervention under consideration, it is foremost the Agricultural and Business 
Development Services that are supposed to serve these latter purposes and indeed, the 
effects on consumption are highest for those participants that had Ag/BDS at the time 
of the survey. Also results on participants who have livestock insurance indicate that 
this service effectively insures household against the loss of one of an extremely 
important asset in the context of the respondents’ households’ livelihoods - the milk-
animal. 
An unexpected result is the finding that program participants experience a negative 
impact on their income from engaging in milk selling as an extra income-generating 
activity. Possible explanations for this result (relating to the productivity of households 
as well as the available market linkages) were brought forward in the discussion of 
these results. An additional issue could be the fact that the analysis conducted lacks 
information that is obtainable but not available. The first set of information is a 
baseline survey. The potential bias that results from having no baseline and therefore 
not being able to account for differing starting values was discussed in the first section. 
The technique applied in the analysis, propensity score matching, minimizes this type 
of bias by matching closely resembling observations but it is possible that some bias 
remains.  
The second set of information that is not accounted for is information on the village 
level. This issue is taken up on the next chapter, which is also concerned with 
evaluating the effect of Ag/BDS on the customers’ income. It will be seen there that 
not including information on a village level (such as the availability of market 
linkages) results in an underestimation of the program effect.  Also this type of bias 
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was addressed as far as possible by including regional information on the mandal 
level. Unfortunately, data collected about the survey villages was found to be too 
unreliable to be used in the analysis. 
This study goes further than purely estimating the effect on realized indicators as is 
typically done in evaluation studies.  
The availability of information on subjective expectations allows estimating the 
subjective return to investment into a milk-producing animal with a loan from the LPI. 
Estimates reveal that participants themselves expect a positive return on their 
household income from participating in the intervention in the future. They further 
expect to also in the coming year earn less from selling dairy in the coming than the 
control group. Nevertheless, the effect on expected income from dairy is much smaller 
in magnitude, almost approaching zero, than the one on realized income from dairy.  
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Appendix 5a – Table 5.A1: Household Characteristics – by Group 
 
Variable Customer (B) Control (C ) ttest B vs. C 
  median mean std.dev median mean std.dev t-stat 
hh-head – gender (1=male) 1.0 0.91 0.28 1.0 0.91 0.29 -0.20 
hh-head - age 42 44 12 45 46 12 2.79 
Education hh head: none 1.0 0.58 0.49 1.0 0.73 0.44 4.19 
Education hh head: some primary 0.0 0.10 0.30 0.0 0.12 0.32 0.68 
Educ. hh head: some secondary 0.0 0.10 0.30 0.0 0.03 0.18 -3.37 
Educ. hh head: some high school 0.0 0.15 0.35 0.0 0.07 0.26 -2.97 
spouse - age 35 36.4 11.1 36 38.8 11.4 2.67 
education spouse: none 1.0 0.67 0.47 1.0 0.76 0.42 2.63 
education spouse: some primary 0.0 0.07 0.26 0.0 0.06 0.24 -0.54 
Educ. spouse: some secondary 0.0 0.08 0.27 0.0 0.02 0.13 -3.41 
Educ. spouse: some high school 0.0 0.07 0.26 0.0 0.02 0.13 -3.26 
no. of hh members 4.0 4.72 1.80 5.0 4.92 1.84 1.49 
no of kids between 0 and 5 0.0 0.28 0.55 0.0 0.27 0.56 -0.41 
no of kids between 5 and 10 0.0 0.42 0.68 0.0 0.37 0.62 -0.92 
no of kids between 10 and 15 0.0 0.66 0.86 0.0 0.68 0.86 0.22 
caste: forward caste 0.0 0.36 0.48 0.0 0.27 0.45 -2.46 
caste: backward caste 0.0 0.45 0.50 0.0 0.48 0.50 0.71 
caste: scheduled caste 0.0 0.11 0.31 0.0 0.17 0.38 2.34 
caste: scheduled tribe 0.0 0.04 0.20 0.0 0.05 0.22 0.57 
hh: vegetarian 0.0 0.07 0.25 0.0 0.10 0.31 1.68 
primary activity: farmer 0.0 0.28 0.45 0.0 0.27 0.44 -0.46 
primary activity: agric. labour 1.0 0.62 0.49 1.0 0.64 0.48 0.58 
primary activity: selfemployed 0.0 0.05 0.21 0.0 0.01 0.11 -2.46 
hh lived in village all life 1.0 0.95 0.23 1.0 0.96 0.19 1.13 
hh plans to move 0.0 0.01 0.09 0.0 0.00 0.06 -0.81 
house ownership: own 1.0 0.86 0.34 1.0 0.94 0.23 3.23 
no. of rooms 2.0 2.11 0.81 2.0 1.95 0.61 -2.72 
roof material: cement/RCC 0.0 0.06 0.25 0.0 0.04 0.19 0.95 
roof material: stone/slab 1.0 0.78 0.42 1.0 0.81 0.39 1.13 
roof material: sheet/tin 0.0 0.04 0.21 0.0 0.06 0.24 0.91 
floor material: cement 0.0 0.06 0.24 0.0 0.04 0.21 -0.86 
floor material: stone 1.0 0.89 0.31 1.0 0.91 0.29 0.69 
bath: closed inside/outside house 0.0 0.36 0.48 0.0 0.41 0.49 1.31 
bath: enclosure in/outside house 0.0 0.46 0.50 0.0 0.49 0.50 0.78 
bath: shielded/thatched outside 0.0 0.17 0.38 0.0 0.09 0.29 -2.92 
cooking fuel: LPG 0.0 0.10 0.30 0.0 0.08 0.27 -0.99 
cooking fuel: Firewood 1.0 0.83 0.38 1.0 0.91 0.29 2.96 
drink water :publ outdoortab close 1.0 0.72 0.45 1.0 0.82 0.38 3.27 
drink water: publ outdoor tab far 0.0 0.15 0.36 0.0 0.13 0.34 -0.67 
Asset: Agric Land 1.0 0.80 0.40 1.0 0.77 0.42 -0.88 
Asset: Chair(s) 2.0 2.28 1.47 2.0 1.82 1.16 -4.32 
Asset: Table(s) 0.0 0.28 0.50 0.0 0.10 0.29 -5.48 
Asset: Bed(s) 1.0 1.16 0.70 1.0 0.98 0.50 -3.50 
Asset: Cupboard(s) 1.0 0.80 0.53 1.0 0.77 0.44 -0.58 
Asset: Radio 0.0 0.04 0.20 0.0 0.03 0.18 -0.77 
Asset: Telephone / cell 0.0 0.43 0.59 0.0 0.25 0.44 -4.15 
Asset: Sewing machine 0.0 0.10 0.32 0.0 0.04 0.20 -2.54 
Asset: Electric iron 0.0 0.24 0.43 0.0 0.16 0.36 -2.78 
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Variable Customer (B) Control (C ) ttest B vs. C 
Asset: Electric Fans 1.0 1.09 0.49 1.0 1.01 0.41 -2.24 
Asset: Steel Utensils 1.0 1.19 0.87 1.0 1.38 1.14 2.59 
Asset: Jewellery 1.0 1.98 7.84 0.0 0.83 4.48 -2.15 
Asset: Bullock 0.0 0.62 1.00 0.0 0.58 1.01 -0.55 
Asset: Buffalo 1.0 1.66 1.50 0.0 0.51 1.04 -10.9 
Asset: Irrigation Equipment 0.0 0.16 0.71 0.0 0.04 0.20 -2.68 
Asset: Modern agric. equipment  0.0 0.16 0.40 0.0 0.06 0.26 -3.60 
Asset: other agricultural equip. 0.0 0.23 0.43 0.0 0.18 0.40 -5.01 
 
APPENDIX 5.B – Table 5.B1: Propensity Score of being a participant vs. Control 
 
Probit Model for being a dairy customer of BASIX 
variable coef std.err z 
No of kids under 5 -0.027 0.114 -0.23 
No of kids between 5 and 10 -0.017 0.070 -0.25 
Vegetarian household (0/1) -0.057 0.204 -0.28 
hh head: age -0.015 0.041 -0.36 
hh head: age² 0.000 0.000 0.29 
hh head: gender (1=male) -0.962 0.550 -1.75 
hh head education: none -0.310 0.139 -2.22 
spouse: age 0.013 0.040 0.34 
spouse: age² 0.000 0.000 -0.51 
spouse education: none -0.251 0.167 -1.5 
caste: backward 0.212 0.155 1.36 
caste: forward 0.216 0.175 1.23 
hh primary activity: farmer 0.378 0.255 1.48 
hh primary activity: agricultural labour 0.272 0.242 1.13 
hh primary activity: self-employed 0.975 0.461 2.12 
lived in village all life (0/1) 0.783 1.411 0.55 
hh plans to move (0/1) 0.181 0.849 0.21 
risk experienced: illness (0/1) 0.129 0.145 0.89 
female population per area -1.896 0.512 -3.7 
distance to Anantapur -0.048 0.010 -4.58 
average landholding 3.491 0.916 3.81 
no. of workers per household -22.812 4.247 -5.37 
no. of veterinarian staff per household 1.608 1.576 1.02 
grazingland per area -6.154 1.635 -3.76 
villages on main road (%) 6.338 1.872 3.39 
villages with bus stop (%) 3.391 1.111 3.05 
irrigated area used for paddy (%) -5.508 2.524 -2.18 
bankbranches per population 0.000 0.000 3.8 
literates (%) -52.737 18.859 -2.8 
Constant 70.925 16.411 4.32 
Common support was chosen and yielded the following region:[0.23, 0.99]; Model 
Indications: LR Chi²(194.5)=, Pseudo R²=0.24. 
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Table 5.B2: Balancing Property 
Inferior of block of pscore Conrtol LPI Total 
0.20 27 11 38 
0.40 37 17 54 
0.50 29 46 75 
0.60 60 168 228 
0.80 16 90 106 
0.9 4 108 112 
Total 173 440 613 
Notes: Number of observations per block of the balanced propensity score 
 
 
Figure 5.B1: Histogram of Propensity Score of being a participant 
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6. Microfinance Plus: Impact of the ‘plus’ on customers’ 
income in rural India 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter is concerned with estimating the impact of 
BASIX’s dairy intervention on its customers, more specifically the effect of having 
additional services with the loan. Also, this chapter gives new insights into whether 
microfinance credit has a higher impact on the customers’ productivity if non-financial 
support related to that activity is provided as well. The crucial difference to the 
previous chapter lies in the data used: while the earlier analysis used data from a 
survey that was specifically designed to be able to conduct an impact analysis, this 
chapter deals with data that is readily available. More specifically, information on 
households is taken from the organisation’s Management Information System (MIS). 
This data is merged with regional information that is made publicly available by the 
Department of Economics and Statistics, Andhra Pradesh. 
This latter data on regional characteristics is used to address the problem of 
endogeneity that is inherent in every evaluation study other than randomized control 
trials. The endogeneity bias one has to deal with typically results from unobservable 
characteristics of a borrower or issues such as programme placement. A classical 
example is that income of a borrower might be higher not due to having been able to 
engage in an extra income generating activity, but because he had higher motivation 
and entrepreneurial spirit to begin with. McKernan (2002) finds that such (self-
selection) bias can result in an overestimation of programme benefits of up to 200 per 
cent. One of the perhaps most often cited impact assessment that accounts for such 
selection bias is that of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The authors, Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), investigate the impact of a microfinance programme on poor 
households, focussing on female participants. They rely on a quasi-experimental 
survey design to account for self-selection. One of their findings is that both men and 
women benefit from the programme, but women do to a greater extent. Other 
interesting studies with similar results include Coleman (1999, 2002), Binswanger and 
Khandker (1995) and Khandker & Feruqee (2003).106  
                                                 
106 For a review of impact evaluations of additional microfinance services see the Introduction of chapter 
five. 
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This chapter relies on an instrumental variable approach to account for endogeneity in 
estimated effects. The estimated effect is the one of having additional services 
alongside the loan. Since the loan is for the purpose of buying a bovine animal, the 
additional services for example include how to feed and keep the animal and regular 
check-up visits by a veterinarian. 107  Findings of this study suggest that such 
additionally offered services alongside the microfinance loan have no significant effect 
in the context of the intervention. In other words, customers who purchase non-
financial services designed to support their loan-related income generating activity 
experience no difference in their income compared to customers that only avail credit. 
Comparing to simple ordinary least square regression results, not accounting for 
endogeneity would overestimate this effect significantly: When taking having the 
services as random, the estimated effect is estimated to be positive and highly 
significant. Of further interest is the result that not accounting for market linkages in 
the estimation underestimates the effect: the estimate is negative (still insignificant 
though) when not taking information on availability or non-availability of different 
buyers of the milk product into account. 
The non-availability of information on non-clients as well as a very constrained set of 
outcome indicators set limits to the analysis. Due to these constraints, only the effect 
of a component of the programme on household income can be estimated. As could be 
seen in the previous analysis, finding no significantly positive effect on income does 
not imply a failure of the program. Many other indicators play a role when talking 
about successful or unsuccessful livelihood promotion. This caveat is acknowledged 
but it needs to be stressed that the main purpose of this chapter is to explore the 
possibilities of evaluating a programme – or a component of a programme – with data 
readily available and hence much more cost-efficient than when collecting survey data. 
It gives insight into possibilities as well as limitations that one has based on 
information that the microfinance institution collects anyway in their daily activities in 
combination with data that can be attained from official statistics departments. 
Comparing results from this analysis with those presented in the previous chapter 
gives confidence in the estimates presented here. Both evaluations – the one with 
readily available data as well as the one making use of household survey data – find an 
insignificant effect.  
Since the programme under consideration was described in detail in section two of the 
previous chapter, the next section jumps directly to the description of the data used in 
this analysis. The third section goes on describing the strategy to address the problem 
of endogeneity. Thereafter, estimation results are presented and the final section 
concludes. 
 
                                                 
107 See chapter five, Section 2 for details on the intervention under consideration. 
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6.2. The Data 
In order to assess the impact these additional non-financial dairy services have on 
BASIX’s clients’ income, a data set was constructed from four different sources. The 
first source is the Management Information System (MIS) of BASIX. This system 
collects data on all of the organisation’s clients, including socio-economic information 
as well as all data related to the loan, its repayment and on insurance or other services 
taken by the client. The second source is a separate list from BASIX, providing the 
name, village and application date of customers who bought Ag/BDS-dairy services. 
This information was at the time not integrated into the MIS and needed therefore to 
be matched with loan information of the client. 
This data was then merged with official statistics108 of Anantapur district as provided 
in the “District Hand Book of Statistics”. These statistics are available from the 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. 
It is an extensive data set on population, industries, housing, employment, price 
indices, state finance, five year plans, tourism, environment and almost any other area, 
some of which is disaggregated on the mandal level.109 The data is collected from 
various central/state government departments, public sector undertakings, corporations 
and other agencies and is available on a yearly basis from 2000 to 2006. For this study, 
data from the financial years 2003/04 and 2004/05 was used in the analysis.  
Finally, the fourth data source used is information collected on alternative (non-
BASIX) milk vendors it was collected specifically for this study and integrated in the 
analysis.110  
The client data was extracted in January 2007 so that the final sample consisted of 
clients, who became customers of BASIX in the time period from the first of April 
2003 to the 30th of December 2006 (reducing the sample from 15,557 to 12,570 
observations). While BASIX offers loans for different investment purposes111, only 
clients that took a loan for the purpose of buying a cow or a buffalo were considered as 
these had the possibility to opt for additional services112 (reducing the sample to 4,410 
observations). The sample needed to be restricted further due to non-availability of 
income figures (416 observations had a stated annual income of zero Rupees, 468 of 
less than 1,000 Rupees, and 63 of more than 500,000 Rupees) as well as the non-
availability of the loan size (for 131 clients the loan size was stated to be below 500 
                                                 
108  Handbook of Statistics, 2004-05 Anantapur District, available for purchase at the Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India. 
109 India is divided into several subnational administrative units. Mandals form the third subdivision below 
states and districts (www.wikipedia.org). 
110 I would like to thank Ramanjaneya Reddy P., unit head Anantapur, for making this extra data collection 
possible. 
111 See Appendix 6.A Table 1 for the different loans and their distribution given the final sample and Table 2 
for comparative statistics on dropped and kept observations. 
112 Ag/BDS is also offered for crop-loans which make up only 7.5% of all Ag/BDS-clients though. 
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Rupees – a loan size not given by BASIX). The final sample consisted of 3332 
observations.113 
Table 6.1 provides information on the customer’s socio-economic background as well 
as on their financial relationship with BASIX, split by whether the customer took on 
additional services or not. 
The great majority (about 65 per cent) are female clients in their mid thirties belonging 
to Other Backward Classes (OBC)114 or other castes. Only 1.2 per cent of all clients 
belong to the scheduled castes (ST) and eight per cent to scheduled tribes (SC). On a 
district basis, these percentages are only available for SC and ST for more recent years. 
According to the census of 2001, two per cent of Anantapur’s population belonged to 
the ST and eight per cent to SC and proportions are hence almost identical to the 
sample proportions.115,116 
Table 6.1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of sample 
Dairy t-stat 
WithOUT Ag/BDS WITH Ag/BDS Variable 
mean sd mean sd 
for equivalence 
of means across 
two groups 
Observations 2,056   1,397     
Yearly income (Rs.) 86,451 1,460 108,080 1,908 -9.13 
Age 35.89 0.18 35.03 8.34 -2.08 
Female 0.67 0.01 0.71 0.01 -2.31 
Familysize 4.19 0.03 1.66 0.04 51.2 
Other Backward Caste, % 0.40 0.01 0.36 0.01 2.62 
Other Caste, % 0.47 0.01 0.51 0.01 -2.59 
Scheduled Caste, % 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 -1.38 
Scheduled Tribes, % 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.46 
Minority caste, % 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.97 
Notes: Summary statistics for active BASIX clients without and with additional services. 
It can be seen that clients with Ag/BDS tend to be wealthier than those without, while 
on the other hand they are more likely to have a thatched roof as compared to one 
made of stone for clients without Ag/BDS. 
                                                 
113 Appendix A includes a table on descriptive statistics and t-tests of the variables dropped and kept. 
Customer Characteristics are in general comparable. Exceptions are that of the dropped observations, 
customers have on average statistically significant bigger families and are younger if they have Ag/BDS; 
more are male and belong to Backward Castes, Scheduled Case or Scheduled Tribes if they do not have 
Ag/BDS. Income figures and variables that give information on the loan are almost all significantly different 
between dropped and kept observations, no matter whether customers have Ag/BDS or not. This is not 
surprising given that these relate to reasons for dropping observations. 
114 Other backward classes – as well as scheduled tribes and scheduled castes – are Indian communities that 
are granted a special status by the constitution of India in order to extend positive discrimination against 
these groups. 
115 Data on OBC are available only in the 1931 census. There, OBCs are estimated to make up 52 per cent of 
the population, as compared to 60 per cent of the client sample under consideration. 
116 Note that variables are also in line with sample averages of the survey data set used in the previous 
chapter. 
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Table 6.2 shows the average loan size of clients is about 11,500 Rupees 
(approximately US$ 290) – covering the cost of a cow or a buffalo. On average, clients 
with Ag/BDS repay the loan in less instalments than those without, all other loan 
characteristics (security amount, amount overdue and number of days overdue) do not 
seem to differ systematically between the two groups. Most of the observations in the 
sample have taken only one loan, while clients without Ag/BDS are more likely to 
have had an earlier loan with BASIX. 
Table 6.2: Loan information of sample 
Dairy t-stat 
WithOUT Ag/BDS WITH Ag/BDS 
Variable 
mean sd mean sd 
for equivalence 
of means 
across two 
groups 
Observations 2,056   1,397     
Loan size (Rs.) 11,489 109 11,573 82 -0.57 
No. of Loans with BASIX 1.11 0.01 1.00 0.00 10.64 
Number of instalments 18.76 0.13 15.75 0.10 16.94 
Amount overdue (Rs.) 20.66 6.87 5.03 3.81 1.76 
No. of Days overdue 5.49 1.19 3.55 0.25 1.34 
Security Amount 1149 10.85 1157 8.22 -0.56 
Notes: Summary statistics for active BASIX clients without and with additional services.  
 
6.3. Strategy to address endogeneity 
The fact that a programme itself, as well as participation in the program, is not 
assigned randomly, can create substantial problems in assessing the effect of an 
intervention. In this setting, a comparison between villagers lending from BASIX that 
receive Ag/BDS and villagers lending from BASIX that do not receive Ag/BDS, even 
when controlling for observed characteristics, can yield very misleading results – as 
highlighted by McKernan (2002). This is due to participation in an intervention being 
neither on the demand nor on the supply side at random. Both, the placement of the 
intervention by the institution and participation by clients are choice variables that give 
rise to endogeneity problems. 
Several strategies can be followed to tackle (and solve) this problem of endogeneity, 
one of which is an instrumental variable approach, as applied in this chapter. That is, at 
least one variable will be identified that is likely to affect the participation in the 
intervention of interest but is unlikely to affect the outcomes of interest directly. 
Typically, one looks either on the demand or supply side for appropriate instruments. 
According to demand theory, price can be a good instrument for predicting a product’s 
demand. The price of BASIX charges for the Ag/BDS services changed twice during 
the sample period: in the initial testing phase, the fees were set at 50 rupees, then 100 
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rupees and 200 rupees per year, in 2004-05 at the end of financial year Ag/BDS took 
off with a fee of Rs 150 and was standardized to Rs 300/- in 2006-07. Since it is not 
apparent from the data who was charged with which amount, this variation in costs is 
not a useful predictor of demand for the service.  
This study turns to the supply side for identifying instrumental variables. Most often, 
eligibility criteria are used as instruments (see for example Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
Nevertheless, since BASIX does not have any exogenous eligibility criteria for 
Ag/BDS, a different instrumental strategy will have to be adopted which was first 
proposed by Khandker and Faruqee (2003). It is based on the assumption that 
resources of an organisation, in this case BASIX,117 as well as other resources (such as 
milk-chilling plants in the area) are constrained, and the demand for services exceeds 
the supply. This implies that BASIX needs to make two sets of choices in the process 
of lending and delivering services. The first set of choices relates to where to operate. 
The second set of choices relates to whom to take on as customers within the chosen 
areas. This latter choice becomes irrelevant for matters of this study as only customers 
rather than non-customers are considered in this study.  
It is the first set of choices made by the organisation, i.e. where to operate, which is 
made use of in this study in order to identify suitable instruments, which can account 
for the endogeneity of dairy Ag/BDS services. 
The idea is that given the fixed resources, BASIX can only operate in a constrained 
number of areas and hence chooses those that have greatest potential for the 
intervention to be successful. BASIX staff calls such areas ‘areas with dairy potential’. 
Phansalkar & Gosh (2001) point out that BASIX strives to allocate resources to the 
best possible borrowers and to operate in areas with favourable factor conditions (like 
availability of power, roads, milk chilling plants, etc.), demand conditions (size of 
domestic/local market, presence of buyers, general growth rate of domestic demand, 
etc.) and related supporting industries. 
The approach of choosing certain areas to operate in implies that potential clients who 
live in more promising areas (as perceived by BASIX) are also more likely the 
additional services from BASIX. In other words, given the available resources of 
BASIX, whether a client receives additional services or not depends not only on the 
own demand but also on the area the client is living in. In the same vein, and this is the 
crucial aspect for the identification strategy in this chapter, it also depends on the area 
other clients live in; these ‘other areas’ can hence be seen as competitors to one’s own.  
The proposed instruments in this study are hence characteristics of these ‘competing’ 
areas. To give an example: In BASIX’s choice of where to establish and hence offer 
additional services related to dairy activities, the number of veterinarians per 
                                                 
117 Resources in the form of staff, such as number of field executives and hence nr of villages they are able 
to cover; in the form of veterinarians that can serve the village and so on. 
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household can be seen as one determining factor. Nevertheless, once services are in 
place, the impact of BASIX’s intervention on customers’ income will not be 
dependent on the number of veterinarians (per household) in another area. The 
characteristics of other areas therefore fulfil the requirements of valid instruments – 
namely that they are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but are 
uncorrelated with the error term of the regression equation.  
As described in the data section, the smallest area unit for which official statistics are 
available are mandals. The district Anantapur is divided into 63 mandals. In 29 out of 
these BASIX offers loans for the purpose of buying a cow or a buffalo. 
Information on these mandals m, Xm, are to be included as explanatory variables in the 
model. Averages of these same indicators for all mandals except for the one the 
subject lives in, contribute to the proposed instruments, X A−m .118 
 
The basic point of departure for impact estimation is then the following equation: 
(1) imimimim SXy εβα ++= 1 , 
with yim indicating the outcome variable of interest (here income) for client i in mandal 
m, Xim are customer characteristics as well as mandal characteristics, Sim denoted 
whether a client receives Ag/BDS or not and εim is an unsystematic error term. α1 and β 
are unknown parameters to be estimated. If no problem of endogeneity was 
encountered and all determining variables were observed, estimated β by OLS would 
measure the impact of having Ag/BDS on income without any bias. Nevertheless, 
receiving Ag/BDS or not, Sim, and the error term of the equation, εim, are correlated – 
the source of the described endogeneity bias.  
In the Instrumental Variable approach that accounts for this bias and that is applied in 
this chapter, the determinants of Ag/BDS are estimated in a first stage; Ag/BDS being 
modelled as follows: 
(2) immAimim XXS υαα ++= −32 . 
where α2 and α3 are again unknown parameters, X A−m  is as defined above and υim is 
the error term, assumed to have an expectation of zero given the explanatory variables. 
As mentioned, X A−m  are average mandal information for all mandals other than the 
one the observation lives in. The characteristics chosen are those that influence 
                                                 
118 Within-area competitor’s characteristics can be dismissed as most likely being poor instruments because 
of ‘spill-over’ and ‘social capital’ arguments. 
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BASIX’s decision of where to offer the services but the income of the observation is 
not influenced by these variables and can hence be excluded from equation (1). 
 
6.4. Estimation Results 
6.4.1. Estimates of Ag/BDS Impact on income - Simple OLS Results and Testing for 
Endogeneity 
Observable customer characteristics included in the model are the age (squared) and 
sex of the customer, information on the family size, an interaction term between the 
latter two variables and one between age (squared) and being female. Information on 
the caste of the household is included as well as information on the type of the 
household’s roof. All other customer characteristics captured in the MIS (such as 
primary occupation and asset value) could not be used as the number of clients for 
whom this was recorded is very limited.  
Further included were variables providing information on the borrowing-relationship 
between the client and BASIX, namely the number of loans taken, the size of the latest 
loan and whether or not a customer was active at the time the data was extracted from 
the MIS. 
Finally, mandal characteristics used in the model include information on percentage 
deviation from normal rainfall in the mandal over the last four years, as well as 
government expenditure and receipts in the mandal in the financial year 2004-05 per 
1,000 households. The variables on rainfall were chosen due to the strong dependence 
on agriculture in the study area in combination with low availability of irrigation 
facilities for poor households. Government receipts and expenditures can be 
interpreted as a proxy of wealth as well as availability of other services and 
infrastructure in the region. 
The other regional characteristics included are counter-parts to the instrumental 
variables. More details are given below when describing the instruments used. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of overall annual household income. BASIX 
reports annual income of the household in its MIS due to most households being, as 
already stated, highly dependent on agriculture – and hence on seasonal income. This 
makes annual income much more informative in terms of wealth of the household than 
monthly income. 
As a first step, equation (1) is estimated by simple OLS, which takes the services as 
randomly given. Results are presented in Table 6.4. 
The results suggest that taking the additional services has a positive and highly 
significant effect on household income. Nevertheless, these results are likely to be 
biased due to a correlation of the indicator of whether a customer receives Ag/BDs or 
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not and the error term of (1). The Wu-Hausman as well as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
tests were applied in order to test for this endogeneity. Results are presented in Table 
6.5. Both of these tests indicate that there are systematic differences between the two 
models. This means the OLS results show that whether a client receives Ag/BDS or 
not cannot be taken as given and IV estimates are to be preferred over the simple OLS 
estimates. 
Table 6.4:  Simple OLS regression Results 
  Ordinary Least Squares  
Dependent Var: log(Income) coeff. t-stat 
Ag/BDS 0.128 3.790 
Age² 0.000 1.430 
Female -0.394 -5.910 
Female*Familysize 0.072 6.460 
Female*Age2 0.000 1.140 
log(Familysize) -0.080 -2.650 
Caste: OC -0.086 -3.760 
Caste: ST -0.187 -2.180 
Caste: SC -0.135 -3.390 
Roof: Stones -0.096 -3.190 
Roof: Tiles -0.085 -1.230 
log(Loansize) 0.404 9.600 
no. Of loans taken with BASIX -0.359 -9.800 
Active customer 0.256 8.230 
% deviation rainfall 2005 0.274 1.870 
% deviation rainfall 2004 -0.402 -3.390 
% deviation rainfall 2003 0.362 2.090 
% deviation rainfall 2002 -0.024 -0.450 
Gvnmt expenditure per 1,000 households (04-05) 25.32 1.57 
Gvnmt receipts per 1,000 households (04-05) -4.663 -0.3 
Average difference in rural domestic electrification per household  -0.008 -0.11 
Average difference of veterinarian staff per household 0.067 0.83 
Average growth in area used for agriculture 0.227 3.74 
Average growth in area used food production -0.056 -0.85 
Average growth in area used non-food production 0.005 0.07 
log(landrevenue per household) -0.004 -1.1 
No. of banks per household 0.630 4.06 
Constant 7.066 17.19 
 Number of obs.:      3370 F(27,3343) 24.43 
  Prob>F 0.00 
  R2 0.165 
  Adj. R2 0.158 
Notes: OLS estimates with bootstrapped standard errors at the village level 
 
Table 6.5: Test statistics for the endogeneity of Ag/BDS 
Tests of endogeneity of: Dairy-Ag/BDS services     
H0: Regressor is exogenous   
Wu-Hausman F test: 6.964 F(1,3312) p-value: 0.008 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 6.992 Chi-sq(1) p-value: 0.008 
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6.4.2. Estimates of Ag/BDS Impact on income - Instrumental Variable Regression  
Given the confirmation of Ag/BDS being an endogenous variable, the instrumental 
variable approach is now estimated.119  
The first stage regression includes – in addition to all variables used in the OLS-
model, average ‘competitors’ characteristics as instruments. As described above, these 
are variables that influence whether services are being made available in a certain area 
or not, but have no influence on the customer’s income. Table 6.6 lists the variables 
used in the final model and provides a brief explanation of why they were chosen and 
an interpretation of the sign of the estimated coefficient. Note that all these variables 
are averages in other mandals than the one a customer lives in. 
Table 6.6: Instrumental Variables 
Instrument Explanation 
difference of 
veterinarian staff in 
2003-04 and 2004-05 
per 1,000 hhs  
Also part of Ag/BDS are regular check-ups for the animals. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that if the difference in veterinarian 
staff between two financial years is on average bigger in other 
mandals than in the one the customers lives in, he/she is more likely 
to have Ag/BDS services. 
average number of 
milk animals per 
1,000 households, 
BASIX does not offer dairy-loans in areas where hardly any 
households are engaged in dairy activities. A certain presence of 
these is important for the success of the intervention. Nevertheless, 
a part of the service in the dairy intervention includes the 
establishment of market linkages in areas where BASIX sees 
potential. This explains the positive coefficient of the variable in the 
model. 
growth in area used 
for food production 
from 2003-04 to 
2004-05, 
Availability of fodder for the animals is a big risk factor for many 
customers. Some customers get fodder from their own land or 
purchase it. However, most collect fodder which makes the 
availability of grazing or undeveloped land important. The growth 
in land, which is used for food production can be seen as a proxy of 
how much land is unused and hence available for fodder collection.  
average growth in 
area used for 
agriculture   
This variable is seen as important since most of BASIX customers 
are engaged in agriculture as their main source of income – either 
owning some land themselves or working as agricultural wage 
labourers. Furthermore, ‘waste’ from harvests often serves as an 
additional source for fodder for animals. 
average difference in 
rural domestic 
electrification per  hh   
This variable can be seen as a proxy for the level of development in 
an area. Having electricity is still not an issue in areas where 
BASIX operates of course. 
number of 
households per area 
The number of households per area can be seen as important in an 
organisation’s service supply decision in terms of having enough 
demand for the product offered. 
Note: All these instrumental variables enter the model as averages of OTHER mandals, hence 
excluding the one the customer lives in. See Section 6.3 for the rationale behind this strategy. 
                                                 
119 Limited Information Maximum Likelihood is applied. See Greene (2005), Chapter 15 for a review. 
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In addition to the competitors’ characteristics, one further variable was used as an 
instrument. This is the distance of the mandal capital to Anantapur – the district capital 
and at the same time the town where BASIX has its main office in the district. This 
variable is an important variable in BASIX service supply decision. The typical 
approach is to first serve areas that are closer to the main office and then expand into 
areas further away. Once the distance gets too big, a branch is established in those 
respective areas. This approach is reflected in the estimated coefficient of the variable: 
the further away a customer lives, the less likely it is that he or she has access to 
Ag/BDS services. 
Note that although the dependent variable is a binary indicator, a linear model is used 
for estimation. Angrist (2001) provides evidence that a linear instrumental variable 
approach can be used in the context of a binary endogenous variable. 
The last two columns of Table 6.7 display estimation results of the instrumental 
variable approach - the approach that was shown to be preferred over simple OLS 
estimates. 
When accounting for the endogeneity of the additional (Ag/BDS) services, the effect 
of having Ag/BDS on a customer’s income is estimated to be negative but 
insignificant. The estimated coefficient changes from a positive value of 0.128 to a 
negative one of 0.188. This is a considerable change and shows by how much a 
programme effect might be overestimated when not accounting for endogeneity. While 
insignificant the negative effect is considerably counterintuitive and calls for more 
attention. The issue will be looked at in more detail in the next section. 
Most other estimated coefficients in the model have the expected sign given the 
cultural setting of the area. Belonging to scheduled tribes or a scheduled caste for 
example has a negative effect and also being female translates into lower income. 
Being older on the other hands increases income, all else equal.  
One unexpected result is the coefficient on the number of loans a client took out. This 
variable is estimated to have a highly significant negative effect, which is unexpected 
in the sense that one would assume long-term benefits from taking part in such a 
programme (with time the loan size increases and opens up more opportunities, and 
clients would be expected to slowly mature into higher income brackets). Nevertheless, 
some support for the finding comes from Khandker and Pitt (2003). In their paper they 
examine the impacts of microfinance on a number of outcomes using a panel 
household survey from Bangladesh. More specifically, they consider issues such as 
whether the effects of microfinance are saturated or crowded out over time, whether 
programmes generate externalities, and whether the estimated impacts of microfinance 
found earlier with cross-section data analysis can be corroborated using an alternative 
method. They find a declining long-term impact of microfinance as well as the 
possibility of village saturation from microfinance loans. Since the average number of 
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loans taken out by the clients under consideration is only 1.1 loans it is unlikely that 
customers would actually already experience declining long-term effects, but village 
saturation might be what drives the results.  
Table 6.7:  First Stage & 2SLS (IV) Regression Results 
  
  
1st stage: Dependent 
Var: Ag/BDS 
IV (LIML): Dep. 
Var: log(Income) 
  coeff. t-stat. coeff. t-stat 
Ag/BDS     -0,188 -0,450 
Age² 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.450 
Female -0.077 -2.270 -0.418 -5.600 
Female*Familysize 0.014 2.410 0.076 6.090 
Female*Age2 0.000 1.160 0.000 1.300 
log(Familysize) -0.341 -23.89 -0.188 -1.290 
Caste: OC 0.010 0.860 -0.084 -3.600 
Caste: ST -0.117 -2.680 -0.224 -2.260 
Caste: SC -0.137 -6.680 -0.182 -2.470 
Roof: Stones -0.300 -20.770 -0.191 -1.470 
Roof: Tiles -0.306 -8.730 -0.178 -1.250 
log(Loansize) 0.201 9.430 0.470 4.840 
no. Of loans taken with BASIX -0.085 -4.540 -0.387 -7.420 
Active customer 0.188 12.000 0.31 3.76 
% deviation rainfall 2005 -0.507 -4.100 0.213 1.260 
% deviation rainfall 2004 0.211 1.680 -0.419 -3.440 
% deviation rainfall 2003 0.353 2.290 0.463 2.100 
% deviation rainfall 2002 0.02 0.49 -0.031 -0.560 
Gvnmt expenditure per 1,000 households (04-05) -3.84 -0.38 25.14 1.54 
Gvnmt receipts per 1,000 households (04-05) -9.717 -0.960 -5.005 -0.320 
Avg. difference in rural domestic electrification per hh  -0.563 -0.740 0.020 0.250 
Avg.difference of veterinarian staff per hh 1.261 1.530 0.061 0.760 
Avg.growth in area used for agriculture 0.378 0.570 0.212 3.310 
Avg.growth in area used food production -0.807 -1.090 -0.067 -0.980 
Avg.growth in area used non-food production -0.092 -1.780 -0.039 -0.400 
log(landrevenue per household) 0.00 1.68 -0.004 -0.980 
 
No. of banks per household -0.09 -0.87 0.55 2.97 
Distance (km) to district capital -0.001 -2.370     
Avg. difference in rural domestic electrification per hh  
in OTHER mandal  -36.31 -0.77    
Avg. difference of veterinarian staff per hh 92.00 1.67    
Avg. growth in area for agriculture  in OTHER mandal 25.07 0.63    
Avg. growth in area food production in OTHER mandal -43.69 -0.93    
Avg.no. of milk animals per hh in OTHER mandal 0.0671 0.03    
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
No. of Households per Area in OTHER mandal 11.48 2.95    
Constant -59.40 -2.11 6.71 10.73 
 Number of obs.:       3370                     F(33,3336) 167   Wald Chi2:    634 
Prob>F 0.00   Prob>Chi2:   0.00 
(Adj.) R2   0.62    R2 0.14 
Test for overidentifying restrictions: Anderson-Rubin chi(6) 0.41   
  Basman F(6,3337) 0.42   
Test for weak Instruments: CV (10%) of 5% Wald 4.18   
  
  F(7,3336) 4.43   
 Notes: Instruments are averages of OTHER mandals, hence excluding the one the customer lives in. See Section 6.3 for the rationale behind this strategy. 
 129
6.4.3. Estimates of Ag/BDS Impact on income – Including information on milk 
vendors 
In this section, the unexpected negative effect of Ag/BDS on income is investigated 
further. 
Personal observations and preliminary primary data collection in autumn 2006 for the 
household survey used for the analysis in the previous chapter had indicated that in 
some cases milk agents120 that operate on milk routes and initiated by BASIX pay a 
lower price per litre of milk than local vendors. In addition, in some villages the milk 
agent would take a sample of the customers’ milk for testing but would not return it to 
the customer. By doing so, he could make a personal profit through selling the samples 
as his own milk but would at the same time reduce the customers’ income. 
Such practices led to an average loss of two Rupees per litre of milk for the customer. 
While two Rupees, which is just 0.05 US Dollar might sound like a negligible amount, 
it is not considering the price of milk: A milk agent on average pays ten Rupees for 
one litre of buffalo milk and eight for one litre of cow’s milk – a customer can 
consequently experience losses up to 20-25 per cent. Why would a customer still sell 
milk to the milk-agent and not directly to the local vendor? In an interview one woman 
explained that she sold some of her milk to the local vendor – since he would pay a 
higher price - and some to the milk agent – in order not to jeopardize BASIX’s 
presence in the village. 
Based on these observations in combination with the above mentioned estimation 
results, BASIX staff in Anantapur were asked to collect data on the presence of local 
and private milk vendors in intervention villages. Due to the heavy workload of field 
staff, only 21 out of 30 mandals could be covered. Therefore, including the collected 
information resulted in a further loss of observations, reducing the sample size to 
2,150 customers.121 
Table 6.8 gives information on average numbers of private milk vendors in villages 
where BASIX customers have Ag/BDS and where they do not. No significant 
differences between the villages in terms of the number of private vendors as well as 
the number of all vendors before and after BASIX started operations are to be 
observed.  
 
 
                                                 
120 A milk agent collects milk from customers and sells it on to a milk chilling plant. Mostly, these agents 
use – or are supposed to use - an instrument for fat and SNF-testing which is purchased through a loan from 
BASIX. The higher the fat and SNF percentage of the milk, the higher the price per litre should be. 
121 See Appendix 6.B Table 1 for a comparison of the sample for the model with and without information on 
milk-vendors. 
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Table 6.8: Information on Milk Vendors in Sample Villages 
Dairy-Villages t-stat 
Variable WithOUT Ag/BDS WITH Ag/BDS 
  mean sd mean sd 
equivalence of 
means for groups 
Observations 56   28     
private vendor present in the village 0.86 0.35 0.89 0.31 -0.45 
number of private vendors in the village 4.70 4.59 4.64 5.04 0.05 
nr of vendors before BASIX started operations 2.91 3.32 2.89 3.55 0.02 
nr of vendors after BASIX started operations 1.91 2.03 1.81 2.09 0.19 
nr of years BASIX is in operation 4.64 1.93 4.38 1.70 0.59 
The previous analysis was repeated with the reduced sample, integrating information 
on milk vendors. 
First Step estimation results as well as test results for the endogeneity of Ag/BDS are 
to be found in Appendix 6.C Table 1 and 2. The same explanatory variables and 
instruments as in the previous model are used - all estimated coefficients having the 
same sign. 
Table 6.9 presents OLS and IV results.  
The effects of milk vendors being present in a village on customers’ income are highly 
significant. The presence of a local vendor is estimated to be positive while customers’ 
income decrease the more private vendors operate in a village. These are results in line 
with the observations from the field.  
The negative coefficient on the number of private vendors in the village can be 
interpreted as additional support for the hypothesis that village saturation might drive 
the negative effect of the number of loans taken, as mentioned in the previous section.  
As before, when taking Ag/BDS as randomly given, the interventions impact on 
customer’s income is estimated to be positive and highly significant. Nevertheless, by 
accounting for market linkages and endogeneity, the estimated effect does not change 
its sign and remains positive; it does however become insignificant. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the insignificant intervention impact does 
not lead to the conclusion of the services being superfluous. It may well be that 
customers with additional services do indeed not experience an increase in their 
income due to the services but they can nevertheless expect to have a lower variability 
in their income streams. This would translate into lower risk and vulnerability, which 
is one desired result from such an integrated microfinance intervention. Whether this 
process is taking place can unfortunately not be tested with the data used in this 
analysis. 
 
 131
Table 6.9: Estimation Results – Model including Information on milk vendors 
  Ordinary Least Squares IV (LIML) 
  coeff. se coeff. se 
Ag/BDS 0.093 2.290 0.290 0.660 
Age² 0.000 1.090 0.000 1.090 
Female -0.520 -6.030 -0.496 -4.930 
Female*Familysize 0.101 7.110 0.095 5.180 
Female*Age2 0.000 2.040 0.000 1.780 
log(Familysize) -0.137 -3.550 -0.064 -0.390 
Caste: OC -0.023 -0.780 -0.024 -0.820 
Caste: ST -0.109 -1.070 -0.089 -0.800 
Caste: SC -0.098 -2.010 -0.066 -0.760 
Roof: Stones -0.139 -3.730 -0.080 -0.590 
Roof: Tiles -0.098 -1.140 -0.035 -0.210 
log(Loansize) 0.381 6.930 0.335 2.920 
no. Of loans taken with BASIX -0.362 -7.830 -0.344 -5.620 
Active customer 0.241 5.980 0.20 2.18 
% deviation rainfall 2005 0.144 0.660 0.199 0.790 
% deviation rainfall 2004 0.168 0.750 0.168 0.750 
% deviation rainfall 2003 -0.309 -1.280 -0.381 -1.320 
% deviation rainfall 2002 0.10 1.34 0.117 1.420 
Gvnmt expenditure per 1,000 households (04-05) 43.69 1.34 48.09 1.39 
Gvnmt receipts per 1,000 households (04-05) -34.616 -1.170 -38.195 -1.230 
Average difference in rural domestic 
electrification per household 0.035 0.360 0.024 0.240 
Average difference of veterinarian staff per hh -0.003 -0.020 0.027 0.180 
Average growth in area used for agriculture 0.199 1.880 0.207 1.920 
Average growth in area used food production -0.302 -2.140 -0.297 -2.100 
Average growth in area used non-food production -0.110 -0.580 -0.055 -0.240 
log(landrevenue per household) 0.01 1.27 0.008 1.230 
No. of banks per household 0.12 0.43 0.18 0.58 
Presence of local vendor 0.190 2.380 0.202 2.410 
No pf private vendors -0.011 -3.090 -0.01 -3.06 
Constant 7.961 13.51 8.188 10.69 
 Number of obs.:       22758                   F(29,2228) 16.39   WaldChi(29) 471 
Prob>F 0.00    Prob>Chi 0.00 
Adjusted R2   0.17     R2 0.17 
Test for overidentifying restrictions: Anderson-Rubin chi(6): 0.08   
  Basman F(6,3337): 0.08   
Test for weak Instruments: CV (10%) of 5% Wald: 4.18   
  F(7,2222):   5.17   
Notes: Instruments are averages of OTHER mandals, hence excluding the one the customer lives in. See 
Section 6.3 for the rationale behind this strategy. 
 
6.5. Conclusion  
Microfinance and its impact have received considerable attention over the last few 
decades, with most studies confirming a positive impact on the customers. However, 
almost exclusively these studies only consider the effect of credit and make use of data 
that was specifically collected to conduct an evaluation on the other hand – something 
timely and costly to do. 
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This study has addressed both of these issues. 
As was already explained in the previous chapter, today, the term ‘Microfinance’, and 
going beyond financial services ‘microfinance plus’, involves much more than just 
giving someone financial credit. Over the last decades enormous developments and 
innovations have taken place in the microfinance sector, resulting in a much broader 
approach taken. Training is being given, insurance products and saving possibilities 
are offered, market linkages are being established – to name just a few of the 
developments that can be observed. 
General consensus exists that these are services which are needed by the poor – though 
not much quantitative evidence exists to support this view.  
The programme under consideration in this study takes this recently developed holistic 
approach. The effect of services offered for customers engaging in the dairy sector 
have been estimated. Customers of the microfinance institution BASIX India who take 
a loan for the purpose of buying a cow or a buffalo can choose to additionally purchase 
so-called Agricultural/Business Development Services. These for example include 
training on how to keep and feed the animal or a monthly check-up of the animal by a 
veterinarian. 
Estimating the effect of these services on the customer’s income by simple OLS, hence 
taking them at random, overestimates the effect significantly. The bias which results 
from the program-variable being endogenous leaves one to believe that the services 
influence income in a significant way. Nevertheless, taking account of this 
endogeneity shows that the customers actually experience no noteworthy effect on 
their income as compared to customers who only avail themselves of credit.  
This might reflect that these customers pay a price for a lower variability in their 
income, which can hence be interpreted as a form of insurance. The analysis in chapter 
four revealed that this is actually true. The standard deviation of typical income is 
lowest if a customer has Ag/BDS (whether in combination with livestock insurance or 
not) and highest if he/she has no additional services. This implies that the additional 
services might not have an immediate effect on the income of the clients themselves, 
but that they influence the health of the animal and by doing so reduce risk. Given the 
context in which the programme is being offered, this result is probably of higher 
importance than an increase in income, as an animal falling ill or dying can have 
severe consequences for the people that are the subject of this study. These individuals 
are extremely poor, owning hardly any assets so that incurring medical expenses for 
their animal or losing them is very difficult to cope with.  
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The chapter further points to the importance of the establishment of market linkages: 
the profit margin of dairy activities is typically very small122 so that even a minute 
reduction in prices can significantly reduce profits for producers.  
The second issue addressed in this chapter is the exploration of evaluating a 
microfinance intervention with data readily available and hence doing so in a cost 
efficient manner. Since data from the Management Information System does not 
provide any information on non-customers it was not possible to estimate the overall 
effect of the program. The analysis was constrained to comparing customers to 
customers, i.e. those that use additional services to those that do not. To overcome 
problems of endogeneity, official statistics and data on market linkages was turned to 
in the analysis. While results are very dependent on the quality of data collected by 
field agents of the microfinance institution, this analysis– in combination with results 
from the previous chapter – shows that getting insight into the effectiveness of a 
programme is possible without conducting a specific survey. It also becomes clear 
though, that the type of information one gets is very limited. Looking at overall 
household income as a dependent variable is very constrained when talking about 
livelihood promotion. If the organisation is hence interested in getting a broader 
picture, the collection of other outcome indicators should be integrated into their loan-
appraisal forms. 
                                                 
122 In rural areas for example, where customers need to purchase fodder for the animal, profit can only be 
attained when mixing milk with water one to one. 
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APPENDIX 6.A 
Table 6.A1: Distribution of Customers by Purpose of Loan 
Purpose of loan freq. % cum. 
House Repairs / Extensions 2 0.02 0.02 
General Purpose - S.H.G 4 0.04 0.06 
S.H.G.S without C.S 4 0.04 0.1 
Federation of S.H.G.S/MACTS 8 0.08 0.18 
Vehicle loans for employees/LSAs 9 0.09 0.27 
Agri Investment loans 11 0.12 0.39 
Housing & Infrastructure loans 42 0.44 0.83 
Crop Loans (JLGS) 510 5.37 6.2 
General Purpose Women (JLG) 521 5.49 11.69 
AGRI-ALLIED LOANS 3,454 36.4 48.09 
Non-farm Micro-Enterprises 4,924 51.89 100 
Total 9,490   
 
Table 6.A2: Comparison of Dropped and Kept observations 
  WITH Ag/BDS WithOUT Ag/BDS 
  dropped obs. kept obs. dropped obs. kept obs. 
Variable mean sd mean sd 
t-test 
mean sd mean sd 
t-test 
No. Of Obs. 34 1443   901 2140   
Income 536718 408618 108080 72493 26.23 18594 113445 86451 67013 -20.38 
Age 33.15 7.56 36.49 8.51 -2.27 36.05 8.63 35.89 8.35 0.48 
Sex 
(Female=1) 0.559 0.504 0.708 0.455 -1.89 0.527 0.500 0.672 0.470 -7.57 
Family size 2.735 1.864 1.663 1.348 4.54 4.284 1.854 4.195 1.510 1.38 
Caste: OBC 0.471 0.507 0.356 0.479 1.37 0.483 0.500 0.400 0.490 4.23 
Caste: OC 0.412 0.500 0.512 0.500 -1.16 0.424 0.494 0.468 0.499 -2.23 
Caste: SC 0.059 0.239 0.101 0.302 -0.81 0.074 0.263 0.087 0.283 -1.19 
Caste: ST 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.079 -0.46 0.002 0.047 0.020 0.142 -3.77 
Caste: 
Minority 0.059 0.239 0.024 0.154 1.27 0.017 0.128 0.024 0.154 -1.30 
Loan size 13853 5235 11573 3126 4.12 12021 6299 11490 4978 2.47 
No. of 
Loans 1.059 0.239 1.003 0.070 4.12 1.560 0.839 1.110 0.375 20.34 
No. of 
Instalments 18.56 2.98 15.75 3.79 4.29 18.82 6.18 18.76 5.98 0.25 
Amount 
overdue 0.18 0.46 5.04 144.58 -0.20 122.95 895.12 20.66 315.39 4.61 
Days 
overdue 3.50 8.57 3.55 9.69 -0.03 18.84 123.97 5.49 54.46 4.10 
Security-
amount 1385.29 523.47 1157.31 312.58 4.12 1202.04 629.94 1148.95 497.85 2.47 
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APPENDIX 6.B 
Table 6.B1: Comparison of observations in Model with and without information on 
milk-vendors 
in both samples 
not in milk-
vendor model   
  mean sd mean sd t-test 
  WITH Ag/BDS 
No. Of Obs. 1000 443   
Income 108176 69041 107862 79821 0.08 
Age 37.07 8.65 35.18 8.03 3.91 
Sex (Female=1) 0.741 0.438 0.634 0.482 4.13 
Family size 1.676 1.359 1.634 1.324 0.54 
Caste: OBC 0.373 0.484 0.318 0.466 2 
Caste: OC 0.48 0.5 0.585 0.493 -3.68 
Caste: SC 0.123 0.329 0.052 0.222 4.15 
Caste: ST 0.005 0.071 0.009 0.095 -0.89 
Caste: Minority 0.019 0.137 0.036 0.187 -1.95 
Loan size 12047 1991 10503 4611 8.88 
No. of Loans 1.003 0.055 1.005 0.095 -0.38 
No. of Installments 16.48 1.95 14.1 5.87 11.46 
Amount overdue 1.97 56.96 11.96 246.57 1.21 
Days overdue 2.69 7.87 5.5 12.67 -5.13 
Security-amount 1204.7 199.07 1050.34 461.13 8.88 
  WithOUT Ag/BDS 
No. Of Obs. 1324 780   
Income 85299 64094 88406 71695 -1.03 
Age 35.53 8.33 36.51 8.37 -2.6 
Sex (Female=1) 0.704 0.457 0.617 0.487 4.13 
Family size 4.147 1.55 4.277 1.438 -1.91 
Caste: OBC 0.356 0.479 0.473 0.5 -5.31 
Caste: OC 0.489 0.5 0.433 0.496 2.46 
Caste: SC 0.106 0.308 0.056 0.231 3.88 
Caste: ST 0.024 0.154 0.014 0.118 1.58 
Caste: Minority 0.025 0.156 0.023 0.15 0.27 
Loan size 11514 4941 11447 5043 0.3 
No. of Loans 1.109 0.367 1.112 0.388 -0.16 
No. of Installments 18.75 6.21 18.77 5.57 -0.08 
Amount overdue 26.69 373.59 10.43 177.03 1.14 
Days overdue 6.18 56.89 4.3 50.09 0.77 
Security-amount 1151.44 494.14 1144.73 504.36 0.3 
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APPENDIX 6.C – Test for Endogeneity and 1st Stage Regression Results: Model 
including information on Milk Vendors 
 
Table 6.C1: Test statistics for the endogeneity of Ag/BDS 
Tests of endogeneity of: Dairy-Ag/BDS services     
H0: Regressor is exogenous   
Wu-Hausman F test: 4.917 F(1,2127) p-value: 0.027 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test: 4.959 Chi-sq(1) p-value: 0.026 
 
Table 6.C2: 1st Stage Regression Results 
  1st stage 
  coeff. t-stat 
Age² 0.000 0.060 
Female -0.132 -2.960 
Female*Familysize 0.028 3.790 
Female*Age2 0.000 1.600 
log(Familysize) -0.375 -20.28 
Caste: OC 0.017 1.120 
Caste: ST -0.104 -1.980 
Caste: SC -0.135 -5.160 
Roof: Stones -0.293 -15.98 
Roof: Tiles -0.342 -7.76 
log(Loansize) 0.241 8.490 
no. Of loans taken with BASIX -0.098 -4.06 
Active customer 0.203 9.76 
% deviation rainfall 2005 -0.742 -2.82 
% deviation rainfall 2004 0.131 0.50 
% deviation rainfall 2003 0.728 2.530 
% deviation rainfall 2002 -0.11 -1.13 
Gvnmt expenditure per 1,000 households (04-05) -28.67 -0.92 
  
Gvnmt receipts per 1,000 households (04-05) 1.372 0.040 
  Avg. difference in rural domestic electrification per hh  -3.294 -1.270 
Avg.difference of veterinarian staff per household -1.961 -1.120 
Avg.growth in area used for agriculture -0.820 -0.560   
Avg.growth in area used food production -1.754 -1.370 
Avg.growth in area used non-food production -0.028 -0.100 
log(landrevenue per household) 0.00 0.44 
No. of banks per household -0.33 -1.24 
Presence of local vendor -0.170 -3.50 
  
No pf private vendors 0.000 0.050 
Distance (km) to Anantapur (district capital) -0.001 -0.600 
Average difference in rural domestic electrification per 
household  in OTHER mandal  -197.1 -1.24 
Avg. difference of veterinarian staff per household -104.3 -0.89 
Avg. growth in area used for agriculture  in OTHER mandal -42.34 -0.49 
Avg. growth in area used food production in OTHER mandal -114.49 -1.33 
Avg. no. of milk animals per household in OTHER mandal -7.72 -1.75 
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
No. of Households per Area in OTHER mandal 8.54 0.99 
 Constant 18.471 0.24 
  Number of obs.:      2258 F(35.2222):   108.61 
   Prob>F:          0.00 
       R2:     0.63 
   Adj. R2 0.63 
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7. Overall Conclusion 
 
 
 
“The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening opportunity, 
to the greater triumphs and achievements that await us. Are we brave 
enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and accept the challenge 
of the future?” 
Jawaharlal Nehru, speech on the granting of independence, August 14, 1947. 
 
In many ways India was indeed brave and wise enough to grasp opportunities it was 
given over the last two decades. Its economy has become a rising star in the 
international sphere, with growth rates of more than nine per cent for the third year in 
a row. This remarkable economic growth is attributed to science, technology and 
innovation-led development, primarily in sectors such as IT and pharmaceuticals. 
Growth in the agricultural sector on the other hand fell far behind. This is worrisome 
given that agricultural activity is the main means of livelihood for almost two thirds of 
the Indian workforce, currently contributing about one fourth to GDP. And the 
absolute population dependent on agriculture is increasing rather than decreasing in 
the Indian context (Business Standard India 2008). 
The Indian government is aware of the graveness of the situation and is taking 
measures accordingly. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) urges attention to the 
stagnation in the agricultural sector, which is recognised by most as a crisis. The 
Government’s plan says: “It is necessary to double the growth rate achieved in the 10th 
Plan and put agriculture on a growth path of around 4 percent.” 
 
  “So far as I am able to judge, nothing has been left undone, either by man 
or nature, to make India the most extraordinary country that the sun visits 
on his rounds. Nothing seems to have been forgotten, nothing overlooked.” 
Mark Twain, Following the Equator, 1897. 
 
The Indian microfinance economy observed a similar – if not much brighter – growth 
than the overall economy. Chapter two gives an overview of the immense spread of 
the major microfinance model in India, the SHG Bank Linkage Programme, but it also 
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shows that the microfinance institution model is expanding rapidly. Ghatak’s (2007) 
estimates for 2006 are that the MFI model served about 7.3 million households and the 
SHG model 14 million households; allowing for overlap, this adds up to 
approximately one fifth of all poor Indian households. 
These are impressive numbers, but small within a populous country the size of India 
with people living below and just above the poverty line numbering in hundreds of 
millions. As is the case in the overall economy, the major backbone of the 
microfinance economy is lagging behind; the backbone being the very remote areas, 
the very backward areas, the very poor people, and – uniquely so in India – the urban 
poor. And, contrary to the agricultural sector, a lot has been forgotten and a lot has 
been overlooked. 
The first part of this dissertation deals with such forgotten and overlooked factors of 
microfinance in India. Fortunately, most of these are not forgotten and overlooked by 
all. A book edited by Dichter & Harper (2007) repeatedly points to the fact that 
“microfinance can ‘crowd out’ other initiatives” (p. 258). Hulme for example states in 
the second chapter that: 
“MFI and donor hype has created the impression that microfinance is a cure to 
poverty. […] This is a potentially dangerous line of argument as it distracts attention 
from the fact that poverty reduction requires action on many fronts: social safety nets 
for the poorest and most vulnerable, an effective education system, low-cost and 
reliable health services, governments that can provide social inclusion (and thus 
maintain law and order) and sound macroeconomic policies, and many other issues” 
(Hulme, 2007, p. 21) 
While such observations are being made, little if any quantitative support exists to 
corroborate them. Chapter two of this dissertation gives evidence to the claim by 
undertaking a quantitative analysis of the determinants of the spread of the SHG 
model. Amongst others it is found that the SHG model is predominantly active in areas 
where a banking network is available – and as of yet not in areas devoid of a formal 
financial sector. Also, indication is given that the focus on SHGs seems to be a trade-
off with other social schemes – leaving many underprivileged groups unattended to. 
In fact, the SHG model seems to grow ahead of its capacity, an issue also taken up in 
the third chapter. This chapter goes deeper into implications of the growth and the 
microfinance hype it brings about. The lesson is clear: There is an unquestionable need 
for greater transparency as well as greater awareness.  
The greater awareness that is called for is public awareness – public awareness of 
issues related to financial indicators. A lot has been written about the high costs of 
microfinance loans and especially practitioners of the microfinance institution model 
in particular argue for the need of high interest rates to cover these costs. Chapter three 
gives an account of what can happen in circumstances of lacking awareness – when 
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real costs are not known by the public and beliefs reside that high interest rates are a 
result of greed and money-making and not a necessity to cover costs. Institutions find 
ways to lower the interest rates, but what is saved on one side needs to be recovered 
somewhere else – be it in additional charges to the customer or near to perfect 
recovery rates, which often do not come without pressure. The crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh is just one example of the severe consequences. 
Contrary to what is usually promoted, the transparency called for in this dissertation 
relates to consumer protection. Typically in the context of finance, discussions evolve 
around asymmetric information in terms of what the institutions do not know about the 
clients. The success of microfinance is partly based on finding solutions to this 
problem, such as the joint-liability model. The asymmetries that run in the other 
direction are much less talked about are– all the information that the institution 
possesses and knowingly or unknowingly withholds from the clients; with the real 
costs of credit topping the list. 
As argued in chapter three, the focus to date lies too much on economic indicators of 
the institution, pushing for financial sustainability and neglecting the consequences of 
such one-sided attention. Of course, facts and figures are important when for example 
considering funding decisions. But an effort should be made to go beyond the standard 
ratings and financial performance indicators – especially when the aim is poverty 
alleviation. 
And this is in fact less difficult than it might appear at first sight – little by little, 
possibilities are being given that facilitate paying attention to social performance.123 In 
March 2005, a Social Performance Task Force was created based on the initiative of 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Argidius Foundation, and the 
Ford Foundation. Their aim is to define social performance and to decide on how to 
measure and monitor it.124 Four rating institutions125 already conducted social ratings 
of some microfinance institutions. The percentage of microfinance institutions that has 
such ranking is more than negligible, and a lot can be said about the difficulty in 
measuring and the missing accuracy of such social indicators. Nevertheless, the crucial 
aspect is to put weight and emphasis on the issue.  
And it is donors who can - and should - play a major role in pushing for greater rights 
of microfinance consumers by encouraging and spreading these types of indicators. 
Clear signals need to be given that support is provided to institutions that are not only 
performing well in terms of financial indicators but that the social aspect is at least as 
important. 
                                                 
123 The Social Performance Task Force initiated by CGAP defines social performance as “the effective 
translation of an institution’s social mission into practice in line with accepted social values.” 
124 More recently (November 2007), ACCION International published its report “Guidelines to Evaluate 
Social Performance”, which develops a framework for MFIs of how to assess and report social performance. 
125 These are MCRIL, MicroFinanza Rating, MicroRate and Planet Rating. 
 140
In fact, as results from the third chapter, donors should not even focus on funding 
institutions with an excellent track record of financial indicators. 
The success of micro“financial”services in their original purpose (such as a loan for 
investment into an income-generating activity) came about because returns of financed 
activities were high enough to cover costs of such loans and for customers to still 
benefit on several levels (household, empowerment...). Microfinancial services do not 
need to be dependent on donor money. Organisations that demonstrate to be able to 
work on financially self-sustainable basis are nowadays able to attract investment from 
other sources – a new market develops in which investors look for possibilities to 
combine capitalism with altruism; such as investing in microfinance institutions that 
yield a competitive rate if return to its investors. 
One example is the Bangladeshi microfinance organisation Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA). Its founder and president Shafiqual Haque Choudhury managed 
to attract 500 billion Euros from investors such as the Dutch pension fund ABP or the 
American one TIAA-CREF, offering a yearly interest yield of ten per cent over ten 
years. Another example that has been recently widely discussed is Compartamos, a 
Mexican microfinance bank. This microfinance organisation which was founded in 
1990 went public in April 2007, the original investors offering 30 per cent of their 
shares. They walked away with US$ 450 million. That altruism fell far behind in this 
incidence - original investors making an enormous profit and keeping most of it for 
themselves – is of course a not to be neglected issue and relates back to the discussion 
of pushing for the importance of placing emphasis on the altruistic motives. Chapter 
three elaborates on possible consequences that evolve when the social objective are 
lost out of sight. Muhammed Yunus voiced his concern in an interview with the 
German magazine the Spiegel saying that: “It was our goal to crowd out usurers. Now 
they are coming back, dressed up as benefactors”.126 
The point these examples are supposed to make is that donors do not need to play a 
role in microfinance – for sure not in the long-run, maybe not even today. 
The emphasis is, however, on finance. 
As was detailed in chapter five, over recent decades a broader approach to 
microfinance developed. This was mainly a reaction to observations that the very poor 
need more than just loans and that microfinance – the tool for poverty eradication - 
would neglect this part of the population if it did not adapt to their needs. 
Many microfinance institutions now offer services alongside the loan that are aimed at 
increasing efficiency and productivity. Of course, these services increase costs – costs 
that are already high given the peculiarities of the clients and hence the financial 
services provided. Given that microfinance institutions are filling a hole; that they are 
                                                 
126 Buse (2008). “Die Grenzen des Anstands“. Der Spiegel (33/2008), own translation. 
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playing a role that should be someone else’s to play, this is where donors’ money can 
be meaningfully invested. 
What non-financial services are MFIs offering and whose role would it actually be to 
do so?  
The range of additional services as offered today is very broad. Chapters five and six 
go into more detail of one such an integrated approach, looking at a program that 
provides a loan for the purpose of buying a cow or a buffalo to engage in milk-selling 
as an extra-income generating activity. With the loan comes a health and life insurance 
for the client and the spouse. Additionally livestock insurance is being offered as well 
as a non-financial-services-package that includes, among others, training on how to 
keep and feed the animal, regular check-ups by a veterinarian as well as health camps. 
Furthermore, market linkages are established in areas where needed and fat-testing of 
the milk is introduced to guarantee fair prices for the product. This is just one example. 
Many other microfinance programs offer skills training in income-generating activities 
and capacity building, business skills development courses, ongoing business support, 
courses in functional literacy, health and sanitation awareness sessions and even 
healthcare services, they address issues of social empowerment and gender 
sensitization, give food grain assistance and sometimes even provide grants before 
giving loans.  
The list is long and it is clear that these are not services that one would imagine a 
financial institution to have an expertise in. These are services that the government or 
maybe some private institutions are expected to provide – basic education, building of 
infrastructure, healthcare. If these institutions fail, one would expect Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Donors to step in. Not, however,  “banks”. 
Well, why not? Let microfinance develop into “microfinance plus”, “integrated 
microfinance”, “holistic microfinance” – but give them the needed support. Do not 
expect financial experts to know when the buffalo should be inseminated for the milk-
production cycle to be maximized or to teach their clients how to read and write 
numbers so that they can actually keep track of their sales. 
By supporting such non-financial activities donors can further place emphasis on the 
social mission of microfinance institutions, which - as argued above – is an important 
role for them to play. 
Hence, instead of looking for supporting “microfinance-stars” in terms of financial 
indicators donors should rather turn to support NGO-MFI type of microfinance 
providers. These are NGOs that took up lending activities. Besides placing greater 
emphasis on non-financial services and hence being a more appropriate provider for 
the very poor, the encouragement of this more grassroot form of credit delivery is also 
an important step in the development of the Indian microfinance sector. 
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Two main reasons can be brought forward to explain this view: For one, given their 
smaller size and stronger focus on social objectives, NGO-MFIs are much closer to the 
ground, in more direct contact and discussion with the clients and therefore serve as an 
important source of innovation with respect to microfinance services. Furthermore, 
NGO-MFIs are much more likely to operate in remote and underserved areas, not at 
last because of their smaller size. Given the results from chapter two, that the SHG 
Bank Linkage Programme is much less dominant in for example remote hill tribe areas 
the distinguishing feature of the NGO-MFI to operate in such un(der)served areas 
obviously fills the observed gap.  
One of the most convincing arguments to support such integrated programs remains 
evidence of course that they actually do the participants good. 
The second part of the dissertation looks at the benefits to the customers of such an 
approach, by analyzing the livelihood promotion intervention in the dairy sub-sector 
previously described. The providing organization, BASIX India, is not an NGO-MFI 
but a Non-Banking Finance Company. Nevertheless, it is one of the drivers of the 
integrated sector approach to microfinance in India. They are seen as one of the most 
innovative institutions – almost an experimental microfinance laboratory, following 
their strategy of the livelihood triad as explained in chapter five. BASIX is a 
remarkable institution with unique leadership, which needs to be acknowledged as one 
of the driving forces behind the institution’s successes in working with the poor, which 
are also reflected in the results of the impact analysis conducted in this dissertation. 
This raises the question of replicability of their initiatives. While it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to answer this question, it is without doubt that personality and 
commitment are crucial when mixing banking with non-banking services. And even an 
institution like BASIX can and did fail as can be seen from their effort to potato-
growers in Jharkand with the snack-food company Frito Lays.127 
Before going into the evaluation of BASIX’s specific program, the fourth chapter of 
this dissertation is devoted to analysing the benefits of engaging in dairy as an extra 
income generating activity in general terms. Results show that households do derive 
economic benefits from selling dairy products: they had in the previous year, typically 
have and also expect a significantly higher overall income stream than people whose 
household income sources do not include milk-selling. These results are confirmed in 
a Lorenz-curve analysis, which shows that engaging in dairy activities is indeed 
welfare-improving.  
This positive result on the role of dairy-activities links back to the concern about the 
agricultural sector raised in the beginning of the conclusion. While the sector’s growth 
is stagnating at 3.3 per cent, the livestock sector, which contributes to about 25 per 
cent to agricultural GDP, is growing at an annual rate of 5.6 per cent. With 66.6 per 
                                                 
127 See Harper (2009). 
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cent in 2001-03, the greatest contribution to the livestock sector came from milk and 
milk products. Livestock and especially milk production is showing great potential to 
be the main driver of agricultural growth and hence also to be the potential solution to 
the currently observed stagnation in this backbone of the Indian economy. 
India is at present in fact the largest producer of milk in the world with an annual 
production of 88.1 million tones in 2003-04 (Ali, 2007). This translates into a 
production of approximately 1,123 kg/year per animal as compared to 9,306 kg/year in 
the United States and 5,529 kg/year in the European Union (FAPRI, 2008). 
Productivity in India lies much below the world average of approximately 3,882 
kg/year per cow, which calls for further policy interventions, developments and 
innovations within this sector. Chapters five and six go into more detail of such an 
intervention. 
A further important result that comes out of chapter four is that, while greater 
heterogeneity in income is observed for households that derive income from selling 
milk, they face lower uncertainty in their future income streams. 
This latter observation is possible despite the fact that only cross-sectional data is 
available for analysis. Data on subjective expectations of the customers allows 
distinguishing between heterogeneity and uncertainty, as was detailed in chapter four. 
The work of subjective expectations is a relatively new but growing field. This 
dissertation adds to the literature by collecting new data in a developing country on a 
population that faces above average uncertainty as well as by eliciting expectations on 
investment-specific returns. These latter expectations on returns directly linked to the 
intervention are more elaborated on in the evaluation studies presented in chapters five 
and six. 
The results of these evaluation analyses indicate a positive program effect on 
considered economic outcome indicators. This suggests that the just described analysis 
of engaging in dairy activities might inherit a bias given that the greater part of the 
respondents is clients of the organisation BASIX India. This needs to be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, they are in line with other studies that 
show dairy to be a welfare improving activity (for references see chapter four) and it is 
therefore believed that the possible bias is not extensive. 
Significant positive programme impact is found on household income, assets and 
consumption categories (food, other non-durables and durables) of customers. The 
positive and significant effect on consumption holds for all sub-groups of customers 
considered (looking at additional (non-)financial services). This finding supports the 
statement of Monique Cohen (2003) that microfinance should be seen as a “necessary 
but not sufficient condition for development”; that credit to the (income) poor might 
not necessarily lift them above the poverty line but that it plays a crucial role in vital 
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issues such as consumption smoothing, in reducing risk and uncertainty and in the 
ability to cope with shocks. 
In fact, the Agricultural and Business Development Services as well as Livestock 
Insurance that BASIX offers alongside the loan, serve exactly these latter purposes of 
among others productivity enhancement and risk mitigation. And indeed, the effects 
on consumption are highest for those customers that had Ag/BDS at the time of the 
survey. 
An unexpected result is the finding that program participants have a negative impact 
on their income from engaging in milk selling as an extra income-generating activity. 
This effect is significant for customers who have livestock insurance.  
Several explanations can be brought forward for this result. One lies in data constraints 
that the applied statistical techniques fail to account for and that hence lead to biases in 
the results. Of course, one always has to deal with unobservables that are difficult if 
not impossible to measure and where additional data collection effort would not lead 
to a solution. Nevertheless, the two sets of information that are obtainable but are 
missing in the analysis are village as well as baseline data. The potential bias that 
results from having no baseline was discussed in chapter five, stressing the problem of 
missing data on outcome indicators before the intervention started, hence not being 
able to account for differing starting values. Simple summary statistics as well as 
discussions with staff of BASIX, indicate that customers who opt for additional non-
financial services are on average poorer and have less experience with the keeping and 
rearing of cows or buffaloes than those that only take the loan. The lack of data and 
hence inability to account for it in the analysis might be driving the insignificant 
results for customers with additional services as compared to those without. Propensity 
score matching minimizes this type of bias by matching closely resembling 
observations but it is nevertheless possible that some bias remains.  
Chapter six gives evidence that not including information on a village level (such as 
the availability of market linkages) results in an underestimation of the effect. While 
the selection of survey villages followed a thorough process that aimed at minimizing 
differences between the program and non-program villages, it would be more efficient 
to include information on village level. For that matter, village information was 
collected in the course of the survey but unfortunately the quality of the data was not 
deemed good enough to be included in the analysis. Data on a few villages was 
collected twice and comparison showed too large differences to be confident with the 
information. Unfortunately, time (and money) constraints did not allow for 
recollection of the data. 
Throughout the analysis conducted for this dissertation, attention was paid to minimize 
such biases to the best possible extent and to take limitations into account when 
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interpreting results. There is hence confidence that the conclusions presented are a 
reflection of what is going on in the field.  
In the second part of the dissertation, this “what is going on” captures whether 
customers are better off due to participating in the intervention or not. What remains 
unanswered and is subject to future research are questions such as whether the 
additional services reduce the risk of the customers; i.e. make them less vulnerable to 
shocks.  
In order to get a complete (or more complete) picture, one needs to go beyond one-
shot level indicators that reflect the current state. As mentioned several times in this 
dissertation, risk and uncertainty play a major role in the life of microfinance clients, 
and livelihood promotion is geared at reducing this risk and at the same time 
increasing the customers’ ability to cope with shocks. To capture effects of such 
forward-looking anti-poverty interventions one needs a measure that reflects a 
household’s future prospects and that by doing so incorporates risk and uncertainty - 
an ex-ante measure of poverty such as vulnerability to poverty is an example. 
The measurement of vulnerability is not straightforward. Since it is forward-looking, it 
involves the measurement of all possible outcomes as well as their likelihood. In other 
words hypothetical situations of what outcome level (such as consumption level) a 
household will have in a certain state of nature needs to be measured. 
Estimating the first two moments of expected outcome distributions as was done in 
chapter four, is a first step in analysing vulnerability by looking at uncertainty. The 
standard deviation of this subjective outcome distribution reflects this uncertainty and 
can hence serve as a measure of idiosyncratic risk. As mentioned before, descriptive 
statistics presented in that chapter indicate that households engaging in dairy as an 
extra income generating activity are less vulnerable – their expected income is higher 
and their expected standard deviation on average lower than for households not selling 
any milk.  
In order to get deeper insight into the issue of vulnerability, a second survey round is 
required (and actually planned). With panel data available, measures of vulnerability 
that are not based on subjective expectations data is possible and hence a comparison 
of the two approaches can be undertaken. Besides delivering interesting insights into 
the program under consideration, further contributions to the literature can be made by 
shedding light on the potential usefulness of expectation data for estimation and 
identification, here in the context of risk and vulnerability.  
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9. Appendix 
9.1. Survey Design 
9.1.1. Introduction 
This is a description of a survey and its implementation, designed to evaluate an 
intervention by the microfinance institution BASIX India in the Indian state of Andhra 
Pradesh. 
9.1.1.1. The program to be evaluated 
BASIX India started its operation in the second half of the 1990s following the 
strategy of the so-called ‘livelihood triad’, the three corners being Institutional 
Development Services (IDS), Livelihood Financial Services (LFS), and Agricultural 
and Business Development Services (Ag/BDS). The dairy intervention under 
consideration in this study encompasses all three of these aspects. IDS in the context 
of this intervention include for example the formation of producers’ groups, 
federations and cooperatives. The loan itself falls under LFS. The conditions are 
typically a loan period of on average 18 months, implying 18 loan instalments with an 
interest rate of 24 per cent per annum. An additional security deposit of 10 per cent of 
the loan (with an average loan size of 11,500 Rupees, approximately US$ 290) is 
retained. Besides this security deposit no collateral is asked for but the loan is joint-
liability and it comes with a health and life insurance for the client as well as the 
spouse. In addition, the customer has the option to buy insurance for the animal, 
covering its death. In brief, Ag/BDS covers credit productivity enhancement, non-
insurance risk mitigation and the establishment of alternate market linkages, where 
needed. Currently, all customers that decide to buy these services are charged a rate of 
300 Rupees. For this amount, they can expect timely advisory services on preventive 
measures to reduce and deal with the risks involved in their selective livelihood at his 
doorstep/village on fixed dates by a Livelihood Service Provider. 128  Besides the 
overall program effect, the aim was to analyse the particular effect of these latter 
additional services on outcome indicators. 
9.1.1.2. Design and evaluation methodology 
In the evaluation literature one typically distinguishes between three evaluation 
designs: experimental, quasi-experimental and non-experimental. When the goal is to 
                                                 
128 In more detail this implies that customers pay for regular and timely access to the physical presence of a 
Livelihood Service Provider (LSP) on his doorstep for a 12 months period (24 visits by LSP in a year), 
timely advisory services on their animals management aspects which are appropriate at that time, exposure 
on latest technologies and market prices connected to his commodity, practical demonstrations on selected 
themes/activities by LSP (ex. disease identification method), possible facilitation for inputs supply of their 
choice and also for market linkages, and preventive vaccination for FMD or HS/BQ for 2 animals at free of 
cost/customer will be done apart from regular health check-ups, first aid treatment on need based, de-
worming etc.. 
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establish causal relationships and effects, the first of these three, randomized 
experiments, is considered to be the one with strongest internal validity.  
Nevertheless, most often a randomized experiment is not feasible as was the case in 
this study. The main reasons were ethical considerations by the institution, not wanting 
to exclude eligible and potential beneficiaries of the intervention under consideration. 
A quasi-experimental design, using a comparison instead of randomly assigned control 
group, was therefore opted for. As laid out by Bawden & Sonenschein129 the three 
most common sources of which comparison groups are chosen are “(1) eligible non-
participants in the same community, (2) individuals similar to the participants from an 
existing data base that contains the outcome measures of interest, and (3) individuals 
in a matched comparison site who would have been eligible for the program if it were 
in that site.” 
Considerable thought and effort has to be put into the choice of a valid control group. 
This becomes especially important in a setting like the current one where data is 
collected after the program has been in operation for some time.  
In this study, the first and the third type of group was chosen. The third type, 
individuals in similar communities are usually perceived as the most promising 
comparison group once randomization is ruled out. The choice was made to also 
sample eligible non-participants as for one, no problem of program placement bias in 
encountered for such individuals. More importantly though by comparing outcomes of 
these two comparison groups one can address the issue of spill-over effects. 
In addition, when a follow-up survey on the same individuals is considered, this set-up 
allows studying issues of self-selection and targeting. In the context of this study, the 
“similar communities” chosen were villages where the microfinance institution 
BASIX was not operating at the time of the survey but where they considered offering 
their services in the near future. This implies that the sample includes respondents that 
did not participate in the program at the time of the first survey but that self-selected 
into the program before the follow-up. 
The main evaluation technique to be applied when data from the first survey round is 
available is Propensity Score Matching (PSM). This technique has proven reliability in 
the non-experimental evaluation literature, being for example widely applied in the 
context of labour market policies. The key idea and assumption is that conditional on 
observable variables, the assignment of a program is random. Since conditioning on all 
relevant variables implies in most settings a high dimensional covariate vector, it is 
common practice to make use of a result by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) which 
suggests that instead of conditioning on all covariates one can use a single function of 
these same variables – such as the propensity score. A propensity score of which the 
distribution is the same for treated as well as non-treated individuals can be used to 
match pairs within the two groups. The average difference in outcomes between these 
pairs is then the so-called average treatment effect on the treated. 
                                                 
129 http://www.childwelfare.com/courses/Documents/bawden.htm, accessed 7.7.2008. 
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Propensity Score Matching improves over Ordinary Least Square Regressions (OLS) 
that include a dummy variable to estimate treatment in three respects: For one, it is a 
semi-parametric estimation method and hence avoids distributional and functional 
form assumptions; second, one does not need to assume homogeneous effects and 
third, the method does not extrapolate outside the common support, meaning that one 
avoids comparing the incomparable. 
A detailed description of this method can be found in Dehejia & Whaba (2001). 
The survey was primarily designed to estimate the impact of the intervention. A 
second focus was on eliciting subjective expectations of respondents; specifically 
expectations of outcome indicators. The main motivation for this was the fact that 
expectations of prospective outcomes are a central component to models of 
intertemporal choice. Especially the distribution of future income has always been of 
major concern to economic theory and economic policy. Income and income 
uncertainty influence among others consumption and savings decisions, schooling 
decision, insurance purchase, and enrolment into welfare programs. 
The importance of taking action in response to beliefs about what will happen 
increases in environments where future outcomes are extremely uncertain and where 
insurance markets are typically very imperfect. 
Information on respondents’ beliefs is hence of major interest. 
In what follows the survey design and its implementation are described in greater 
detail. 
9.1.2. Sample Size and Survey Design 
For reasons outlined above, interviews were conducted in villages where BASIX is 
operating as well as in comparison (or hereafter referred to as ‘control’) villages. The 
targeted number of interviews for this survey was set at 1,000, spread over three 
different respondent groups, as indicated in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In sum: 1000 interviews 
(250) (500) (250) 
Clients Non-Clients 
‘BASIX Villages’ 
Controls 
Control Villages 
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9.1.3. Sample Selection 
The survey was based on stratified clustered sample design. 
A three-step process was followed to determine the final sample: 
(1) Geographical area selection 
(2) Village selection 
(3) Household (customer, non-customer and control) selection 
9.1.3.1. Area Selection:  
The geographical coverage was limited to one State only and within this state to one of 
BASIX’s units. These restrictions were opted for mainly in order to be able to work 
with one survey team and in one language only. 
It was decided to conduct the survey in Anantapur district, where one of the oldest 
units of BASIX is placed. BASIX started its operation in that district due to the 
opportunity to become involved in the dairy sub-sector and the potential it saw for 
livelihood promotion. Anantapur unit is hence one of the pioneering units in BASIX’s 
dairy intervention – namely of offering loans for the specific purpose of buying a cow 
or a buffalo in combination with additional services. 
Furthermore, Anantapur is one of the most backward provinces in the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, which for a great part results from it being the second most drought-affected 
district of India. 130  This makes living conditions very hard; people are extremely 
vulnerable and poverty is highly prevalent. Aspects such as these make holistic 
microfinance interventions even more important, but at the same time much harder to 
implement.  
9.1.3.2. Selection of program and control villages 
Program as well as control villages were randomly selected, while different sources of 
information will have been used to draw up a list of prospective sample villages for 
both types. 
Program Villages: 
Program villages were selected based on information obtained from BASIX’s 
Management Information System. (Note that villages in the system might actually be 
                                                 
130 Anantapur is one of the 23 districts in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), India, and was constituted in 
1882 from the erstwhile district of Bellary. The district headquarters is Anantapur city. It is the largest 
district of Andhra Pradesh spanning an area of 19,130 km² and a population of 3,640,478 of which 25.26% 
is urban as of 2001 (Census India, 2001). The district is again split in 68 mandals, which is the unit of 
administration below a district. The economy is principally agrarian with very few industries. Prominent 
crops include groundnut, rice, cotton, maize, chillies, sesame, and sugarcane. Silk trade, limestone quarrying, 
iron and diamond mining constitute the few industries that are there. 
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hamlets). A list of all active dairy clients was extracted on the 28th of December 2007. 
Out of the 92 villages that these active clients lived in, only those villages were chosen 
where BASIX had at least nine customers. Dairy-loans are being given as joint liability 
with group sizes ranging from four to seven members. Choosing a minimum of nine 
customers per village hence ensured that at least two different joint-liability groups 
would be present in the village.  Applying this screening process limited the sample to 
58 villages in eleven mandals, which made up the final village sample for surveying of 
customers and non-customers.  
A similar screening process was used by Gine, Townsend and Vickery studying 
rainfall insurance offered by BASIX. They limited their village sample to where at 
least five households purchase BASIX rainfall insurance, reducing the number of 
program villages to 25 (out of 37). The higher number of villages (as compared to 
Gine et al.) seems desirable, since typically, the variation in behaviour and outcomes 
across Indian villages would be much larger than within villages (Janssen, 2007). This 
implies that relatively few households are needed to represent a given village, while a 
larger number of villages will be appropriate in order to reflect the diversity among 
villages (Deaton, 1997). 
Control Villages: 
Control Villages were chosen to be located in areas that are closely comparable in 
selection criteria to the area where the intervention is being implemented. The strategy 
that was followed was to have BASIX staff identify villages with ‘dairy potential’ – 
those that are seen to be suitable for dairy intervention but where no such services 
were offered at the time of the survey.131 Reasons for this absence can be, among 
others, capacity or time constraints. Gine, Townsend and Vickery followed this 
strategy of implying a pre-selection. This pre-selection assures that villages are more 
likely good counterfactuals for the program villages.132 
Respondents from these thirty villages not served by BASIX contribute to the ‘control 
group’. 
 
                                                 
131  More specifically, the identification of these villages was done by Field Executives (FXs) for the 
respective areas, since they are the ones identifying villages for BASIX to operate in. Most of the villages 
surveyed will hence be taken up into BASIX’s portfolio in the near future. 
132 Initially, a propensity score was estimated, indicating the likelihood of a village being a BASIX village or 
not. This was done using data obtained from the Government of Andhra Pradesh and collected for the Rural 
Poverty Reduction Program. This data will be described in more detail when discussing selection of non-
customers. Explanatory variables that were available and used in the probit estimation were the population 
in the village as a percentage of the total population in the district, the percentage population below the 
poverty line, average number of females/males/boys/girls per household, percentage of different castes, the 
distance to the district capital, as well as area dummies and interaction terms. This led to models with 
explanatory powers of 10-12 per cent. Intervention and control villages were then paired based on the value 
of their propensity score. This strategy was abandoned though when it turned out that some control villages 
chosen turned out to be villages without any dairy potential or so-called ‘OD villages’, OD standing for 
Overdue – meaning that BASIX stopped lending in these villages when the repayment culture turned out to 
be very unsatisfactory. 
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9.1.3.3. Selection of households within villages 
The unit of analysis for the survey was chosen to be a household. The rationale behind 
choosing  a household is that microenterprises “exist as part of a larger portfolio of 
economic activities, and that decisions with respect to microenterprises - whether 
made jointly or individually vis à vis other members of the household - can be 
understood more clearly when considered in relation to tradeoffs within the overall 
household economy” (Sebstad et al. 1995, p. 1). In other words, economic activities 
are part of a larger, dynamic household economy – which holds particularly true in the 
survey area. 
Selection of Customers 
550 customers were selected randomly from the list of active dairy clients in the 
selected 58 villages extracted from the MIS on the 28th of December 2007. No 
stratification was undertaken along whether a customer has Ag/BDS and or Animal 
Insurance or not as this information was not integrated in the MIS at the time of 
sampling. 
Selection of Non-Customers and Controls 
The data that was used for the sampling of 250 non-clients and 250 controls stems 
from the Rural Poverty Reduction Program, a program funded by the World Bank and 
implemented by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.133 As part of the program, an 
independent society, the Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty (SERP), had been 
established in 2001. The chairman is the serving Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and 
the CEO is the Senior IAS Officer. The program is implemented in 22 out of 23 
districts of Andhra Pradesh, only Hyderabad having been excluded, as it is mainly 
urban. 
The main strategy of the Program is to implement targeted poverty reduction programs. 
Special effort was hence put into the division of the population into the World Bank 
Categories, namely (1) Poorest of the poor, (2) Poor, (3) Not so poor and (4) Non-poor. 
A description of the process is given in Box 1. Most of BASIX’s dairy customers fall 
into the second and third of these categories. Therefore, the random sample of non-
customers was only done from households falling into any of those two categories. 
Over-sampling 
All respondent groups were over-sampled to allow for possible problems in either 
locating borrowers or obtaining their cooperation.  
Over-sampling of non-customers and controls needed to be higher as the population 
data used was collected in 2003. This made it more likely that respondents would not 
live in the same village anymore or would have died. Furthermore, information that 
could be provided to locate the respondents was very limited. Interviewers had only 
the respondent’s name, the name of either the husband or the father (given that any of 
the two was applicable) and the flat number. Especially in bigger villages, this scarcity 
                                                 
133 I would like to greatly thank Mohan Reddy for helping me to obtain this data. 
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of information made identification difficult. In towns with more than 4,000 households, 
the help of employees from the Rural Poverty Reduction Program itself was sought. 
 
Box 1: The ‘Participatory Identification of the Poor’-Approach 
The poor were identified using the so-called Participatory Identification of the Poor 
(PIP) approach, which is based on extensive interaction with and participation of all 
interested villagers. 
As a first step, a meeting with villagers was organised to explain the purpose and give 
information on the program as well as to lay out the process of the ‘Social Mapping’ 
that was to follow. This ‘Social Mapping’ was the main tool to identify the poor and 
poorest of the poor in villages of Andhra Pradesh. 
To start with, villagers were asked to draw their village on the ground – including the 
main infrastructure such as roads and bus stops as well as other landmarks. Next, a 
card for each household was written and placed at the appropriate place on the village 
map. 
As a next step, indicators for the World Bank categories were discussed. The 
categories are (1) Poorest of the poor, (2) Poor, (3) Not so poor and (4) Non-poor, 
where the first two categories combined make up households living below the poverty 
line (BPL) and the latter two the ones living above (APL). Villagers were asked to 
identify which characteristic or indicator would contribute to which category – non-
poor would own their own bathing facility, poorest of the poor would have no access 
to drinking water facilities and the like. After agreement of these characteristics for 
each category, card by card, each household was placed into one of the four categories. 
This was done by taking one card at a time and villagers deciding on a category for the 
respective household. Once the decision was taken, the characteristics of that category 
were read out: Housheold XY is…. After doing so, the categorization of the household 
was reconsidered and finalized. This way, about 45 per cent of all households in rural 
Andhra Pradesh were identified to live below the poverty line (20 per cent in category 
one and 25 per cent in category 2). 
 
9.1.4. Questionnaire Design and Piloting 
9.1.4.1. Questionnaire Design: 
A first exploratory field visit took place in March 2006. During this visit, meetings 
were scheduled with BASIX staff at headquarters as well as field visits organized to 
two of BASIX units, namely Parbhani in Andhra Pradesh as well as Ramayampet in 
Maharastra, both very active units in the provision of Agricultural/Business 
Development Services (Ag/BDS). These visits, which included interviews and 
discussions not only with BASIX staff but also with customers in the villages, 
provided a first understanding of BASIX’s work. A second, more elaborate field visit 
followed from October 2006-March 2007. This time was used to develop a deeper 
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understanding of the local context, define a set of hypotheses, and to exploratory pilot 
questions on subjective expectations. Furthermore, data for several units from 
BASIX’s Management Information System was collected, which contained 
information on all customers. Additional secondary data, including official statistics of 
potential survey areas, was obtained. 
All this information, combined with a literature review, is the basis for the two types 
of questionnaires administered for the purpose of this study:134,135 
Village Questionnaire:  
This questionnaire is based on BASIX’s village information sheet, and contains 
information on: 
- location (s.a. distance from head office, field office, a main road, the next village), 
- demographics (number of households and their caste),  
- sectors these households are engaged in (dairy, poultry, leather works…),  
- agricultural sector (land under irrigation, number of pumps, main crops), 
- kind and number of shops, 
- infrastructure (quality of roads, bus service…), 
- institutions (banks, SHGs, cooperatives…), and 
- reputation of the village (law and order, repayment culture…) 
- and prices of consumption goods in the village. 
 
Household Questionnaire: 
Household Questionnaire: This questionnaire contains eleven modules, namely: 
1. Baseline 
2. Household Roster 
3. General Household Characteristics 
4. Assets 
5. Consumption 
6. Income 
7. Livestock 
8. Risk 
9. Credit, Savings and Insurance 
10. Part for NON-Customers 
11. Part for Customers 
a. BASIX General 
b. BASIX – Agricultural/Business Development Services 
c. BASIX – Livestock Insurance 
                                                 
134 Additionally, the questionnaire developed by X. Gine (World Bank, DECRG), R. Townsend (University 
of Chicago) and J. Vickery (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) for a study n BASIX’s rainfall insurance, 
which was implemented by ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) in 
late 2004 served as an example. I would like to thank them for providing me with this information. 
135 The detailed questionnaires can be found in Appendix 9.2. 
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As mentioned, the one aim of the survey was to elicit subjective expectations data 
from the respondents. This data on expectations was elicited at three times during the 
interview – in the income section on total expected future household income and in the 
livestock section on expected future income from dairy activities as well as expected 
expenditures on health costs for the animal. The question format to elicit the subjective 
expectations is based on the use of percentages.  
9.1.4.2. Translation of Questionnaire: 
The questionnaire was translated by an independent translator, recommended by the 
Centre of Microfinance Research in Hyderabad. No back-translation was undertaken 
but the quality of translation was checked independently by several staff of BASIX as 
well as the research assistant and few mistakes found were corrected accordingly.136 
9.1.4.3. Piloting of the Questionnaire: 
A preliminary testing of questions asking about subjective expectations was 
undertaken in November 2006.  
Clients of BASIX (all of which were women137) were asked on their subjective belief 
of the expenditures they would have to bear in one year on their animal(s). More 
precisely, the customers were asked how likely they think it is that they will have to 
pay a certain threshold. These thresholds (three) were determined on the basis of the 
number of buffaloes the customer owned, average occurrences of emergencies and 
costs for health services.138 To explain the idea of probabilities a ruler with a scale 
from 1-100 was used and a “practice round”, asking about the probability that it will 
rain tomorrow (as well as next week and next month), was asked. The client could 
then point to the number on the ruler corresponding to her belief. Interestingly, women 
were hesitant in the beginning, but picked up the idea quickly and had no problems 
answering the questions. They even found it interesting and were very involved. This 
an important factor since “some economists dismiss subjective data a priori by 
asserting that survey respondents to surveys have no incentive to answer questions 
carefully or honestly” (Dominitz & Manski, 1997). 
The piloting of the whole questionnaire was done in December 2007. 
Altogether, 26 piloting-interviews were undertaken. The first eight were done by he 
survey assistant under my presence. The subsequent interviews were partly done by 
the research assistant together with the interviewers. These interviews were undertaken 
in the villages close to Anantapur town, where BASIX’s unit office is based. The 
choice was not only made for convenience but also since these villages were chosen 
                                                 
136 A first translation had been done by WASNET – an organisation that BASIX itself collaborates with for 
translation. Nevertheless, as they could not finish the final translation on time the second translation had to 
be done from scratch as writing Telugu in one font requires apparently different keyboard combinations than 
in another font and there is not one general font that people learn to write in.  
137 By the end of 2006, about 67 per cent of all of BASIX’s dairy customers were women. 
138 The thresholds were deduced based on information on health expenditures and frequency of animal 
sicknesses previously experience by animal owners. 
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not to be part of the sample, given their proximity to the town. All in all, 12 non-
customers and 14 customers were interviewed during the piloting phase. 
 
9.1.5. Data Collection: 
A research assistant was recruited in December 2007.139 The tasks of this assistant 
included translation during the piloting phase, training of interviewers (initial in-house 
training as well as in the field), monitoring of field operations related to the project, 
conducting back-checks in the field, taking reporting from interviewers and scrutiny of 
questionnaires 
A team of fourteen interviewers (eight of which were female) was recruited towards 
the end of December 2007. They underwent a three-day training course of which two 
days were classroom training and one day in the field.  
The curriculum of the classroom training covered the background, mission and 
operations of BASIX, including a special section on the dairy intervention and its 
components. 140 The purpose of the survey, the conceptual framework and hypotheses 
were explained, Furthermore, the role and responsibilities of an interviewer were laid 
out and interviewers were trained on interviewing techniques - in how to conduct an 
interview and what to do if the respondent was distracted, lost interest, or ran out of 
time. The second day, the questionnaire was explained in detail, with an extra session 
on the questions on subjective expectations. Particular attention was paid to the 
explanation of probabilities as well as the calculation of thresholds. 
After the in-house training, the interviewers went to the field in teams of three, 
accompanied by the research assistant. The research assistant first conducted an 
interview himself as an example for the interviewers. Thereafter, the interviewers took 
their turns. The assistant as well as the other team-members would observe and later 
on discuss what had gone well and what needed improvement. This practice interview 
improved the comprehension of the questionnaire and accuracy in entering and coding 
answers.  
After about five days of interviews, an extra training session on how to allocate non-
customers was conducted. As briefly mentioned above, scarce information made the 
task of the interviewers difficult. In order to facilitate their work, Mohan Reddy, 
[position] with BASIX, who had participated in the data collection for the Rural 
Poverty Reduction Programme. He explained how respondents could be best allocated, 
by discussing village dynamics and people that should be contacted first, given their 
position in and their knowledge of the village. 
To carry out the survey, the interviewers worked in teams of two to three, travelling to 
the villages by bus or rickshaw (or even tractor if no other public transport was 
                                                 
139 Actually two were recruited – the first needed to be fired. 
140 I would like to thank D. Adinarayana, area representative of BASIX, for a great 
training session on BASIX. 
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available). The first week, each team reported back to the unit office once a day, 
thereafter approximately every second day in order to reduce their travel time. In the 
office, they debriefed on their completed interviews, reported on possible difficulties 
experienced and received their next assignments. 
During the survey, the research assistant conducted checks in the field – going back to 
already interviewed respondents, asking them whether the interview had really taken 
place. These checks were conducted on several areas as well as for each interviewer. 
According to these checks, the team of interviewers proved to be quite efficient and 
diligent. 
 
9.1.6. Data Entry 
Data Entry was performed by Samruddhi Marketing Assistance for Rural Territory (S-
MART), established by BASIX to facilitate micro processes of the mainstream service 
providers while at the same time contributing towards the institution’s mission of 
creating livelihoods. The data was entered Kuppam (Andhra Pradesh) where one of 
their two Business Process Outsourcing units (BPOs) is located. 
The data entry personnel was trained and supervised by myself for the first two days of 
the entry work. I also checked regularly for mistakes in their entered work, which was 
send to me about every second evening. The data was entered into Excel and 
questionnaires were scanned so that the files could be transported easily and also used 
to answer questions coming up when starting on cleaning the data. 
 
9.2. Questionnaires 
9.2.1.  Household Questionnaire 
1. Baseline 
2. Household Roster 
3. General Household Characteristics 
4. Assets 
5. Consumption 
6. Income 
7. Livestock 
8. Risk 
9. Credit, Savings & Insurance 
10. Part for NON-Customers 
11. Part for Customers 
a. BASIX General 
b. BASIX - Agricultural/Business Development Services 
c. BASIX - Livestock Insurance 
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9.1.1 Household Questionnaire 
 
1. BASELINE 
WORK DONE BY WHOM 
 
a 
Day 
b 
Month 
c 
Year 
d 
NAME INTERVIEWER 
1. Actual interview date         
2.  Data entry Date         
 
HOUSEHOLD CONTACT ATTEMPTS: 
    
a 
Day 
b 
Month 
c 
Year 
d 
Reason why not 
started/ finished 
e 
NAME 
Interviewer 
3. 1st contact date          
4. 2nd contact date          
5. 3rd contact date          
  
6.  Interview start time   
7. Interview end time   
 
 8. Supervision yes = 1, no = 0     
 
  NAME ID CODE 
9. District     
10. Mandal     
11. Village     
12. Household ID number in village sampling list     
13. Name of main respondent in household   
  
14.a. BASIX CUSTOMERS:  yes = 1, no = 0           
14.b. Loan No.   
15. Loan Cycle with BASIX   
16. Years with BASIX   
17. Receives Ag/BDS   
18. Years receiving Ag/BDS   
19. Receives Livestock Insurance  
20. Years receiving livestock insurance  
21. Used Loan for buying cow or buffalo (yes=1, no=0)  
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2. HOUSEHOLD ROSTER  
 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Please list the 
names of people 
normally living 
in this household   
 
Please list the 
names of people 
normally living 
in this household 
(this includes 
both family 
members and 
non- family 
members, e.g. 
residing 
servants).  
Start with the 
household head, 
the spouse, and 
their children. 
Then list the 
most immediate 
family 
subsequently.  
 
What is the relationship 
of […] to the household 
head? 
 
1. Head  
2. Husband  
3. First wife  
4. Second wife  
5. Child / adopted child  
6. Father / Mother  
7. Sister / brother  
8. Grandchild  
9. Son/Daughter in law  
10. Sister/brother in law 
11. Father/Mother in 
law  
12. Grandparent  
13. Uncle/Aunt  
14. Other relative  
15. Friend  
16. Neighbor  
17. Servant  
18. Employer / landlord  
19. Fellow villager  
20. Other (SPECIFY) 
 
What 
is the 
gend
er of 
[…]? 
1.Ma
le 
2.Fe
male 
  
What 
is the 
age 
of 
[…]? 
  
put 
'0'for 
infan
ts < 1 
yr 
Curre
ntly 
in 
Schoo
l? 
Y=1 
N=0 
  NAME RELATION SEX YRS 
What is the highest 
level of education 
completed by […] 
 
0. no eductaion 
1. Standard 1
st 
 
2. Stndrd 2
nd 
 
3. Stndrd 3
rd 
 
4. Stndrd 4
th 
 
5. Stndrd 5
th  
6. Stndrd 6
th 
 
7. Stndrd 7
th 
 
8. Stndrd 8
th 
 
9. Stndrd 9
th 
 
10. Stndrd 10
th 
 
11. Intermediate 1
st
 
12. Intermediate 2
nd  
13. Diploma/ 
vocational course  
14. Bachelor degree 
(3yrs)  
15. Prof. Bachelors (4 
yrs)  
16. Masters degree 
17. Other (specify) 
 
H1            
H2            
...            
 
a. Caste or ethnic/religious group of 
household head 
1. forward caste  
2. backward caste  
3. scheduled caste  
4. scheduled tribe  
5. minority   
7. 
b. if minority, specify 1. Muslim  
2. Christian  
3. Sikh  
4. other (SPECIFY)   
8. Is the household vegetarian? yes = 1, no = 0  
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3.GENERAL HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. What is the 
primary 
activity of the 
household? 
1. Agricultural labourers 
2. Construction workers/skilled labourers  
3. Farmers, farmers, fishers, hunters, loggers, AH 
4. Self-employed, business, transport-equipment operators 
5. Professional, technical, clerical, administrative, managerial, 
executive, and teachers 
6. Dairy 
7. Other 
 
2. How long has the household lived in this 
dwelling? YEARS 
  TICK if 
all life 
  
3. How long has the household lived in this village? YEARS   TICK if all life 
  
a. Does the hh have any plans to move/migrate out of this village? Yes=1 No=0  4. 
b. If YES: Where do you plan to move to? Yes=1 No=0  
5. What type of dwelling 
is this? 
1. Pucca house (strong 
structure)  
2. Semi-Pucca house  
3. Kutcha house 
(weak structure)  
4. other, specify 
  
  
6. How many rooms does the dwelling have?  No of ROOMS   
a. Do you/your family 
own or rent this 
dwelling? 
1. Owns the dwelling   
2. rents the dwelling 
3. use without paying 
rent  
4. Dwelling allotted 
by govt.    
5. any other 
(SPECIFY) 
  
b. IF RENT: How much do you pay in rent for this dwelling?  
(INCLUDE MONETARY VALUE OF IN-KIND 
CONTRIBUTION) 
 Rs. 
  
c. IF OWN: What is the present market value of the dwelling?  Rs.  
7. 
8. 
What is the material of 
the walls? 
1. concrete/brick  
2. mud/brick/stone   
3. mud/wooden plank   
4. tin   
5. thatch/bamboo  
6. other (SPECIFY) 
 
9. What is the material of 
the roof? 
1. cement/RCC   
2. stone slab  
3. roofing tiles 
4. sheet/tin 
5. thatch 
6. other (SPECIFY) 
  
10. What is the material of 
the floor? 
1. tiles 
2. cement   
3. stone   
4. mud/earth/cow dung   
5. other (SPECIFY) 
  
11. What kind of bathing 
facility does the 
household have? 
1. Closed inside/outside house   
2. enclosure inside/outside house   
3. shielded/thatched structure outside 
4. open space outside the house   
5. river/open tanks/canals/ponds/etc. 
6. any other (SPECIFY) 
  
12. What is the main fuel 
used by the household 
for cooking? 
1. LPG 
2. Biogas 
3. Kerosene 
4. Firewood 
5. Charcoal 
6. Any other (SPECIFY) 
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13. What is the main fuel 
used for household 
lighting? 
1. Electricity 
2. Generator 
3. Battery 
4. Kerosene lamps 
5. Candles 
6 Any other (SPECIFY) 
 
14. What kind of drinking 
water facility does the 
household have? 
1. piped into dwelling or compound 
2. protected/unprotected personal well 
3. public outdoor tap or drinking water pump close to 
the house   
4. public outdoor tap or drinking water pump far from 
the house   
5. (un)protected community well   
6. river/lake/pond   
7. access to another hh’s private water source   
8. Govt. water tank 
9. Govt. water tank only in summer   
10. any other (SPECIFY) 
  
a.  yes = 1 (copy hh member code and 
NAME from ROSTER) no = 0 
 15. Is there any member of this 
household who has ever been or 
currently is a ward representative 
for local Gram? b. CHECK if currently active 
 
 
 
 
 
4. ASSETS 
 
a. yes = 1, no = 0   No. 1. Do you own any other house elsewhere? If so, 
if you were to sell your house today, how 
much would you ask for it? b.   Present MARKET VALUE  
(Rs.) 
  
a.    yes = 1, no = 0   2. Do you rent it out? 
b.  Rent received per month (Rs.)   
a. yes = 1, no = 0  
b. Acres irrigated  
c. Acres NOT irrigated  
d. Acres rented out   
e. Rent received p. month   
3. Does the household own any agricultural 
land? 
f.    Present market value(Rs.)  
4. Did the hh own more/less/same amount of 
land one year ago? 1.less 2.same 3 more 
  
 
a.    yes = 1, no = 0  
b.    Acres rented   
5. Does the household RENT any land? 
c.    Rs. Paid for rent   
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 6. How many 
[…] does your 
hh own? 
7. If you sold all of your […] today, 
how much money could you get? 
Note value of share, TICK if share 
ownership & state % owned 
  TYPE OF ASSET No. a. Market Value b. √      c. % 
1. Bicycle       
2. Motorcycle       
3. Scooter    
4. Four wheeler       
Furniture:   a. Chair(s)       
b. Table(s)    
c. Bed(s)    
d. Cupboard(s)    
5. 
 
e. Other    
6. Refrigerator       
7. TV – colour       
8. TV – black and white    
9. Radio       
10. Telephone / cell       
11. Sewing machine       
12. Electric iron       
13. Pressure cooker    
14. Electric Fans    
15. Clock    
16. Steel Utensils    
17. Jewellery    
Livestock total: a. Bullock    
b. Buffalo    
c. Cow    
d. Calf       
e. Goat       
f. Sheep       
g. Pig       
18. 
h. Chicken      
 i. Other    
19. Irrigation Equipment       
20. Dairy Assets (shed, milking 
machine…)  
  
21. Modern agricultural equipment 
(tractor…)  
  
22. other agricultural equipment    
23. any others (SPECIFY)    
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5. CONSUMPTION 
 
INTERVIEWER: HERE IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU GUIDE THE RESPONDENT THROUGH 
THE CALCULATIONS AND HELP IF NECESSARY IN THINKING ABOUT HOW OFTEN THEY BUY 
SOMETHING, THE PRICE PAID PER UNIT AND THEN MULTIPLY UP FOR THE PRICE PER PAST 
WEEK OR PAST YEAR. 
 
Now I would like to talk to you about various items the entire household (including all household members, 
regardless of who made the purchase) acquired (bought, received, from its own business or parcel of land, or 
a payment in kind) within the last week (year).  To make it easier to remember, we will talk about different 
groups of goods that you might be consuming, regardless of whether you have bought them or they are 
home produced. 
 
1 In the last  WEEK, did any member of 
the household acquired any of the 
following food items? Share Bought 
10 How 
does this 
quantity 
compare to a 
typical 
week? 
  
Yes=1, No=0 (next item) 
2. Did 
you 
buy it? 
 
Yes=1
>>3, 
No=0 
>> 6 
3. 
Quantity 
bought 
4. 
Unit  
5. 
Amount 
(Rs.) 
1-same,  
2-higher,  
3-lower 
1 Rice from market             
2 Rice from PDS shop             
3 Sugar from market             
4 Sugar from PDS shop             
5 Wheat flower             
6 Wheat Flower 
fromPDS shop             
7 Dal             
8 Other pulses             
9 Sorghum             
10 Millets             
11 Other cereals             
12 Edible oils             
13 Vegetables             
14 Fruits             
15 Milk             
16 Milk Products             
17 Meat (Beef, chicken…)             
18 Fish             
19 Eggs             
20 Spices and condiments             
21 Other food expenses 
(bread, sweets, 
snacks…)             
22 Beverages (incl. tea, 
coffee, soft drinks)             
23 Alcohol beverages and             
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toddy 
24 Tobacco products             
25 Transport             
26 Water, electricity, 
telephone, cable             
27 Fuel (including gas, 
firewood, kerosene)             
28 Salary for field or other 
worker             
Ask here: Within the last YEAR 
29 Clothing             
30 Shoes             
31 
Education (school fees, 
books)             
32 
Health expenses 
(medicine, doctor 
visits…)             
33 
Repairs and 
maintenance of the 
house             
34 
Services (servants, 
barber, washmen …)             
35 
Cosmetics, soaps, 
shampoo…             
36 
Religious and festival 
ceremonies, such as 
Telugu new year 
Dassera…             
37 Gifts and payments             
38 
Entertainment and 
recreation             
39 Dowry and bride price             
40 Taxes             
41 
Other yearly 
expenditures 
(SPECIFY)             
 
6. In this household did you acquire […] without 
needing to pay for it? 
 
Yes=1>> 7 
No=0>>10 
Share obtained WITHOUT 
buying it 
10 How does 
this quantity 
compare to a 
typical 
week? 
  
 
7. Quantity 
consumed 
8. 
Unit  
9. 
Amount 
(Rs.) 
1-same,  
2-higher,  
3-lower 
1 Rice from market         
2 Rice from PDS shop         
…          
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6. INCOME 
 
INTERVIEWER: IF THE HOUSEHOLD’S PRIMARY ACTIVITY IS FARMING, ASK ABOUT 
YEARLY INCOME. OTHERWISE, ASK ABOUT MONTHLY INCOME. 
 
1. 2. 3. 
Within the last MONTH (Year), has 
anyone in your household earned any 
income paid as cash or in-kind from […]? 
How much income was 
earned by those members on 
(INCOME SOURCE) per 
month (year)? 
  
 ASK RESPONDENT TO 
TRANSLATE IN-KIND INCOME 
TO MONETARY VALUE yes=
1 
>>2. 
no=0 
a. 
Rs. / 
MONTH 
(Year) 
b. 
tick if 
CASH 
c. 
Tick if 
IN-
KIND 
Did income 
from 
(INCOME 
SOURCE) 
change as 
compared to 1 
yr ago? 
1. increase  
2. same  
3. decrease 
1 Wages from agricultural labour 
(not on own farm)  
          
2 Wages from non-agricultural sector 
- formal sector, (salary…) 
          
3 Wages from non-agricultural sector 
- informal sector 
          
4 Wages (possibly in-kind) from 
public relief work, e.g. food for 
work or other similar programs 
          
5 Non-farm self-employment (net-
income) 
          
6 Farm profit           
7 Income from Dairy Activities           
8 Sales of handicrafts or other non-
agricultural goods at market (net 
income) 
          
9 Traditional hereditary occupation            
10 
migration income / remittances  
          
11 Benefits from government 
schemes, such as social assistance, 
child benefits, assistance from 
development or welfare programs, 
subsidies 
          
12 Pensions            
13 Dowry income            
14 Other income sources, not 
previously mentioned (e.g. 
gambling), SPECIFY  
          
 
INTERVIEWER: Add all income sources in the shaded column to calculate 
monthly (yearly) income (Rs) 
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4. READ OUT CALCULATED MONTHLY (Yearly) INCOME Is this a typical monthly income? 
1. yes  
2. no, higher  
3. no, lower 
  
5. What would be a typical monthly (yearly) income for your household? (Rs)   
 
IF ONLY INCOME SOURCE IS FROM DAIRY ACTIVITIES (7) >> GO TO 
NEXT SECTION! Else, go on to 6. 
 
6. 
Imagine that you have a very good month (year), every member of 
working age in the household managed to have work, and there were no 
droughts or anything the like. What would be the maximum amount of 
income your household would receive in such a situation in one month? 
Y Rs.
  
7. 
Now imagine the total opposite: the harvest is bad, animals get sick, 
finding work is not possible. What would be the monthly (yearly) income 
of your household in such a situation? 
X Rs.
  
INTERVIEWER: Calculate the expected income (threshold B – this should 
be close to the typical monthly (yearly) income in question 5). B=(X+Y)/2 
  
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold A. A=(B+X)/2   
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold C. C=(B+Y)/2   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. How likely do you think it is that your monthly (yearly) income in the coming month will be higher than _________(A) Rupees?  
9. How likely do you think it is that your monthly (yearly) income in the coming month will be higher than _________(B) Rupees?  
10. How likely do you think it is that your monthly (yearly) income in the coming month will be higher than _________(C) Rupees?  
 
 
 
Please explain the rainfall question to the respondent (See extra sheet!).
 
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain tomorrow?  
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain within the 
coming week? 
 
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain within the 
coming month? 
 
 
We will now use the same rules as with the rain-question.  
 177
7. LIVESTOCK 
 
a. Does your household own any cows or buffalos? yes =1 
no = 0 >> NEXT SECTION 
  
IF YES:              b.  No. of Milk-animals  
c.  No. of non-milk animals  
1. 
d.  No. of Calves  
 
For CALVES (Milk and non-milk): 
a.              No. BORN  2. How many were born/died the last year? 
b.                No. DIED  
a.         No. BOUGHT  
b.   Rs. Value bought  
c.               No. SOLD  
3. How many did you buy/sell within the last year? 
d.       Rs. Value Sold  
 
For NON-MILK Animals: 
4. How many were died the last year? No. DIED  
a.         No. BOUGHT  
b.  Rs. Value bought  
c.              No. SOLD  
5. How many did you buy/sell within the last 
year? 
d.      Rs. Value Sold  
 
  For MILK Animals: 
 
(1) 
Local 
Buffalos 
(2) 
Graded 
Buffalos 
(3) 
Local 
Cows 
(4) 
Graded 
Cows 
6. How many […] does your household 
own? 
No. Owned
        
7. 
If you sold all your […] today, how 
much money would you receive? 
Market Value 
(Rs.)
        
8. How many […] died the last yr? No. DIED     
9.  How many of these were insured?      
10. For how many was claim settled?     
No. bought         
Rs. bought         
No. sold         
11. How many […] did you buy/sell 
within the last year? 
Rs. sold         
full season         12. Ho many liters per day do […] give 
in… lean season         
13. On average, how many months per 
year does the animal not produce 
milk? 
No. Months
        
 
a. Is there a cooperative in your village / local area? Yes=1, No=0  14. 
b. IF YES: Are you a member of this cooperative? Yes=1, No=0  
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15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
Whom do you for the 
most part sell your 
milk to?  
(up to 3 answers) 
How often is the 
fat %age of your 
milk tested?  
  
How often is the 
SNF %age of 
your milk tested? 
  
  
1. BASIX initiated 
milk route   
2. other milk route 
3. local vendor  
4. door to door 
5. dairy cooperative 
6. other (SPECIFY) 
How 
much are 
you (on 
average) 
being 
paid PER 
LITER? 
Are you paid 
according to 
the fat and SNF 
% of your 
milk? 
1. fat %   
2. SNF %   
3. fat & SNF %  
4. just acc. to 
the litres of 
milk 
1. every time  
2. once a day   
3. once a week   
4. once a month 
5. never 
1. every time  
2. once a day   
3. once a week   
4. once a month 
5. never 
 1.           
 2.           
 3.           
 
For ALL Animals: 
20. How do you acquire the fodder for your 
animals? 
1. buy all 
2. collect all 
3. buy and collect 
4. Other (SPECIFY) 
 
21. If the hh collects AND buys: What’s share of feed & fodder you collect yourself? (%)  
22. Do you collect this from your own farm? Yes=1, No=0  
a.  Green Feed  
b.   Fodder  
 
23. 
If the household buys (all or some): 
Within the last month, how much did you spent on […]?  
(Rs.) c.   Other  
24. Of the produced milk, how many litres does your household consume per day? (%)  
25. What would be a typical monthly income from milk and other by-products for your 
household? (Rs.) 
 
26. Imagine all your animals stay healthy and give quality milk. What would be the 
maximum amount of monthly income your household would receive in such a 
situation from selling by-products of your animals? (Rs.) 
Y   
27. Now imagine the total opposite: your animals fall ill and give no milk. What would 
be the monthly income of your household in such a situation from selling by-
products of your animals? (Rs.) 
X   
INTERVIEWER: Calculate the expected income (threshold B – this should 
be close to the typical monthly income in question 23). B=(X+Y)/2 
  
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold A. A=(B+X)/2   
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold C. C=(B+Y)/2   
 
INTERVIEWER: Use again the ruler to ask question 28-30. In case the household 
only receives income from dairy activities, use first the rainfall question to explain the 
idea of probabilities. 
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain tomorrow?  
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain in the coming week?  
So, what do you think how likely it is that it will rain in the coming month?  
We will now use the same rules as with the rain-question. 
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28. How likely do you think it is that your typical monthly income from 
selling products of the animals in the coming month will be higher than 
_________(A) Rupees? 
 
29. How likely do you think it is that your typical monthly income from 
selling roducts of the animals in the coming month will be higher than 
_________(B) Rupees? 
 
30. How likely do you think it is that your typical monthly income from 
selling products of the animals in the coming month will be higher than 
_________(C) Rupees? 
 
 
HEALTH of the animal: 
31. Did your animal receive vaccinations? 
Yes=1 No=0  
1.   
2.   
32. 
If your animal falls ill, what do 
you do? 
 
(DO NOT PROMT. 
RESPONDENT MAY RANK UP 
TO 3 ANSWERS, ONCE YOU 
HAVE NOTED THE ANSWERS 
CONFIRM THAT THE 
RANKING IS CORRECT.) 
1.  let animal rest and 
wait until it gets 
better 
2. consult neighbour  
3. consult local 
medicine man  
4. go to 
veterinarian 
5. call emergency 
veterinarian 
6. sell the animal 
7. Other 
(SPECIFY)  
3.   
  
33. How often did your animal(s) get sick within the last year? (No.)  
34. What source did you turn to for 
help? 
 
1. none 
2. neighbour 
3. veterinarian 
4. emergency vet 
5. other  (SPECIFY) 
 
 
35. What average cost did you occur each time? (veterinarian, transport, 
foregone earnings) Rs. 
 
36. What other monetary loss did you suffer? (due to lost by-products) Rs.  
37. 
Imagine your animals get seriously ill and you need to get them treated. What 
would be the maximum amount you would have to pay on heath related costs 
in such a situation? (include possible transportation costs) (Rs.) 
Y 
  
38. 
Now imagine the total opposite: your animals do not get any serious illness 
during the coming month. What would be the minimum amount of money 
you would have to pay for health-related costs of your animals? (this does not 
include normal day-to-day costs such as fodder) (rs.) 
X. 
  
INTERVIEWER: Calculate the expected income, threshold B. B=(X+Y)/2   
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold A. A=(B+X)/2   
INTERVIEWER: Calculate threshold C. C=(B+Y)/2   
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As before, we will now use the same rules as with the rain-question 
 
39. How likely do you think it is that you will have to spend more than 
_________(A) Rupees on health services for your animals in the coming 
month? 
 
40. How likely do you think it is that you will have to spend more than 
_________(B) Rupees on health services for your animals in the coming 
month? 
 
41. How likely do you think it is that you will have to spend more than 
_________(C) Rupees on health services for your animals in the coming 
month? 
 
How likely is it that… % 
42. ...you will sell at least one animal in the coming YEAR?   
43. …you will buy at least one animal in the coming YEAR?   
44. …you will breed at least one animal in the coming YEAR?   
45. … none of your animal(s) dies within the coming YEAR?   
46. …none of your animal(s) gets sick within the coming MONTH?  
 
 
8. RISKS 
 ANSWER 
a. Within the last year did you or any 
of the adults in the household ever 
cut the size of your meals because 
there was not enough money or 
food? 
 
Yes = 1   
No = 0 >> 3. 
  1 
b. How often did this happen? 1. every month   
2. sometimes   
3. 1-2 times a year 
  
a. Within the last year, did you/ your 
household ever cut the size of the 
children’s meals because there was 
not enough money or food? 
Yes = 1   
No = 0 >> 3. 
  2 
b. How often did this happen? 1. every month   
2. sometimes   
3. 1-2 times 
  
1.  What are the major sources of risk that you/your household face? 
 
(DO NOT PROMPT. RESPONDENT MAY RANK UP TO 3 ANSWERS, 
ONCE YOU HAVE NOTED THE ANSWERS CONFIRM THAT THE 
RANKING IS CORRECT.) 
2.  
3 
1. drought   
2. flood   
10. unavailability of agri-inputs 
11. crop disease   
3.  
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3. fires   
4. illness  of household member 
5. sudden death of household member  
6. loss of livestock / disease   
7. dramatic change in crop prices 
8. price changes of inputs 
9. price changes of production  
12. Quality of seeds (spurious 
seeds) 
13. erratic electricity supply 
14. crop failure   
15. loss of land   
16. job loss   
17. unsuccessful investment   
18. other (SPECIFY)  
 
Which of these did you actually experience within the last year? 1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
4 
1. drought   
2. flood   
3. fires   
4. illness  of household member 
5. sudden death of household member  
6. loss of livestock / disease   
7. dramatic change in crop prices 
8. price changes of inputs 
 
9. price changes of production  
10. crop disease   
11. erratic electricity supply 
12. crop failure   
13. loss of land   
14. job loss   
15. unsuccessful investment  (s.a. 
well digging) 
16. other (SPECIFY) 
  
 
 
 
9. CREDIT, SAVINGS & INSURANCE 
 
 
CREDIT 
 
1. Has your household any debt? Yes=1  No=0 >> 5.   
 What are the sources of 
credit at present? 
Yes=1 
No=0 
(A) 
Year 
taken 
(B) 
Amount 
taken  
(C) 
Amount 
outstanding  
(D) 
Interest 
Rate     
(E) 
Loan 
Period 
1 Public sector Banks          
2 PACS          
3 Private Banks/Finance 
Companies 
         
4 BASIX          
5 Other MFIs          
6 Commission 
Agents/Traders/Dealers 
         
7 Chit Funds          
8 SHGs          
9 Money lenders          
10 Relatives/Friends       
2. 
11 Any other (Specify)       
3. Did the amount of your debt 
change as compared to one 
year ago? 
1. increase   
2. same  
3. decrease  
4. don't know 
  
4. How is your household's 
capacity to pay the debt as 
compared to one year ago? 
1. easier to take care of   
2. same amount of 
difficulty/ease   
3. more difficult to take 
care of   
4. don't know 
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SAVINGS 
 
5. Has your household any savings? Yes=1  No=0 >> 9.   
 What are the sources of 
savings at present? 
Yes=1 
No=0 
(A) What is 
the money 
value of 
this saving 
now? (Rs.) 
(B) Do you 
receive 
interest? If so, 
how much? 
Yes=1 
No=0    Interest 
(C) Do you make 
regular 
contributions? 
1. Yes, weekly 
2. Yes, monthly 
3. Yes, other 
4. No 
1 Deposits with any bank        
2 Deposit with any private 
financial institution 
       
3 Deposits with post office        
4 Deposit with any chit fund        
5 Cash at home        
6 SHG or other group        
6. 
7 Other (SPECIFY)        
 
7. Did the amount of your savings 
change as compared to one year 
ago? 
1. increase   
2. same  
3. decrease  
4. don't know 
  
 1st  
2nd  
3rd  
8. What are the most 
important reasons 
that you save? 
1. protect against bad 
harvest or drought   
2. access to credit   
3. educational expenses 
4. medical expenses 
5. buy agricultural 
inputs/investments   
6. provide for old age  
7. repair dwelling   
8. emergency events   
9. secure consumption   
10. dowry 
11. festival expenses  
12. as form of other 
insurance 
13. to leave bequest   
14. to pay for debt 
15. other (SPECIFY) 
  
 1st  
2nd  
9. Why do you not 
save (more)? 
 
1. no need   
2. group decision   
3. no funds   
4. don't trust MFI   
5. don't trust bank  
6. low interest rates / high bank fees   
7. other (SPECIFY) 3rd  
 
 
INSURANCE 
 
10. Has your household any insurance? Yes=1 >> 12. No=0 >> 11.   
11. If no, why not? 1. no need  
2. too expensive   
3. don't know good 
insurance   
4. never pays out   
5. don't know what insurance 
is   
6. other (SPECIFY) 
>> NEXT SECTION 
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Does your household have any of the 
following kinds of insurance? 
(A) 
Yes = 1  No = 0 
(B) 
Source 
1 Crop insurance     
2 weather or rainfall insurance     
3 life insurance     
4 health insurance     
5 fire insurance     
6 vehicle insurance     
7 livestock / insurance     
8 Old age   
12. 
9 other (SPECIFY)     
 
10. NON-BASIX CUSTOMERS 
  ANSWER 
1. Have you previously had a loan with or BASIX 
or have applied for one? 
Yes = 1   
No = 0  
  
  
2. Why do you (currently) 
not have a loan with 
BASIX? 
1. do not need credit 
2. better credit source available 
3. I was rejected 
4. Not offered in my village 
5. Other (SPECIFY) 
 
3. Have you heard about any services offered for 
your cow / buffalo (veterinarian, health 
camps…) in the village / local area? 
Yes = 1   
No = 0 >> NEXT 
SECTION 
 
1st   
2nd  
1. general veterinarian   
2. Ag/BDS DAIRY services from BASIX  
3. services from RDT   
4. other (SPECIFY) 3
rd  
4. What services have you 
heard of and who provides 
them? 
(SEVERAL ANSWERS 
POSSIBLE) If 2. IS not among answers >> END of INTERVIEW! 
 
Ask the following questions only if BASIX is active in the village. If not, the 
interview finishes here. 
 
5. Of the villagers you know, how many bought Ag/BDS from 
BASIX within the last year? 
No. 
  
  
6. When did you first hear about Ag/BDS from BASIX?  YEAR   
7. Did you hear about a meeting where BASIX 
Ag/BDS was explained and sold? 
Yes=1   
No=0>>Next section 
 
8. Have you attended such a meeting? Yes = 1  No = 0 >> 10.  
Why did you/your household decide to attend the meeting?  1st   
2nd  
9. 
1. I was interested in the credit   
2. headman recommended going 
3. I like BASIX   
4. I saw/heard good advertisement   
5. want to learn about the product   
6. friends were going   
7. relatives were going   
8. curiosity   
9. other, please specify   
10. don't know 
3rd   
Why did you/your household decide NOT to attend the meeting?  1st  
2nd  
10. 
1. I was not interested 
2. I do not like BASIX  
3. Nobody else I know went 
4. Don’t know 
5. Other (SPECIFY) 3rd  
 184
11. BASIX – CUSTOMERS 
 
A. GENERAL 
 ANSWER 
1. How many members does your group have?  
a. Agri-Allied Loan (=Dairy) No.  
b. Crop Loan No.  
c. Housing & Infrastructure No.  
d. Non-farm Micro or Small Enterprise   
e. General Purpose Loan No.  
2. For what purpose did 
your group members 
take a loan? 
f. Other (SPECIFY) No.  
3. If for Agri-Allied, how many chose to take Dairy-Ag/BDS? No.  
4. How many would have chosen not to take Dairy-Ag/BDS? No.  
5. How long have you been a member of this group?  No. of Years  
6. Did you belong to a different group before? Yes=1 No=0  
7. Did your group ever experience repayment difficulties? Yes=1 No=0  
8. How many group members had difficulties WITHIN THIS LOAN 
PERIOD? No. 
 
9. How often did this happen WITHIN THIS LOAN PERIOD? No.  
10. How was this solved? 1. member was convinced to pay 
2. other members paid for her 
3.other (SPECIFY) 
 
a. Agri-Allied Loan (=Dairy) No.  
b. Crop Loan No.  
c. Housing & Infrastructure No.  
d. Non-farm Micro or Small Enterprise No.  
e. General Purpose Loan No.  
11. For what purpose did 
those group members 
take a loan? 
f. Other (SPECIFY) No.  
 
12. Will you take another loan with this group? Yes=1 >> 14. No=0  
13. Will you try to join another group with BASIX? Yes=1 No=0  
14. Would you prefer borrowing individual liability? Yes=1 No=0  
 
B. AG/BDS – DAIRY 
 
15. Have you/your household ever bought 
Ag/BDS from BASIX? 
Yes=1 
No=0 >> Next Section  
  
 
Why did you/your household buy the service? DON'T PROMPT 1st   
2nd3rd 
 
1. was in combination with loan 
2. advice from village officials   
3. advice from friends   
4. advice from relatives   
5. other livestock owners, that I trust 
bought the services   
6. cannot afford if animal 
gets sick 
7. product was well 
explained 
8. security / risk reduction 
9. other (SPECIFY) 
3rd 
 
16. 
 
 
IF 1 AMONG THE ANSWERS: 
17. Would you have preferred not to buy the services? Yes=1 No=0  
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18. Will you buy Ag/BDS again? 
  
 1. yes in combination with loan   
2. yes without taking a loan 
3. no 
  
19. Why will you not buy the service 
again? 
1. I will not take another loan   
2. too expensive   
3. no need   
4. services not enough   
5. not satisfied with services   
6. don't understand the product   
7. better alternatives   
8. do not like the product   
9. other (SPECIFY) 
  
20. Did you receive training in how to keep/feed/… your 
animal? 
Yes=1 No=0  
21. Do you know when to best inseminate your animal? Yes=1 No=0  
22. Did you visit a health camp? Yes=1 No=0  
23. When was the last camp you visited? YEAR  
24. Will you visit the next health camp? Yes=1 No=0  
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B. LIVESTOCK INSURANCE 
 
25. Have you/your household ever bought livestock 
insurance from BASIX? 
Yes=1 
No=0 >> End 
Interview 
  
1st   Why did you/your household buy the service? DON'T PROMPT 
2nd  
1. was in combination with loan 
2. advice from village officials   
3. advice from friends   
4. advice from relatives   
5. other livestock owners that I 
trust bought it   
6. cannot afford if animal 
dies 
7. product was well 
explained 
8. security / risk reduction 
9. other (SPECIFY) 
3rd 
 
26. 
 
 
IF 1 AMONG THE ANSWERS: 
27. Would you have preferred not to buy 
the services? 
Yes=1 No=0  
28. Did you ever have a claim to settle? Yes=1 
No=0 >> END INTERVIEW  
29. Amount received for claim Rs.  
30. Reasons for the claim not being 
settled: 
  
1=irregular premium payment 
2=improper documentation 
3=missing/tampering tag 
4=insurance pre-conditions 
5=any other (SPECIFY) 
  
31. Will you buy livestock insurance 
again? 
  
1. yes in combination with a loan   
2. yes without taking a loan 
3. no 
  
32. Why will you not buy the service 
again? 
1. I will not take another loan   
2. too expensive   
3. no need   
4. services not enough   
5. not satisfied with services   
6. don't understand the product   
7. better alternatives   
8. do not like the product   
9. other (SPECIFY) 
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9.2.2. Village Questionnaire 
 
Village   Total Population   
District Total No of Households   
Block/Mandal/Taluk   SC   
BASIX Village: Distance from CSA 
Location   ST   
Distance from main road   OBC   
   Minorities   
B
as
el
in
e 
   
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s 
C
as
te
  
C
om
po
si
tio
n,
 %
 
Other Caste   
 
Total land under cultivation (Acres)   No of Grocery Shops  
Acrage under irrigation   No of Tea Hotels   
Number of Tanks   No of Tailoring Shops   
Number of Pumpsets   
No of Electric Repairs & 
Servicing   
Other Sources of Irrigation    No of Cloth Shop   
No of Wine Shops   A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 S
ec
to
r 
Main Crops  1. Groundnut  
2. Paddy  
3. Other (SPECIFY)  
M
ic
ro
-e
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
No of Agri Processing 
units 
 
  
 
No of families engaged in: No of families engaged in: 
Dairy   Handloom Weavers   
Poultry   Potters   
Fishery   Bamboo Workers   
Piggery   Other (SPECIFY)   A
gr
i-A
lli
ed
  
Se
ct
or
 
Goatery/Sheep rearing   O
th
er
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
m
ic
ro
 e
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
      
 
Comment on availability of: Comment on Presence of: 
Bus service (yes=1, no=0)   
No of Banks servicing the 
village   
Auto Service (yes=1, no=0)   No of SHGs   
Quality of Road   No of Milk-cooperatives   
Distance to nearest Police Station   No of Other Co-operatives   
Distance to nearest Primary Health 
Care Centre   
No of NGOs - offering 
dairy services   
Distance to nearly Primary School   No of other NGOs   
Distance to nearest Secondary 
School   
In
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
 
 Canals  (yes=1, no=0)    
In
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Weekly 
Bazar/market(yes=1, no=0)   
  
 
Comment on:   
Law & Order (1=good/peaceful, 2=normal, 3=problems)   
Political Environment (0= non, 1=good/peaceful, 2=normal, 3=problems)   V
ill
ag
e 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
Repayment Culture (1=very good, 2=good, 3=normal, 4=bad)   
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PRICES 
 
  Quantity Product Price 
1 1 kg Rice from market   
2 1 kg Sugar from market   
3 1 kg Wheat flower   
4 1 kg Grains   
5 1 kg Millets   
6 1 l Edible oils   
7 1 kg Green chillis   
8 1 kg Onions   
9 1 kg Tomatoes   
10  Other   
11 1 Banana   
12 1 kg Papaya   
13 1 l Milk   
14 1 kg Chicken   
15 1 kg Mutton   
16 1 kg Fish   
17 1 Egg   
18 100 g Spices and condiments   
19 1 tea   
20 1 coffee   
21 1 soft drink   
22 680 ml Beer (specific brand given)   
23 180 ml Whiskey (quarter) (specific brand given) - cheap  
     - medium  
     - costly   
24 1 pack Cigarettes (specific brand given)              - cheap   
     - medium  
     - costly  
25 1 pack Bidis (specific brand given)   
26  Transport to Anantapur town   
27 daily Wage labour - men   
28 daily Wage labour - women   
29  Education fees  
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Microfinanciering - en groot goed of een kleiner kwaad? 
India heeft gedurende de laatste decennia een sterke economische groei doorgemaakt 
die tot een gestage afname van armoede heeft geleid. Desalniettemin is het aantal 
armen nog steeds enorm: van de bijna 1 biljoen inwoners zijn er ongeveer 300 miljoen 
hoofdzakelijk bezig met van dag tot dag overleven, vinden van voedsel en lijdzaam 
toezien hoe hun kinderen sterven aan eenvoudig te voorkomen ziekten.Van deze 
mensen woont 75 % in rurale gebieden. 
De Indiase regering is zich bewust van de ernst van de stituatie en neemt 
dientengevolge maatregelen; een van de gekozen maatregelen is microfinanciering. 
De ontwikkeling van microfinanciering begon ongeveer 40 jaar geleden, in de jaren 70,  
toen experimentele programma’s in Bangladesh, India en Brazilië en enkele andere 
landen kleine leningen begonnen te verstrekken aan de armen om te investeren in 
micro-ondernemeningen. Het meest bekende van deze programma’s is zonder twijfel 
de Grameen (Dorps) Bank in Bangladesh, opgericht door Professor Muhammed Yunus, 
de Nobelrijswinnaar voor de Vrede van 2006. Yunus’ initiatief wordt vaak geroemd 
als een van de eerste microfinanciering ondernemingen waarbij kleine leningen 
beschikbaar werden gemaakt voor arme lokale dorpelingen die geen toegang hadden 
tot het traditionele formele financiële circuit. Vanaf dat moment heeft de ontwikkeling 
van microfinanciering een vlucht genomen. Hoewel het zich in de eerste plaats geheel 
concentreerde op formele kredietverstrekking, omvat het begrip tegenwoordig een 
breed scala aan financiële diensten zoals spaartegoed, verzekeringen en geldtransacties. 
Door het creeeren van kapitaal en hiermee gepaard gaande verkleining van risico’s en 
vergemakkelijking van consumptie, volgen de aanbieders van microfinanciering een  
sociale missie gericht op  armoedebestrijding en het vergroten van 
ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden en kansen van armen. 
Het concept bleek grote consequenties te hebben: Microfinanciering genereerde een 
breed enthousiasme bij zowel hulpdonoren, NGO’s, deskundigen, politici en de 
academici. Het werd en wordt nog steeds geszien als een middel om armoede te 
verminderen, zelfs als het middel dat de potentie heeft om de Millenium 
Ontwikkelingsdoelstelling om de absolute armoede met de helft te verminderen in 
2015, werkelijkheid te laten worden. 
De realiteit is echter minder rooskleurig dan vaak wordt voorgespiegeld. Hoewel de 
legitimiteit van microfinanciering buiten kijf staat, blijft de belangrijkste ruggegraat 
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van de Indiase microfinanciering, achter. Deze ruggegraat bestaat uit de extreem 
afgelegen en de extreem achter gebleven  gebieden en uit de extreem arme mensen. 
Het eerste deel van deze dissertatie houdt zich bezig met juist deze onderbelichte 
factoren van microfinanciering in India. Gelukkig worden deze factoren niet door 
iedereen over het hoofd gezien. Een boek uitgegeven door Dichter & Harper (2007) 
brengt herhaaldelijk naar voren dat microfinanciering andere initiatieven kan 
‘overschaduwen’ (p.258). Ondanks dat dergelijke opmerkingen gemaakt worden is er 
weinig kwantitatief bewijs om deze te bevestigen. Hoofdstuk  twee van deze 
dissertatie levert bewijs voor deze claim door een kwantitatieve analyse te maken van 
de bepalende factoren van de verspreiding van het SHG model. Naast andere 
bevindingen wordt aangetoond dat het SHG model voornamelijk in gebieden actief is 
waar een bankwezen al aanwezig is, dus niet in gebieden s waar de formele financiële 
sector zich vooralsnog niet heeft willen vestigen.. Daarnaast wordt de aanwijzing  
gegeven dat de focus op SHGs een soort van ‘trade-off’ is met andere sociale plannen 
waardoor verschillende onbevoorrechte groepen niet bereikt worden. 
In feite lijkt het alsof het SHG model buiten haar capaciteit groeit, een onderwerp dat 
ook wordt behandeld in het derde hoofdstuk. Dit hoofdstuk gaat dieper in op de 
consequenties van de groei en de microfinancieringshype die hieruit voortvloeit. De 
boodschap is duidelijk: er is zonder twijfel een behoefte aan meer transparantie en een 
groter bewustzijn. 
Het grotere bewustzijn dat nodig is, is een publiek bewustzijn. Een publiek bewustzijn 
van zaken gekoppeld aan financiële indicatoren. Er is veel geschreven over de hoge 
kosten van microfinancieringsleningen en vooral deskundigen van het 
microfinancierings-institutionele model pleiten voor de noodzaak van hoge 
rentepercentages om de kosten te dekken. Hoofdstuk drie geeft een relaas van wat er 
kan gebeuren als er geen bewustzijn is; als de daadwerkelijke kosten niet bekend zijn 
bij de gemeenschap en er een overtuiging bestaat dat hoge rentepercentages het 
resultaat zijn van hebzucht en winstbejag en niet een noodzaak om de kosten te 
dekken. Instituten vinden manieren om de rentepercentages te verlagen, maar wat aan 
de ene kant wordt gespaard, moet aan de andere kant weer worden gecompenseerd -zij 
het door extra kosten voor de cliënt of de bijna perfecte herstelpercentages die vaak 
niet zonder dwang gepaard gaan. De crisis in Andhra Pradesh is slechts een van de  
voorbeelden van de ernstige gevolgen. 
In tegenstelling tot wat gewoonlijk wordt aanbevolen, is de transparantie waartoe in 
deze dissertatie wordt opgeroepen gerelateerd aan de bescherming van consumenten. 
Vooral binnen de context van financiering onstaan er discussies rondom de 
asymetrische informatie omtrent wat instituten niet van cliënten weten. Het succes van 
microfinanciering is gedeeltelijk gebaseerd op oplossingen die voor dit probleem 
gevonden zijn, zoals het zogeheten ‘joint-liability model’ (een model waarin beide 
partijen een deel van de financiele risico’s dragen). Er wordt echter veel minder 
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gesproken over de asymetrieen die de andere kant opgaan -alle informatie die een 
instituut bezit en die zij haar clienten bewust of onbewust onthoudt; bovenaan deze 
lijst staan de werkelijke kosten van krediet.. 
Hoofdstuk drie beargumenteert dat het de donoren zijn die een belangrijke rol kunnen 
en zouden moeten spelen bij het streven naar meer rechten voor consumenten van 
microfinanciering, door duidelijke signalen te geven dat hulp wordt gegeven aan 
instituten die niet alleen goed presteren inzake financiële indicatoren, maar dat het 
sociale aspect op zijn minst net zo belangrijk is. Dit zou betekenen dat veel 
donoragentschappen hun focus op uitsluitend financiële indicatoren zullen moeten 
veranderen. 
Deze dissertatie gaat een stap verder en beargumenteerd dat donoren -in iedergeval op 
de lange termijn- helemaal geen rol zouden moeten spelen in microfinanciering- met 
de nadruk op financiering! 
Hoofdstuk vijf legt uit hoe in de laatste decennia een bredere aanpak van 
microfinanciering is ontwikkeld. Dit was voornamelijk een reactie op de 
constateringen dat de allerarmsten meer nodig hebben dan alleen krediet en dat 
microfinanciering - het hulpmiddel bij het uitbannen van armoede- juist dit deel van de 
populatie zou verwaarlozen als het zich niet aan hun behoeften zou aanpassen. 
Veel microfinancieringsinstituten bieden nu diensten naast leningen aan die erop 
gericht zijn de efficiëntie en de productiviteit te verhogen. Natuurlijk laten deze 
diensten de kosten stijgen -kosten die al hoog zijn gegeven het karakter van de cliënten 
en hiermee de diensten die worden verleend. Doordat microfinancieringsinstituten een 
leegte vullen; doordat ze een taak vervullen  die eigenlijk door iemand anders vervuld 
zou moeten worden, zou juist het geld van de donoren op een zinvolle manier 
geïnvesteerd moeten worden. 
De reeks van extra diensten die tegenwoordig wordt aangeboden is groot. Hoofdstuk 
vijf en zes gaan dieper in op zo’n geïntegreerde aanpak. Als voorbeeld wordt gekeken 
naar een programma dat wordt aangeboden door BASIX, een instituut voor de 
verbetering van levensomstandigheden, dat leningen verstrekt met het doel een koe of 
een buffel te kopen en hiermee, door middel van melkproductie, een extra 
inkomstenbron te genereren. Aan de lening is een gezondheids -en levensverzekering 
gekoppeld, zowel voor de cliënt als diens echtgenoot. Een extra 
veehouderijverzekering wordt aangeboden, net als een niet-financieel dienstenpakket 
dat o.a training geeft over hoe je het beste een dier kunt voeden en houden, 
regelmatige controles door een dierenarts en ook een gezondheidskamp. Bovendien 
worden er contacten met de markt opgezet in gebieden waar dit nodig is en worden er 
melkvettests geïntroduceerd om eerlijke prijzen te garanderen. 
Voordat er wordt begonnen met de evaluatie van het specifieke programma van 
BASIX,  is het vierde hoofdstuk van deze dissertatie gewijd aan het analyseren van 
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van melkveehouderij als een algemene, extra inkomstenbron. De resultaten laten zien 
dat huishoudens daadwerkelijk economisch profiteren van de verkoop van 
melkproducten: in het afgelopen jaar, op dit moment en naar verwachtingen ook in de 
toekomst, hebben en hadden zij een significant hogere algemene inkomensstroom dan 
van mensen die geen melkverkoop bij hun huishoudinkomsten hadden. Deze resultaten 
zijn bevestigd in een Lorenz curve-analyse die aantoont dat het meedoen aan 
melkveehouderij inderdaad de welvaart verbeterd. 
Op dit moment is India zelfs de grootste producent van melk ter wereld met een 
jaarlijkse productie van 88,1 miljoen liter in 2003-2004 (Ali, 2007). Dealniettemin ligt 
de productiviteit lager dan het wereldgemiddelde wat aanleiding biedt voorverdere 
beleidsinterventies, ontwikkeling en innovatie binnen deze sector. 
Een ander belangrijk resultaat dat in hoofdstuk vier naar boven komt is dat terwijl er 
een grotere variatie in inkomen wordt waargenomen bij die huishoudens die hun 
inkomen verkrijgen door de verkoop van melk, deze huishoudens minder onzekerheid 
kennen ten aanzien van  hun toekomstige inkometen. 
Deze laatste observatie is mogelijk ondanks het feit dat er alleen dwarsdoorsnede data 
beschikbaar is ter analyse. Data betreffende subjectieve verwachtingen van cliënten 
maakt een onderscheid mogelijk tussen variatie en onzekerheid, zoals is beschreven in 
hoofdstuk vier. Het werk van subjectieve verwachtingen is een relatief nieuw doch een 
groeiend gebied. Deze dissertatie heeft een toegevoegde waarde voor de bestaande 
literatuur door het verzamelen van nieuwe data in een ontwikkelingsland met een 
populatie die een bovengemiddelde onzekerheid het hoofd moet bieden en daarnaast 
doet (deze dissertatie) prognoses voor wat betreft de investerings-specifieke 
rendementen . Deze laatste prognoses betreffende de rendementen die een direkt  
verband hebben met interventies, worden uitgebreider behandeld in de evaluatiestudies 
die in hoofdstukken vijf en zes worden gepresenteerd. 
Significante positieve invloed van programma’s wordt gevonden op  het inkomen van 
huishoudens,  op bezittingen en consumptiecategorieën (voedsel,andere niet-duurzame 
goederen en duurzame goederen) van cliënten. Het positieve en significante effect op 
de consumptie geldt voor alle sub-groepen van betrokken cliënten (kijkende naar de 
extra (niet) financiële diensten). Dit resultaat bekrachtigt de uitspraak van Monique 
Cohen (2003) dat microfinanciering moet worden gezien als een “noodzakelijk doch 
niet voldoende voorwaarde voor ontwikkeling”; dat krediet voor (het inkomen van) de 
armen hen niet noodzakelijker wijze boven de armoedegrens tilt, maar dat een cruciale 
rol speelt in belangrijke zaken zoals het spreiden van consumptie, het terugdringen van 
risico’s en onzekerheid en het vermogen het hoofd te bieden aan onverwachte 
tegenspoed. 
Feitelijk dienen de Landbouw en Bedrijfsontwikkelingsdiensten als ook de 
veehouderijverzekering die BASIX aanbiedt, naast leningen, precies deze 
bovengenoemde doelen van o.a. de verhoging van productiviteit en risicovermindering. 
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En inderdaad zijn de effecten op consumptie het grootst voor die consumenten die 
ag/BDS hadden ten tijde van de enquete. 
Een onverwacht resultaat is de constatering dat deelnemers aan het programma een 
negatief effect op hun inkomen hebben van melkverkoop als activiteit die bedoeld is 
om extra inkomen te genereren. Dit resultaat is significant voor deelnemers die 
bovenop de lening tevens voor een verzekering van hun veestapel kozen. 
Een aantal verklaringen voor dit resultaat wordt besproken. Een van de verklaringen is 
dat het opzetten van contacten met andere markten soms onderdeel is van de maatregel 
en dat deelnemers meer van de geproduceerde melk consumeren dan verkopen. Een 
bijkomende verklaring zou kunnen zijn dat in de analyse informatie ontbreekt die wel 
te verzamelen is maar niet beschikbaar is. Ten eerste ontbreekt een nul-meting en ten 
tweede ontbreekt informatie op dorpsniveau. Vertekeningen die hieruit voortvloeien 
worden geminimaliseerd door de toegepaste technieken alsmede door gebruik van 
informatie op mandal-niveau. Desondanks blijft wellicht enige vertekening bestaan. 
Hoofdstuk zes geeft het bewijs dat het niet meerekenen van informatie op dorpsniveau 
(zoals de beschikbare verbanden tussen markten) resulteert in een onderschatting van 
het effect. Hoewel de selectie van de te onderzoeken dorpen volgens een grondig 
proces tot stand is gekomen en als uitgangspunt had om de verschillen tussen 
programma en niet-programma dorpen te minimaliseren, zou het effciënter zijn om 
informatie op dorpsniveau hierin mee te nemen. Om deze reden werd dorpsinformatie 
verzameld gedurende het onderzoek, maar de kwalitiet van de data werd niet als goed 
genoeg bevonden om deel uit te maken van de analyse. Van een aantal dorpen werd 
twee keer data verzameld, maar  de vergelijking toonde te grote verschillen om zeker 
van de informatie te zijn. Helaas lieten tijd- (en geld)beperkingen het opnieuw 
verwerven van de data niet toe. 
Gedurende de analyse die voor deze dissertatie werd uitgevoerd werd er naar beste 
weten aandacht gegegeven aan het minimaliseren van afwijkingen en werd er rekening 
gehouden met beperkingen bij het interpreteren van de resultaten.  Hierdoor kan met 
zekerheid worden gezegd dat de conclusies een duidelijk beeld geven van wat er 
daadwerkelijk  in het veld gebeurt. 
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